Panic, affiliation or social identity? Interviewing survivors of mass emergencies and disasters

1. Panic, affiliation or social identity?Interviewing survivors of mass emergencies and disasters John Drury University of Sussex, UK

2. Popular images of mass emergencies and evacuations Crowd ‘panic’: • In the face of threat: • ‘Instinct’ overwhelms socialization • Emotion outweighs reasoning • Rumours and sentiments spread uncritically • Reactions disproportionate to danger • Competitive and personally selfish behaviours predominate • Ineffective escape

4. Empirical problems for ‘panic’ Panic is actually rare (Brown, 1965; Johnson, 1988; Keating, 1982; Quarantelli, 1960). Lack of crowd panic (examples): • atomic bombing of Japan during World War II (Janis, 1951) • Kings Cross Underground fire of 1987 (Donald & Canter, 1990) • 9/11 World Trade Center disaster (Blake, Galea, Westeng, & Dixon, 2004)

5. Explaining helping in emergencies Normative approaches • Behaviour is guided by norms • People adhere to everyday social roles e.g. Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, 1977 (Johnson, 1988)

6. Explaining helping in emergencies Affiliation Affiliation (existing social ties) determine how people behave, whether they survive • in threat, we are motivated to seek the familiar rather than simply exit (hence family groups will stay together rather than exit individually); • the presence of familiar others (affiliates) has a calming effect, working against a ‘fight or flight’ reaction e.g. fire at the Summerland leisure complex in 1973 (Sime, 1983)

7. Norms and affiliation: Theoretical developments and empirical limitations  The evacuating/emergency/disaster crowd as a social (not individualised/instinctual) phenomenon Continuity with everyday psychological processes  • Risk to self as ‘normative’? • Crowds of strangers don’t panic • Helping strangers not just ‘affiliates’

8. Problems for normative and affiliation models • Theoretical • For normative approaches, a ‘norm’ of helping strangers would require an extended period of ‘milling’ (face-to-face interaction) • For affiliation, ‘sociality’ is limited to the small group; affiliation is with those one already has attachments • Meta-theoretical • ‘Disaster research’ tradition – emerged from ‘small group’ tradition: emphasis on interpersonal interaction • Need a model of mass emergent sociality

9. Shared fate in relation to threat/emergency creates sense of we-ness (Clarke, 2002)

10. A self-categorization-based account of aspects of mass emergency behaviour How does a physical crowd (or ‘aggregate’) become a psychological crowd? • ‘Shared fate’ (Campbell) as one criteria for self-categorization • Crowd conflict studies (Reicher et al.): action by an outgroup which is perceived to be indiscriminate leads crowd members to see themselves as one Hence in a disaster or mass emergency, the external threat posed to the crowd as a whole serves to make people see themselves more as one

11. A self-categorization-based account of aspects of mass emergency behaviour • A personal self and as many social selves as we have memberships of social groups or categories. • ‘Depersonalization’  seeing other ingroup members as part of self. •  caring about these others and acting in their interests, even where these others are not personally known or even liked • Indirect support: SCT principles have been applied to explain: • group cohesion/attraction within and between groups (e.g., Hogg, 1987) • crowd behaviour (Reicher, 2001) • commitment to collective action (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam, 2000 • helping within and between groups (e.g., Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005).

12. A note on methods… • The panic tradition • Anecdotal evidence • military studies • Experimental social psychology: • Mintz – rationality • Kelley et al. – threat • Issues: balancing engagement with ethics • Disaster research • sociological background • emphasis on detailed field work

13. A note on methods… • The need to combine methods • The need for interview data to be added to experimental and secondary data: • To probe and interrogate people’s accounts/experiences • To examine the role of identity

14. Overview of interview studies: Research questions 1. To examine whether or not there was mass panic: personally selfishness vs mutual aid • Rationale: ‘Panic’ has been discredited academically but still influential in applied settings 2. If so, to examine whether shared identity (versus norms and affiliation) explains any of the evidence of helping 3. If so, to examine how shared identity arose.

15. Acknowledgements • Chris Cocking (University of Sussex, UK) • Steve Reicher (University of St Andrews, UK) The research was made possible by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council Ref. no: RES-000-23-0446.

16. Interview study 1 (multiple events) • Interviews with (21) survivors of (11) disasters (and perceived/potential disasters): e.g. Hillsborough (1989), sinking ships, Bradford City fire (1985), Fatboy Slim beach party (2002)

17. Questions on: • Perceptions of of danger • feelings towards others around them • own and others’ behaviours (helpful and/or personally selfish). • Analysed qualitatively and quantitatively

18. Interview study 1 hypotheses H1: In the face of danger there is a perception of shared fate, and hence a common identity emerges H2: The common identity means that those in danger help others, including strangers H3: if there is no common identity, there will not be this level of help.

19. H1: Danger  shared fate  common identity Most who described a sense of threat (13 vs 1) also referred to a sense of unity (12 vs 7) in relation to this threat: TC: Oh yeah of course I I get on the train every day. So a train journey you would normally take is, you know, I myself get on the train at ten to seven in the mornings, sit down, open the paper and there might be one or two people talking out of a completely packed carriage. Int: Yeah. TC: So, you know, that that sort of thing and the perception… of of being involved in that, and everyone’s involved and let’s do, let’s group together’ (Train accident)

20. H2: Common identity  indiscriminate help Most who described a sense of unity (12 vs 7) also described giving help to others (12 vs 6) and, even more so, cited examples of others helping others (18 vs 3) – sometimes at a clear cost or risk to the personal self: the behaviour of many people in that crowd and simply trying to help their fellow supporters was heroic in some cases. So I don’t think in my view there was any question that there was an organic sense of… unity of crowd behaviour. It was clearly the case, you know.. it was clearly the case that people were trying to get people who were seriously injured out of that crowd, it was seriously a case of trying to get people to hospital, get them to safety .. I just wish I’d been able to.. to prevail on a few more people not to.. put themselves in danger. (Hillsborough 3)

21. H3: No common identity  less help At the Fatboy Slim beach party, while some felt in danger (from the tide and the crush) and described a sense of unity, for another interviewee there was no perceived danger, and others present were perceived as not part of a common group and indeed were seen to behave as competing individuals:

22. H3: No common identity  less help ’It wasn’t a group thing, it was a very individual lots of individuals together... I felt like I was with my .. five or six friends and that was it.. and it was like the others were the enemy [ ] It wasn’t like ‘oh I was at Fat Boy Slim, I experienced all the the bad times with my fellow clubbers,’ it wasn’t like that, it was the opposite.’ ‘the fact that people were trying to barge past me, I thought that was really selfish. No-one was letting me go first. There was no courteousness at all’ (Fatboy Slim 3)

23. Interview study 1: Conclusions • N of Ps small, but rich accounts (of n of incidents, behaviours, perceptions, feelings) • No evidence for widespread panic • Some evidence for affiliation, roles and norms • BUT evidence of common unity and its correlation with indiscriminate and self-sacrificial helping makes prima facie case for an SCT-based account of mass evacuation behaviour: • Disaster turns an aggregate into a psychological crowd

24. Interview study 2: London bombings of 7/7/05 • Three bombs on the London Underground and one on a London bus • 56 people killed (including the four bombers) over 700 injured • Those in the bombed underground trains were left in the dark, with few announcements, and with no way of knowing whether they would be rescued, whether the rail lines were live and so on. • There were fears by both those in the trains and the emergency services of further explosions. • Triages were set up close to the explosions. • Some though not all those injured ferried to various London hospitals; others made their own way to work or home • London was massively disrupted and didn’t return to near-normal till the evening.

26. London bombs: data-set 12 face-to-face interviews plus seven e-mail responses Secondary data: (i) ‘Contemporaneous’ interviews with survivors and witnesses, from 141 different articles in 10 different national daily newspapers. (ii) 114 detailed personal accounts of survivors (web, London Assembly enquiry, books or retrospective newspaper features. . = data from at least 145 people, most of whom (90) were actually caught up in the explosions

27. Was there panic? • There was talk of ‘panic’: 57 eye-witness accounts used the term ‘panic’. 20 eye-witness accounts explicitly denied that there was panic 37 accounts referred to ‘calm’ amongst those affected by the bombs 58 to an ‘orderly evacuation’.

28. How much mutual help was there? In the personal accounts: • 42 people reported helping others • 29 reported being helped by others • 50 reported witnessing others affected by the explosions helping others

29. ‘this Australian guy was handing his water to all of us to make sure we were all right I I was coughing quite heavily from smoke inhalation and so [ ] I’d got a bit of a cold anyway which aggravated it [ ] and also I mean he was really helpful but when the initial blast happened I was sat next to an elderly lady a middle aged lady … and I just said to her “are you all right?”’ • (Edgware Road)

30. Did people help despite feeling in danger themselves? • There was a widespread fear of danger or death through secondary explosions or the tunnel collapsing. Yet: • Nine of our 19 respondents gave examples of where they had helped other people despite their own fear of death. • Three others described helping behaviour by professionals they witnessed as brave or heroic because they saw it as involving a clear risk of death:

31. ‘People outside our carriage on the track were trying to save the people with very severe injuries - they were heroes. The driver of our train did his utmost to keep all passengers calm - he was a hero. If he knew what had happened he gave nothing away.’ (King’s Cross)

32. Were people with strangers or affiliates? Most of the people affected were amongst strangers: • nearly 60 people in the personal accounts reported being amongst people they didn’t know (including 48 people who were actually on the trains or bus that exploded) • only eight reported being with family or friends at the time of the explosion.

33. How much personally selfish behaviour was evident? Selfish, competitive behaviour was rare • Personal accounts: only four cases of people's behaviour that could be described as personally selfish, and six cases where the speaker suggested that another victim behaved selfishly to them or to someone else. • Seven people referred to their own behaviour as selfish BUT in most cases this was ‘survivor guilt’

34. Was there a sense of ‘unity’ (shared identity)? • Only occasional references to unity and shared fate in secondary data, e.g. ‘Blitz spirit’ • BUT no references to dis-unity either • Interview data: • Nine out of twelve were explicit that there was a strong sense of unity in the crowd • References to unity were not only typical but also spontaneous and elaborate/detailed:

35. ‘empathy’ • ‘unity’ • ‘together’ • ‘similarity’, ‘affinity’ • ‘part of a group’ • ‘you thought these people knew each other’ • ‘vague solidity’ • ‘warmness’ • ‘teamness’ • ‘everybody, didn’t matter what colour or nationality’

36. London bombs: Summary • Talk of ‘panic’ but no mass panic behaviour • Mutual aid was common, selfish behaviour was rare • Most people were with strangers not affiliates • Most people felt in danger but continued to help • Good evidence of unity in the primary data • Hence relationship between: external threat, shared identity, help.

37. Unity and helping as everyday norms? • Is the unity and helping described different from social relations normally on the trains and just before the bomb?

38. CC can you say how much unity there was on a scale of 1-10 • LB1 I’d say it was very high I’d say it was 7 or 8 out of 10 • CC ok and comparing to before the blast happened what do you think the unity was like before • LB1 I’d say very low- 3 out of 10 I mean you don’t really think about unity in a normal train journey, it just doesn’t happen you just want to get from A to B, get a seat maybe

39. CC – You mentioned that there appeared to be quite a strong sense of unity after the blast. Can you remember if there was any unity before the blast happened amongst people on the train? • LB7 – um maybe a tiny bit, you know everyone’s all in the same situation, on a really crowded uncomfortable train on their way to work. But at the same time people are kind of annoyed with each other just from being in that situation, you know. But there was probably a little bit of unity but not very much. • CC – Ok and can you remember when this strong sense of unity first emerged, when you first thought that? • LB7 – I guess probably straight away and then it probably grew a bit but as soon as it happened and people were screaming there was another guy saying ‘calm down’ and people were talking to each other straight away and obviously something huge had happened and we just kind of instantly felt quite together really

40. Some conclusions • Affiliation and everyday norms may explain some aspects of mass emergency behaviour but not all • There is some evidence that shared identity explains some of the helping behaviour (and reduces ‘selfish’ behaviour) in emergencies • The evidence that shared identity develops with the sense of shared threat is in line with the SCT account • In contrast to ‘panic’, an emergency brings people together not drives them apart

41. Theoretical implications • Previous SCT research has shown the role of shared identity in helping (Levine et al.) • This research adds that such group-based helping can also take place in highly stressful, dangerous situations • This research suggests a psychological basis for the concept of ‘resilience’ (collective self-help, resources and recovery in disasters)

42. Practical implications • If panic is wrong and crowd behaviour is social and meaningful • Design and emergency procedures: More emphasis on communicating with the crowd and less on the crowd as a physical entity (exit widths) • If there is a potential for resilience among strangers • The authorities and emergency services need to allow and cater for people’s willingness to help each other.