Understanding Other Minds: An Evaluation of Simulation Theory

1. Understanding Other Minds: An Evaluation of Simulation Theory Prof. Dr. Albert Newen Ruhr-Universität Bochum

2. What does simulation mean? • „Genericsimulation: Process P is a simulationofanotherprocess P‘ = df P duplicates, replicates, orresembles P‘ in somesignificantrespects (significant relative tothepurposesofthetask)“ (Goldman, 2006, 36) • Accordingto Goldman‘s analysisthemainpointofduplication, replicationorresemblenceisthefactthat in thecaseof a first-persondecisionto do m and a third-personattributionof such a decisionthe same decisionmakingmechanismisinvolved.

3. Decisionto do m g = Goal m = Means Decision-making mechanism Decision

4. Decisionattributionreachedbysimulation Belief g = Goal m = Means Decision-making mechanism Decision

5. Is theuseofthe same mechanism a simulationprocess? Ifwehaveexactlythe same mechanismthe relevant relationisidentity. Tospeakofsimulationdoesnoexplanatorywork in thiscase. • Goldman‘s strategy: Wehaveto a comparethewholeprocesses (not onlythecommoncoremechanism), thefirstpersondecisionmakingandthethirdpersondecisionattribution. • Is thethirdpersondecisionattributionadequatelycharaterizedas a caseofsimulationcomparedtothefirst-personcase?

6. Third-person attribution of a decision consists of • pretending propositional attitudes • using a (the same) decision making mechanism (as in the first-person case) • projecting the result of using that mechanism onto a third person by attributing a decision

7. Is the third person decision attribution adequately charaterized as a case of simulation? • Goldman‘s strategy: Yes, the relevant resemblence (but non-identity) isgivenbythefacttheweare not having propositional attitudes but just pretendthem. Andpretending a mental statehastobecharacterizedas „enactmentimagination“ (thiskindofimaginationinvolves a typicalphenomenalexperience): Ifpretendingwereonlyneutrallyconsideringtobe in a mental statem (imaginethatI am in m) thenitcouldbeeasilyevaluatedtobepartof a theorythat I am constructingabouttheotherperson.

8. Whatistheroleofimagination in understandingotherminds? • Goldman arguesthatenactmentimaginationis a centralelementofunderstandingotherminds in thecaseofhigh-levelmentalizingwhilelow-levelmentalizingis not presupposing it. • High-levelmentalizinginvolves explicit considerationsconcerningthe mental statesofothers. • Critic: These cases do not essentiallyinvolveenactmentimagination. • Argument 1: PhenomenologicalEveryday Observation: In a lotofcasesofhigh-levelmentalizingitis irrelevant whether I have a similar „experience“ asthepersonhavingthat mental state (e.g. when I attributesomeonethe belief thatshewantstogotocinema on thebasisof her utteranceor Email or on thebasisofseeingthe ticket lying on her desk).

9. Analysis of Goldman‘s view: He isfocussing on exampleswhere I understand people on thebasisofseeingfacesorotherlow-levelmentalizingprocesses. Whiletheory-theoryhasoverlookedlow-levelmentalizing, Goldman underestimatesthecasesofunderstandingotherminds on thebasisof „objective, emotionally neutral“ facts. • Argument 2: If also oftenhaveto understand people form radically different culturesorpeoplesufferingfromsevere mental diseases. In such caseswehavetobuild a classofbackgroundbeliefshowthispeople „function“ andweare not abletohave a similar„experience“ (examples)

10. Internal and external representations in the misidentification syndromes.(A) The normal case, seen from the point of view of A. (B) Capgras‘ syndrome; the subject believes that the target person has a familiar external appearance, but an unfamiliar mind.

11. Internal and external representations in the misidentification syndromes.(C) Fregoli‘s syndrome; the subject sees several people who have the mind of someone he knows well. (D) Cotard‘s syndrome; the subject believes that he and/or others are „dead“ or „empty“.

12. Argument 3: The important aspect of high-level mentalizing is not enactment imagination but nonmodular information processing: High-level mentalizing does not need the aspect of enactment in thinking about their mental life. Presupposing (for the sake of argument) that we have a low-level recognition of someone‘s mental state, then this information is used to construct a high-level mental state attribution on the basis of nonmodular processes.

14. What is the status of nonmodular information processing involved in high-level mentalizing? • A typical case of nonmodular information processing is involved in passing a false belief task. It involves the so-called theory-of-mind ability (ToM). The ToM ability includes background attitudes which can be made explicit in a communicative exchange.

16. DoestheToMabilityinvolvehaving a theory? • Toanswerthisquestionweshouldhave a basicunderstandingaboutwhatshouldbecalled a „theory“; • Working definition: A theoryof a classofphenomenais a systematicallyinterconnectedclassofbeliefsconcerningthisclassofphenomena. • Qualifications (ignoringthedifferencebetween belief andknowledge in thiscontext): • Having a belief (or in thecaseofjustifiedtruebeliefs = knowledge) canbeunderstood in at least threeways: • Knowing-how_1 (proceduralknowledge): - theabilityto do something • Knowing-how _2(backgroundknowledge): - havingbackgroundknowledge: knowledgethatcanbeused in concretesituationsandcanat least partlymade explicit in communicativeexchange. • Knowingthat: - fully explicit language-based propositional attitudes

17. Ifwepresupposethathaving a theorypresupposeshaving a systematicallyinterconnectedclassofbeliefs in the sense offully explicit language-based propositional attitudesthen 4 yearoldchildren do not rely on anytheorywhenthey pass thefalse-belief task. But ifwehave a lessdemandingnotionoftheorysubackgroundbeliefschthatsystematicallyinterconnectedaresufficientthenwehavetopresupposethat 4 yearoldchildrenpossess a theoryabout mental states. • Observation: The ToMabilityinvolveshavingbackgroundbeliefs, e.g. aboutthe mental dispositionsofonepersononeknowsvery well, abouttheinterconnectionsof mental statesandadequatebehaviour. • -> The debatebetweensimulationtheoryandtheory-theorymelts (at least partly) down to a questionofdefininghaving a theory. Thisaspectisofcourse not a fruitfuldiscussion.

18. The incompletnessof Goldman‘s picture • Twowaysofunderstandingotherminds: • Recognizingthe mental statessomeoneishaving. • Estimatingthedecisionsomeoneisgoingtomake on thebasisof her/his mental states. • Thesis: Simulation-Theoryisonlyoffering a theoryforphenomenon (2) whiletheory-theoryismainlyfocussing on (1). Theory-Theory also understoodasansweringquestion (2) andherethedebateislocatedby Goldman. But theresearchersdefendingtheory-theoryaremainlyrelying on oberservations in whiledealingwithphenomenon (1). • Understanding othermindsisstartingwithphenomenon (1) andheresimulationtheoryis not evenclaimingtooffer an explanation.

19. Decisionattributionreachedbysimulation ? ? Belief g = Goal m = Means Decision-making mechanism Decision

20. Howcanwerecognizethe mental statesofotherpeople? • Weneed different answers in thecasesoflow-levelandhigh-levelmentalizing. • General theoreticalideas: • Directperceptiontheory: Wecandirectlyperceive all kindsof mental statesofothers (Shaun Gallagher) • Inferencetheory: Wealwaysinferthe mental statesofothersbecausewecanonlyperceivenonmentalphysiologicalorbehavioralfeatures. • Multiple-leveltheory: Wecandirectlyrecognize/perceive (based on nonmodularinformationprocessing) basic mental statesandneed a nonmodularinformationprocessing (includingbackgroundbeliefs) torecognizecomplex mental states.

22. Howcanwerecognizethe mental statesofotherpeople? • Simulation Theory: Thereisnoanswergiven. • Theory-Theory (TT): • Ifwepresupposethathaving a theoryinvolveshaving a systematicallyinterconnectedclassofbeliefs in the sense offully explicit language-based propositional attitudesthen TT seemsempiricallywrong. But ifwehave a lessdemandingnotionoftheory such thatthatsystematicallyinterconnectedbackgroundbeliefsaresufficientthen TT offers a storytoaccountfortheToMability. • Mutiple-leveltheory (MLT): Evidenceforthisclaimcan e.g. presentedby a theoryofemotions.

23. Lit: Zinck, Newen: Classifying Emotions: A developmental account, Synthese 2007.

24. Types of Emotions

25. Back to question 2: How can we estimate the decision someone is going to make on the basis of her/his mental states? • Is theregoing on a processofsimulationor a processoftheoryformation? • Concerningthethreeaspects (pretending, using a decisionmechanismandprojecting) wediscussedthepretenseforhigh-levelmentalizing: Contraryto Goldman enactmentimaginationis not relevant forhigh-levelmentalizing. The imaginationthatisinvolved in ToMcanbecharacterizedas a theory in the sense ofhaving a classofsystematicallyinterconnectedbackgroundbeliefs (thecaseoflow-levelmentalizingneedsfurthertreatment). • Whatabouttheprojection? Is this a processthatsupportsoneoftheviews in debate? • Observation: An importantaspectofunderstandingothermindsistheabilitytowithhold (not touse) one‘sownattitudes in casetheyareessentially different fromthepersononehasto understand (showingquarantine)

26. Decisionattributionreachedbysimulation,showingquarantine

27. Projection in thecaseofhigh-levelmentalizing • The story: If I am pretendingtheattitudesofperson p I maystarttoevaluatewhat p will do. The pretendedattitudesarefedintomydecisionmakingmechanismresulting in a decisionto do m (giventheattitudes). Such a decision must thenbeprojectedtoreceivetheattribution „P decidesto do m“ andwhileprojecting I must withholdthoseattitudesofminethatareessentially different fromtheotherperson (individual properties: temperament, physicaland mental dispositions, especiallylongtermdesires etc.)

28. Projection in thecaseofhigh-levelmentalizing • The processofprojectionpresupposesthat I am abletodistinguishthoseattitudesandpropertiesthatarespecificformypersonalityfromthosethatare (1) not specificforme, but moreorlessgeneralformost human beingsand (2) thosewhicharespecificfortheotherperson. • Therefore: • > I must have a high-levelself-otherdistinctionconcerningtheattributionofattitudesandproperties in general. • > I havetodevelop a theory (at least in the sense ofhavingbackgroundbeliefs) aboutthepersonalityofmyselfandtheother. Projectionseemtoinvolve a classofsystematicallyinterconnectedattitudesaboutmyselfandaboutothers. • > In thecaseofhigh-levelmentalizing, pretendingandprojectionbotharebestcharacterizedas a casesoftheoryformation in the sense ofincludingclassesofsystematicallyinterconnectedattitudes. Sincethedecisionmakingmechanismisexactlythe same, thereisnoneedfor a talk ofsimulation. (Simulation maybeusedtocharacterizethosecasesofhigh-levelmentalizinginvolvingenactmentimagination but thoseare not thecentralcases).

29. Analyzinglowlevelmentalizing: Discussingpretenseandprojecting • So far, we have discussed high-level mentalizing: Is low-level mentalizing a case of simulation? • The most important story to tell in the case of low-level mentalizing is the mirror neuron story.

30. Mirror Neuron Theory • Mirror neuron theory: Basic action-types are realized by mirror neurons in the cortex area F5. The basic action type, e.g. grasping a glass is represented as a goal-directed action. • -> Mirror neurons can explain the causation and observation of all actions and some basic emotions like disgust.

31. The limits of the mirror neuronexplanations • So farithasbeenshownthatmirrorneuronsrepresentbasicactiontypeslikegrasping a glass. But theaction type isrepresentedindependentfromthesubjectthatisactingsincethe same neuronfireswhileactingorwhileobservingthe relevant type ofaction. Thereis a needfor an „WHO“ –system (Jeannerod) • Thereis also evidencethatmirrorneuronsplay an importantroleforthedevelopmentofsympathy but otherfactorsseem also tobeveryimportant. •  Mirrorneuronscannotaccountforperspectivityand all thebody-centeredinformations. Theyhaveat least tobesupplementedby an additional mechanism - „WHO“-system - thataccountsforthesebody-centeredinformationsand additional mechanismsseem also tobe relevant foremotionsorsocialcognition (likesympathy).

32. Thesis: Any case of understanding other minds involves two features: • the registration of a mental phenomenon • a self-other distinction realized by self-representations versus other representations

33. Is low-levelmentalizing a caseofsimulation? • In thecaseofneonate-imitationor in thecaseofotherbasic mental phenomena (goal-directedbehavior) realizedbymirrorneurons, wehave a clearofcaseofrepresentingthe mental statethatneeds an additional self-otherrepresentation. • Thisself-otherrepresentationcanberealized on very different levels (as will beshownsoon). In thecaseofbabiesthegoal-directedbehavioris „immediately“ connectedwith a self- orwith an other-representation. Ofcoursethereare relevant featuresconnectingupwiththeactivityofthemirrorneuronswhichleadto a self- respectivelyto an other-representation. But thereisnoevidencethatthisinformationprocessingcanbecharacterizedas a caseofsimulation. • -> In casesoflow-levelmentalizingtheregistrationof a mental stateis in additionconnectedwith a self- orwith an other-representation. But thereisnoevidencethattheconnectionwith an other-representationismediated via a self-representation. Pretenseandprojectionare not takingplace on low-levelmentalizingrealizedbymirrorneurons.

35. Closing the artificial debate • Defendersofsimulationtheoryareconcentrating on thefactthatthe same mechanismisinvolved in representingsomeoneelsesdecisionto do m andwork out importantaspectsofhigh-levelmentalizinglikepretenseandprojection. The claimthatsimulationand not theoryformationisinvolved in such casesrests on a notionoftheorythatistoodemanding. • Theory-Theoryrelies on an understandingofhaving a theory in a lessdemanding sense whichallowsthemtoaccountforhigh-levelmentalizing. Neverthelessthoseaccountscannot do justicetolow-levelmentalizingwerenotheory (but also nosimulation) isatwork. • -> Weneed multiple-leveltheoryofunderstandingothermindsthataccountsforthefactthatlow-levelunderstandingandhigh-levelmentalizingareessentially different. Ifweaccountforthefactthatunderstandingothermindsinvolvestwofeatures (registrationof a mental phenomenaand a self-otherdistinction) thenthisopensthesearchfordistinctkindsofunderstandingotherminds.

36. Developing a multiple leveltheoryofunderstandingotherminds • I am focussing on the development of self-other representations in human beings illustrating that we can observe different levels of self-other representations in combination with the development of new kinds of content representations. • 1. step: self-representations • 2. step: empirical evidences • 3. step: social interactions

37. Levels ofself-representationsandthedevelopmentofcontentrepresentations • Central cognitive capacities according to developmental psychology • Central forms of representation and their development

38. Classificatory, compositional, recursive, meta-representational anditerative meta-representational: distinguishing first and second order propositional attitudes Levels of Self Representation RepresentationalLevels Cognitive Capacities Psychological Competences Nonconceptual Representation Classificatory: distinguishing properties Recognize sensory states (e.g. feeling hunger), around birth Classify objects (e.g. seeing and grasping a ball), object permanence, joint attention 5 – 12 months Classificatory and compositional:distinguishing things and classify them as part of state of affairs Conceptual Representation Classificatory, compositional, and recursive: Distinguishing states of affairsand classify them as part of complex states of affairs Sentential Representation Categorize events or complex scences (e.g. birthday party), pretend play, perspectivity , shared intention 1,5 – 2 years Meta-Representation Classificatory, compositional, recursive and metarepresentational: distinguishing states of affairs and propositional attitudes Attribute first-order attitudes (e.g. “Johns thinks that p”), ToM, 2 – 4 years Attribute second-order attitudes (e.g. “Mary thinks that John thinks that p”), 7-9 years Iterative Meta-representation Newen & Vogeley, Consc & Cogn 2003

39. Forms of representation Classificatory, compositional, recursive, meta-representational anditerative meta-representational: distinguishing first and second order propositional attitudes Levels of Self Representation RepresentationalLevels CognitiveCapacities Language Competences Nonconceptual Representation Classificatory: distinguishing properties Use of predicates “F“, “G“ Classificatory and compositional:distinguishing things and classify them as part of state of affairs Conceptual Representation Use of predicates “F“, and of singular terms “a“ and their composition “Fa“ Classificatory, compositional, and recursive: Distinguishing states of affairsand classify them as part of complex states of affairs Sentential Representation Additional use of modifiers within sentences (“Charly has a big dog“)and of logical operators to construct complex sentences by recursive composition ‚Fa and Gb‘ Meta-Representation Classificatory, compositional, recursive and metarepresentational: distinguishing states of affairs and propositional attitudes Additional use of a structure distinguishing the propositional content, the attitude and the subject of an attitude „X believes that p“. Iterative Meta-representation Additional use of a structure distinguishing the propositional content, the attitude and the subject on a second order level: „Y believes that X believes that p.“ Newen & Vogeley, Consc & Cogn 2003

40. Forms of representation Classificatory, compositional, recursive, meta-representational anditerative meta-representational: distinguishing first and second order propositional attitudes Levels of Self-Representation RepresentationalLevels CognitiveCapacities Types of Self-Consciousness Nonconceptual Representation Classificatory: distinguishing properties Non-conceptual self-consciousness Phenomenal self-acquaintance Classificatory and compositional:distinguishing things and classify them as part of state of affairs Conceptual Representation Conceptual self-consciousness Classificatory, compositional, and recursive: Distinguishing states of affairsand classify them as part of complex states of affairs Sentential Representation Event-level self-consciousness Meta-Representation Classificatory, compositional, recursive and metarepresentational: distinguishing states of affairs and propositional attitudes Metarepresentationalself-consciousness IterativeMetarepresentationalself-consciousness Iterative Meta-representation Newen & Vogeley, Consc & Cogn 2003

41. Empiricalevidencesfor different kindsofself-representation • Self/other in spatial perspective: study 1 • Self/other in cognitive attitudes: study 2

42. First-person perspective in relation to objects

43. Third-person perspective in relation to objects

44. First- and third-person perspective taking „How many balls does he see?“ „How many balls do you see?“

45. First-person perspective height threshold: p < 0.0000001, corr. extent threshold: 100 voxel

47. med prefr Change of Perspective in “Theory of Mind“ First-Person-Attitudes Third-Person-Attitudes temp-par med par med par med prefr SPM99, n=8, fixed effect height threshold p = 0.05 corr. extent threshold = 17 voxels SPM99, n=8, fixed effect height threshold p = 0.05 corr. extent threshold = 17 voxels Vogeley et al., Neuroimage (2001)

48. fMRI-study on the basis of presenting different „stories“ • 1.) Unlinked or jumbled sentences • –> Testing sentence understanding and memory • 2.) Physical (non-mental) stories • –> Testing the ability to understand simple causal connections • 3.) Theory of other mind stories • –> Testing the ability to make third-person ascriptions • 4.) Stories involving theory of other mind and self-perspective • –> Testing the ability to combine first and third-person attitude ascriptions • 5.) Self-Perspective stories (Theory of Own Mind) • –> Testing the ability to make first-person attitude ascriptions

49. Change of Perspective “Theory of Mind“ (TOM) Aufgabe Theory of (other) Mind (Third-person perspective) + - Theory of Own Mind Theory of Own and Other Mind + First-personperspective Physical facts and causal relations Theory of Other Mind -

50. med prefr Change of Perspective in “Theory of Mind“ First-Person-Attitudes Third-Person-Attitudes temp-par med par med par med prefr SPM99, n=8, fixed effect height threshold p = 0.05 corr. extent threshold = 17 voxels SPM99, n=8, fixed effect height threshold p = 0.05 corr. extent threshold = 17 voxels Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen et al., Neuroimage (2001)