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Extractive activities / dams, and negotiation issues : hypothesis for discussion

Extractive activities / dams, and negotiation issues : hypothesis for discussion. Geert van Vliet 1998.

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Extractive activities / dams, and negotiation issues : hypothesis for discussion

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  1. Extractive activities / dams, and negotiation issues : hypothesis for discussion Geert van Vliet 1998

  2. At the very start of the activity, employment is generated (building phase), the social and environmental impacts are not visible, the use of updated technologies avoids environmental impacts, the first representatives of the operators are open to negotiation T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  3. Once the activities have started, there are changes regarding the representatives of the operators, and even entire substitutions of operators T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  4. Towards the end of the activity the social and environmental impacts become more visible, the technical installations turn obsolete and do not answer anymore to the standards of environmental preservation, the representatives of the operators or even new operators tend to be closed for any negotiation, labour directly hired by the operators is replaced by indirect and short term labour, respect for security and environmental measures decreases T (10,20 años) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  5. Enterprises: disposition to compensate T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  6. Enterprises: disposition to compensate Very high before the construction or the beginning of the extractive activities Very low at the end of the activitiy (due to increase of operation costs and relative decrease of profit margins) T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  7. Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  8. Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand Increases as negotiation capacities are consolidated and social and environmental impacts become visible Before or at the start of the activities : very low, diffuse, inarticulated, easily manipulated T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  9. Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand Enterprises: disposition to compensate T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  10. Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand Enterprises: disposition to compensate Unclaimed resources = margins for corruption or profit increases $, € T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  11. Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand Enterprises: disposition to compensate Growing conflicts around social and environmental impacts, and increasing social demands while the disposition to compensate has vanished T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  12. Enterprises: disposition to compensate Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand environmental and social problems left for resolution by the State privately appropriated financial gains T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  13. Enterprises: disposition to compensate Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand Insuficiently utilized negotiation space T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  14. Enterprises: disposition to compensate Local communities: capacity to negotiate and to exercise demand Costly conflicts that could have been avoided T (10,20 years) 0 Geert van Vliet, 1998

  15. 2011 : A review of these hypothesis • These hypothesis have been verified in multiple cases in LAC and Africa and have contributed to reflexion and early capacity building efforts of govts and affected communities • In order to make the hypothesis more robust need to answer the following questions

  16. 2011 : Updating the 1998 hypothesis • The hypothesis is based on the evolution of one cycle. What if there are succeeding cycles? Is there simply a move upwards of capacities on the right side (local communities, local gvts), or are these capacity increases ofsetted by similar increases in negociation capacity by firms?

  17. 2011 : Updating the 1998 hypothesis • Why is there no cross sector learning regarding the negotiation of contratcs (from international aid to mining, from mining to fisheries, from fisheries to oil?) • (ongoing reasearch in the case of Mauritania and Chad) UICN Mauritania panel

  18. 2011 : Updating the 1998 hypothesis • The hypothesis are fitted to understand the behavior of OECD firms, but what about the behavior of non-OECD (e.g. Chinese) firms? (ongoing study on CNPC in Chad)

  19. 2011 : Updating the 1998 hypothesis • The hypothesis do not explain the increase of the number of woman employed in the mining sector in the Andes Region. Need to develop more specific hypothesis concerning this gender shift (beyond safety concerns other factors are at stake)

  20. 2011 : Updating the 1998 hypothesis • Your comments and contributions welcome! geert.van_vliet@cirad.fr

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