A EU-US-China Global Triangle ?

1. European Institute of Public Administration 23 October 2008 A EU-US-China Global Triangle ? The Search for a New World Order Willem van Kemenade E-mail:kemenade@xs4all.nlwkemenade@clingendael.nlWebsite: www.willemvk.org

2. Global Flux at the Outset of the 21st Century • 2001: Severe crisis in US-China relations over downing of US spy-plane narrowly averted. Rumsfeld vs. Powell • Transatlantic relations in turmoil during Bush first term over Middle East, missile defense, climate change etc. • US-Russia relations tense again over Putin’s reassertion of great power ambitions and his refusal to accept the status of junior partner of the ‘US-led West’. • China-Japan relations poisoned by annual visits of Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine 2001-2006 • China and EU agreed to enter into a “Strategic Partnership” in Nov. 2003 ostensibly to oppose American unilateralism and disregard for the United Nations.

3. EU-China Strategic Partnership “Diluted” • EU’s refusal to meet the Chinese demand of lifting the arms-embargo • Decisive factor hegemonic veto from Washington • US determines ‘Global Truth’; “China is potential Threat to US, ergo EU has to maintain embargo”. • Stapleton Roy 2005: “Change the reasons” • China’s “Anti-Secession Law” (Taiwan) – March 2005 • Arms-embargo debate went “in coma” • Renewed transatlantic “convergence”on China during second Bush term • Human Rights: new showdown over Sakharov Prize for dissident Hu Jia ? • Rogue states • Trade issues

4. Trilateral Strategic Dialogues • The EU and US in 2005 started regular transatlantic “strategic dialogues”on China as both also started parallel dialogues with China. Washington and Brussels agreed that the ‘Rise of China’ should be handled in a globally coordinated way. • Main themes on the agenda are global issues such as the Middle East, Iran, North-Korea, (Burma), terrorism, energy-security etc., where the three have common concerns. • France – still under Chirac – again proposed lifting the embargo in an EU meeting of Asia-policy directors in April 2006. France got support only from one of the Union’s then other 24 memberstates.

5. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement(PCA) • Ninth EU-China Summit in Helsinki, September 2006, made improvement in human rights, transparency with defence budget and accountability about relations with problem countries, Burma, Uzbekistan, Iran, Sudan and Zimbabwe a condition for lifting the arms embargo. • Agreement was also reached on the start of the negotiating process on a PCA, which will encompass the full scope of bilateral relations, including enhanced co-operation in political matters, human rights, ICC etc. • However, the PCA may not be completed unless the EU lifts the embargo. Repression in Tibet is new major human rights issue. • Five years, maybe never ?

6. EU-studies on Chinese attitudes towards the Union • In 2005, the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RelEx) undertook a wide-ranging “Visibility Study” on Chinese attitudes among selected, well-educated target-groups towards the EU. • The EU is seen as an “extremely important” strategic partner for China, especially over such issues as Taiwan independence. But the Chinese also view the EU as lacking cohesion and unity and therefore weak, which they despise. • In the fall of 2007, DG RelEx commissioned a second larger scale study, not only of Chinese attitudes towards the EU, but also of European attitudes towards China. This study will be available middle 2009.

7. Perception Gap • The US and the EU have very different perceptions of China. Besides a huge trading partner and massive creditor-lender, Americans see China as a threat to their strategic domination of East Asia. • Although the EU-China partnership is not even remotely a military pact, Americans, with their more ideological, religious, moralistic mindset cannot accept it. • Having no military alliances nor troop-presence in East Asia, Europeans see China primarily as a market and are learning slowly about the strategic and security implications of China’s rise. • This perception-gap has the potential not only to disrupt transatlantic, but also EU-China relations.

8. Soft and Hard Power in China’s “Grand Strategy” • China has vowed to rise peacefully, unlike Germany and Japan in the 20th century. • Its grand strategy is ‘calculative’, defined by relative weakness for another 20 odd years and marked by pragmatism, caution and restraint. • Many in the strategic communityin China prefer the EU model of soft power, multilateralism and primacy of international law. • Others think the EU is, as a result of its weakness, in the end always subservient to the US. • That’s why they prefer the US model of hard power, unilateralism and interventionism ….

9. How wide is Chinese support for Neo-con style Unilateralist Hard Power ? • David Shambaugh, a leading US specialist on EU-China relations notes that European sinologists have failed to tap into Chinese publications and conduct interviews with China’s “Europe Watchers” and officials responsible for European affairs. China eyes Europe in the world. Real convergence or cognitive dissonance. In ‘China Europe Relations, Perceptions, policies and prospects, 2008, p. 127. • I am currently engaged in a book project and will for about half a year concentrate on new assessments of US-China, US-EU and EU-China relations in current issues of Chinese academic and think-tank journals, and interview a number of their specialists. • My special angle will be whether an influential unilateralist hard-power constituency of nationalists exists among the Chinese military and security establishments, which challenges (liberal) moderates, more attracted to the European model of primacy of international law, multilateralism /multipolarity and diplomacy.

10. Global Flux Continues • The fall-out of the US financial crisis on US-China financial-economic relations. • End to “Chimerica” (the Siamese twin US-China industry-trade relationship) and the “Balance of Financial Terror” ? • Anticipated improvement in transatlantic relations under the new President of the US. What will happen to the China-dialogues ? • The resurgence of Russia as a neo-imperial power and Eurasian challenger of US hegemony. • The deterioration of US-Russia and EU-Russia relations as a result of the Georgia crisis and China’s refusal to support Russia. • The “strategic” stalemate in Russia-China relations • The Rise of India and the emerging special strategic “hedging” relationship between the United States and India

11. How will China respond to embargo and “containment” • Russia's arms industry is suffering a near collapse in exports to China. Top brass agonize over which technology can safely be sold to China. Beijing pushes for licenses to do the work itself. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 28, 2008). • Strategic analysts say, Russians feel concerned that their and Chinese interests may collide again, in the medium to long term. “Should we arm the Chinese when they may eventually turn against us” ? • India is now being armed by the US, Russia, Israel and France, whereas the US and EU embargo China; Russia has reduced its supply line and Israel needs US consent. • Is “cornering” China wise and sustainable ?

12. “Can Europe and China shape a New World Order ?” • A major policy paper by CER (2008) with the above ambitious title proposes to narrow down the (strategic) partnership to climate change, non-proliferation, Africa and global governance – maintaining an open global trading system. • “If Europe can use such a partnership to draw China towards multilateralism, the whole international system will tilt away from balance-of-power politics.” • In 2005, when the transatlantic collision over the arms embargo escalated, the British under Blair already wanted to strip the partnership of a Sino-European security component so as to protect close Anglo-American military (industrial) relationships.

13. Will Russia eventually return to the European Fold ? • It is interesting to note what Zbigniew Brzezinski said about the fragility of Sino-Russian relations: • “In the longer run, I happen to think that Russia really has no choice but to become gradually more associated with the Euro-Atlantic community. Because if it isn’t, then it’s going to find itself essentially facing China all by itself”. • Russia is willing to supply advanced arms to India and not to China, while the US is trying to outbid Russia and marginalize it as India’s traditional supplier of advanced arms. • Russia and the US are both engaged in competitive dumping of old aircraft carriers to India, the Gorshkov and the Kitty Hawk, free of charge but a very high re-fitting bill + new matching planes.

14. One World ~ Two Systems • Does China’s rise inevitably lead to US abdication from its position of preeminence or will a new bi-polarity of the US and China become the upper layer of a new international system, with an EU inspired second layer of multipolarity/multilateralism below it ? • Or will there be “triangulation” with a co-equal European Union, that in a post-dollar world may become the issuer of the premier global currency ? • How does the US view China’s response to former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s call to become “a responsible stakeholder” ? • And are Europeans satisfied ?

15. Should ‘Values’ or (Economic) ‘Interests’ be the Foundation of our ‘Complex’ Relationship with China ? • The EU-China Partnership is stagnating. Relations with several memberstates are troubled, foremost Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel drifted into a confrontation over Tibet and refused to go to the Olympics. She is now in Beijing for ASEM. • China wishes to be a major force in a multipolar world, but is held back by its lack of overall strength. • Given these realities, China continues to see the expanding EU as a ‘partner and counterweight to unchecked US power’. • The Sino-Russian Alliance is a limited, unbalanced one, lacking trust. No common, but selective, cooperative security (Georgia). • Robert Kagan and Azar Gat (Israel) see an Axis of Authoritarian Powers facing an Axis of Democracies in a competitive, multipolar world. • There is already a global strategic triangle. Actions of either of the three have significant impact on the other two. What form it will take: trilateral cooperation or three bilateral competitive relationships ?

16. Towards a China-Centred World ?