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Securing Content Based Routing Publish-Subscribe Systems. (SIENA) John.Giacomoni@colorado.edu 2002.01.28. What is Content Based Routing?. Messages Routed Based on Content No Fixed Address Field(s) Generally Speaking Routers Need Full Access to Message Payload. What is Publish-Subscribe?.
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Securing Content Based Routing Publish-Subscribe Systems (SIENA) John.Giacomoni@colorado.edu 2002.01.28
What is Content Based Routing? • Messages Routed Based on Content • No Fixed Address Field(s) • Generally Speaking Routers Need Full Access to Message Payload
What is Publish-Subscribe? • Event Notification System • Producers (Publishers) • Consumers (Subscribers) • Publications are Routed to Subscribers Based on Filters (Subscriptions)
Interesting Properties of Publish-Subscribe • Publishers and Subscribers can be Anonymous to Each Other • Clients Can be Linked Together to Form an Ad-Hoc Network Using only the Publish-Subscribe Interface
What is SIENA? • Scalable • Internet (Scale) • Event • Notification • Architecture
What/How Does SIENA Work? • Exports a Publish-Subscribe API • Employs Content Based Routing • Accurately Route Messages To Interested Parties • Bandwidth Consumption Reduction
Interesting Properties ofSIENA • Notifications(Messages) Routed Based on Content • Unspecified Number of Clients or Servers • Unspecified Network Topology • Unspecified Communication Protocols • Unspecified Message Delivery Windows • Heterogeneous Host & Authority Domains • Fault Permissive
Unspecified Network Topology • Single Server • Hierarchical • General Graph • Hibrid/Combination Topology
Security Goals • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability As Described In “Secrets & Lies” by Bruce Schneier p. 121
Confidentiality Goals • Data (Publications) • Content Might Contain Sensitive Information • Routing Depends on Content • Subscriptions • Subscriptions May Contain Sensitive Information • Data Flow Analysis • Anonymity
Integrity Goals • Altered Messages • Injected Messages • Dropped Messages
Availability Goals • Denial of Service Protection • Individual Server • Network Congestion • Knowing When System is Overloaded/DoS’ed
Additional Goals • Billing/Accountability • Audit
Conflicting Goals • Scale vs. Security • Performance vs Security • Anonymity vs Security • Anonymity vs Billing • Communication Network vs User Security • Data Confidentiality vs Expressiveness
Observations • Single Solution Very Unlikely • Each Environment Will Need Its Own Setup • Military Always Does Its Own Thing • Minimization of Security in the Servers Maximizes Flexibility • Heterogeneous Solutions do Not Cover Homogeneous Solutions
Homogeneous Authority Domains • Communication Security • IPSEC • SSL (requires server changes) • Bogus Notifications (Traffic Analysis) • Some Faith can be Put into Software • Simple Authentication Tokens Can be Used • Multilevel/Multilateral Security Possible • Military Applications
Heterogeneous Authority Domains • Users Cannot Trust Network • Unknown Recipients • Unknown Servers • Network Cannot Trust Users OR Network • Publications/Subscriptions Valid? • Unknown 3rd Party Server Behavior
User Land Models • Accept Subscriptions and Publications as Public Domain • Subscriptions can be Obfuscated to a Certain Degree • Encrypted Messages • Signed Messages
Problems with Encrypted Notifications • Decreased Routing Performance • 100% Content Confidentiality Results in an Unroutable Message
User Land Security Models(Client/Client) • Protects Data • Anonymity Issues • Key Management/Revocation Issues • Scaling Issues • Organization • No Additional Load on Servers
User Land Security Models(Client/PKI/Client) • Maintains Anonymity Between Publishers and Subscribers • No Additional Load on Servers • Multiple PKI’s can be in Place • Billing Can be Based on Key Management • PKI Management Issues • Initial Key Distribution Closed-PKI, “(Public Key) Infrastructure”
Server Models • Trusted Gateways • Authenticated Publications/Subscriptions • Loss of Anonymity • Foreign Networks Still a Problem • Audit • Loss of Anonymity
Main Problem • Specifying a Security Model Without a Well Defined Environment Will Result in Many Problems
Directions • SSL Aware Communication Layer • Encryption • Authentication • IPSEC Between Servers • Clients if System is Homogeneous • Trusted Gateways
Trusted Gateways • Tunnel Flagged Messages (Encrypted) to Remote Trusted Networks • Unflagged Messages Forwarded Blindly • Rate Limit Unflagged Messages • Minimize Need for Obfuscated Publications • Permits Large Public SIENA Backbones
Parting Comments On Securing SIENA • All Users are Equal in SIENA • Concept of Users and Permissions/Roles Needs to be Introduced.
Trusted Gateways TGW TGW