Adversary Threat and Doctrine: Understanding 21 st Century Strategic Conflict

1. Adversary Threat and Doctrine:Understanding 21st Century Strategic Conflict Dr. Brad Roberts Director, Center for Global Security Research August 7, 2019

2. BLUF: • 20th century: nuclear = strategic • 21st century: nuclear embedded in “transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain” • While the US and its allies innovated for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China (and others) innovated to counter US power projection and US-backed regional orders • They have developed theories of victory in peacetime, crisis, and war built on regional power projection backed by coercion and brinksmanship • The result is a new kind of regional conflict with new strategic dimensions in which nuclear weapons have an important role—but not exactly the role they had in the Cold War • US military has been reluctant to recognize this and adapt

3. Theories of Victory In the spirit of Sun Tzu: To subdue an enemy without fighting (that is, to persuade him with a carefully constructed stratagem not to defend an important interest) In the spirit of Clausewitz: To bring an enemy to a “culminating point” when it makes a political decision not to bear the continued costs and risks of war and accedes to the preferences of the victor in establishing the conditions of peace (conditions aligned with the victor’s original political objectives) Or as the 2017 National Defense Strategy puts it: a “theory of success”

4. The Sources of Russian Innovation, 1990-2019 “Force is becoming an increasingly important factor in international relations amid escalating political, social and economic contradictions […] Although a large-scale war, including nuclear war, between major powers remains unlikely, they face increased risks of being drawn into regional conflicts and escalating crises.” “This expansion would bring the biggest military grouping in the world, with its colossal offensive potential, directly to the borders of Russia….If this happens, the need would arise for a fundamental reappraisal of all defense concepts on our side, a redeployment of armed forces and changes in operational plans. […] NATO today is not the NATO of the cold-war period. But this does not remove the question of the military-security interests of the Russian Federation.” Primakov, 1993 U.S. unilateralism and “almost uncontained hyper use of force […] is plunging the world into an abyss of conflicts….We have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.” “This is our fourth meeting with President Bush in the last few months. I believe this is a vivid demonstration of the dynamic nature of the Russian-American relations. […] The tragic developments of September 11 vividly demonstrated the need for a joint effort to counter this global threat.” Putin “There was a whole series of controlled ‘color’ revolutions...instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks of violence and a series of upheavals…. they have lied to us many times… infamous policy of containment… continues today…. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.” “New rules or no rules..” Calls for a more “democratic and fair world order, a post-West world order.” 2016 Foreign Policy Concept “I told NATO, the Americans, the Germans: Don't push us towards military action. Otherwise, there will be a European war for sure and possibly world war. […] They [NATO] want to bring in ground troops, they are preparing for that, they want simply to seize Yugoslavia to make it their protectorate [...] we cannot let that happen to Yugoslavia.” Yeltsin, 1999 2016: election meddling 2007: Putin’s Munich speech 2008: Putin-Medvedev swap 2012: Medvedev-Putin swap 2017: Lavrov’s Munich speech 2000 Military Doctrine 2007: Russia protests BMD; CFE suspension, INF threat 2015: Russian air war in Syria 2011: Russia backs Assad 1991: dissolution of USSR 1999: Putin becomes President 2014: Russo-Ukrainian War; Russia annexes Crimea 2008: War in Georgia START I NATO-Russia Founding Act START II 9/11 call NATO-RF Council INF suspensions “Reset” and NST 1990 2000 2010 2020 2014: Obama describes RF as a regional power, acting out of weakness 1999: Kosovo 1991: 1st Gulf War 1995: Bosnia 2005: NATO Enlargement 2002: ABM Withdrawal 2010: NATO Strategic Concept seeks “strong partnership” with Russia 2018 NPR: “Great Power competition” Debate begins on NATO’s future 1999: NATO Enlargement 2003: Iraq 2016: Candidate Trump states that NATO is “obsolete…. because it was designed many, many years ago.” Russian spokesman Peskov concurs. 2001: Afghanistan 2011: Libya 2008: NATO “offer” to Georgia and Ukraine

5. General Gerasimov’s View of Modern War Basic Phases (Stages) of Conflict Development Neutralization of military conflict Military conflict Localization of military conflict Immediate military threat Crisis response Contradictions deepen Directed military threat Different interests are transformed into contradictions and recognized by the mil-pol leadership Potential military threat Manifestation of different interests 6. Restoration of peace (post-conflict regulation) 1. Hidden origin 2. Intensification 3. Start of conflict operations 4. Crisis 5. Resolution Formation of coalitions and alliances Search for methods of conflict resolution Conduct of a complex of measures for reducing tensions in relations Political and diplomatic pressure Economic sanctions Conversion of economy to wartime footing Economic blockade Non-military means Break in diplomatic relations Change in mil-pol leadership Operations by opposition forces Formation of political opposition Ratio of non-military and military means (4:1) Conduct of information confrontation Military means of strategic deterrence Military means Strategic deployment Source: Dave Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds (2017) https://cgsr.llnl.gov/ Peacekeeping operations Conduct of military operations

6. Russia’s Theory of Victory In a War with NATO • The alliance will be divided about how to respond, and its publics will be fearful of war, and these factors can be exploited with actions illuminating potential costs and risks to reduce the likelihood of concerted NATO military action to reverse a Russian fait accompli • If this fails, and military reversal is attempted, Russia can divide the allies such that US operations are significantly delayed and constrained, through selective targeting and aggressive information operations • If this fails, it can persuade the Alliance to settle for an outcome dictated by Moscow, by threatening significant new costs for continued conflict • If this fails, it can prevent an outcome worse than the status quo ante by holding out the prospect of strategic escalation • It can utilize a broad set of military and other tools in an integrated way across the spectrum of conflict to induce NATO restraint. Its deterrence strategy uses: • “a combination of coordinated political, economic, ideological, scientific, engineering, military, and other measures to…stabilize the political and military situation by persuading a potential adversary that they have no chance of achieving their military or political goals.” • Russia’s interests in a war with NATO will asymmetrically advantage Russia (its interests being vital, whereas NATO’s would be reputational) and lend credibility to its threats to escalate

7. Russia’s Approach to Implementing this Theory • Employ an expanded “strategic weapons set”… • Through newly revised “strategic operations”… • To inflict a “prescribed dosage” of damage…to “sober, not enrage” the enemy • In order to induce enemy political choices for de-escalation on RF terms Strategic Operations: Strategic Operation for the Deflection of Aerospace Attack Strategic Aerospace Operation Strategic Operation for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets Strategic Nuclear Forces Operation Strategic Operation in a Continental Theater of Military Operations Strategic Operations in an Oceanic Theater of Military Operations Source: Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds

8. Russia’s Approach to (Integrated) Strategic Deterrence Black = nuclear Red = non-nuclear strategic strike Yellow: attacks in cyber space and outer space Green: other means Limited selective nuclear strike on US Strategic nuclear exchanges, nuclear BMD Limited selective conventional strike on US Grouped (limited) nuclear strikes in region Mass conventional precision strikes Single nuclear warning strike Grouped conventional strategic strikes Nuclear revenge Single demonstrative nuclear detonation Very limited non-nuclear strategic strikes Nuclear forces alert • Intended to have decisive effect • Crippling, irreversible effects • Potentially high lethality Nuclear mobilization and deployment Cyber Space and Outer Space “A nuclear scalpel for every problem in Europe.” Nuclear deterrence signaling • Throughout: • General purpose forces • Special operations forces • Information confrontation • Limited in effect, reversible • No or low lethality

9. Strategic Weapons—Alternative Concepts All things nuclear A weapon designed to strike an enemy at the source of his military, economic, or political power • Those weapons that can bring an enemy to a “culminating point” in war because, relative to general purpose military forces, they are exceptionally destructive, promise rapid effects, and are difficult to defend against • Such weapons can also have a significant impact in circumstances short of war by casting a long shadow of incalculable risk over political and military decisions

10. Russia’s Theory of Victory in Gray Zone Conflict Eternal peace lasts only until the next war. Russian proverb

11. The Sources of China’s Innovation, 1990-2019 “With a history of more than 5,000 years, our nation created a splendid civilization, made remarkable contributions to mankind, and became one of the world's great nations. But with the Opium War of 1840, China was plunged into the darkness of domestic turmoil and foreign aggression; […] Today, we are closer, more confident, and more capable than ever before of making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality. […] We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces.” Xi, 2017 “I don’t believe conflicts between big powers are inevitable. […] Shared interests often override their disputes. […] We are willing to construct together with the Obama Administration a new type of relationship between big powers.” “The [forces of] Yugoslavia were always in the position of having to take a beating passively and completely lacked the power to fight back, [not only] because they lacked comprehensive and supporting weapons systems, but especially because they lacked ‘assassin’s mace’ [asymmetric] weapons systems.” Zhang (Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission), 1999 “Whatever the enemy fears most, that is what we should develop.” Jiang “The international situation is currently undergoing profound and complex changes. The progress toward economic globalization and a multi-polar world is irreversible, as is the advance toward informationization of society. The current trend toward peace, development and cooperation is irresistible. But, international strategic competition and contradictions are intensifying, global challenges are becoming more prominent, and security threats are becoming increasingly integrated, complex and volatile.” “China’s armed forces will adapt themselves to new changes in the national security environment…and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the ‘two centenaries’ and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 19th Party Congress PRC becomes 2nd-largest economy Military Strategy Update Belt and Road Initiative Shanghai Cooperation Org. and PRC-RF Treaty “The Chinese government expressed its utmost indignation and severe condemnation of thebarbarian act.” New National Military Guidelines PRC joins NPT, APEC Creation of military installations in SCS PRC joins WTO PRC Issues Science of Military Strategy Xi becomes president; “Chinese Dream” Tribunal rejects PRC’s Nine-Dash claim in SCS 1996: 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis 1992: reopening of U.S.-PRC relations 2003-2007: Six-party talks Hainan spy plane incident Defense White Paper 1990 2000 2010 2020 Bosnia U.S. calls on PRC to be ‘responsible stakeholder’ ‘Pivot’ to Asia Trump inauguration INF suspension ABM withdrawal Kosovo; Belgrade embassy bombing 1st Gulf War Li Teng- Hui visit to US Iraq Libya NSS: “Great Power competition”, China as “rival”, trade war U.S.-China Relations Act NSS: “support, contain, or balance” China’s rise US reaffirms Senkaku Islands part of U.S.-Japan alliance

12. China’s Approach to Modern Conflict • Similarities to Russian Approach • A major re-thinking of military strategy and conflict dynamics beginning in 1993 • A central focus on regional conflict, primarily with the US and its allies • An “active defense strategy,” that is defensive in intent but offensive in character • A strategy aimed at negating the superior power potential of the US and its allies • Full integration of the kinetic, non-kinetic, nuclear, and non-nuclear means • An emerging role for aerospace defense • An assessment of asymmetry of stake lending credibility to escalatory threats • Differences from Russian Approach • Much less prominent role of nuclear weapons (no tactical weapons) • Strategic nuclear role: counter-attack when struck and re-attack as directed by political authorities until attack on China stops Source: China’s Military Power 2019: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (DIA)

13. China’s Theory of Victory in Gray Zone Conflict “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Sun Tzu

14. Implications for US Threat Analysis • Potential pathways to nuclear confrontation: regional wars arising from efforts by RF, PRC, DPRK to break US-backed regional orders • Their strategies in peacetime and crisis: coercion, blackmail, brinksmanship by nuclear and non-nuclear means • Implies US focus on potent signals of US resolve, on potent signals of collective resolve, on assurance of allies • Their strategies in war: to counter US/allied strengths by employing increasingly destructive means in all domains to “sober” decision-makers, punish US allies and US, achieve military objectives, secure early war termination on favorable terms • Implies US focus on theater military posture and possible escalation to homeland exchanges • As NDS Commission has observed, this problem set has emerged at the same time that US has lost its capacity to wage two conventional wars simultaneously, thereby reducing the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence

15. Which Part of Conflict Spectrum is “Strategic”? 20th Century answer: Just here Vital US interests at risk Vital interests of US allies put at risk by Red 21st Century answer: The entire spectrum Nuclear shadow cast by Red over its Gray Zone efforts to re-make regional orders

16. The Changing Place of Strategic Conflict in US Defense Strategy

17. “The US has been responding—inadequately—to operational challenges posed by our competitors. We must reverse that paradigm and present competitors with challenges of our own making.” • Among the “core unmet operational challenges”: “deterring and if necessary defeating the use of nuclear or other strategic weapons in ways that would fall short of justifying a large-scale nuclear response” • “There was little consensus among DOD leaders…on what deterrence means in practice, how escalation dynamics might play out, and what it will cost to deter effectively.” • “DoD leaders had difficulty articulating how the US military would defeat major-power adversaries should deterrence fail.” • “Put bluntly, the U.S. military could lose.”

18. What Does Success Require of the US? • Guidance aligned with the new problem • Including Joint Concepts for transregional, multidimensional, multidomain • And a clear, compelling vision to motivate and focus common preparatory actions • The promised “new playbook” on Russia (and on China and DPRK) • Linking an understanding of regional conflict to specific all-domain operational concepts • A global integrating function • With the necessary authorities to plan and execute • A tailored exercise program • To validate integration and demonstrate capability to execute strategy • An acquisition program that delivers capabilities tailored to new doctrine • A structured assessment process • For assessing the impact of new US approaches and capabilities on the balance of power and influence and on Red’s propensity to take military risk

19. Not by Nuclear Means Alone:The Needed All-Domain Response to the All-Domain Problem

20. The Roles of US Nuclear Forces in the Blue Theory of Victory • In war jeopardizing US vital interests: • To inhibit attack on those interests by threatening to impose unbearable costs and incalculable risks on aggression and escalation • To signal the political resolve of the US to defend its interests • To rapidly and decisively terminate conflict on terms acceptable to US • In a regional conflict against WMD-armed challengers: • To deter aggression and escalation against US allies by casting a shadow of unacceptable cost and risk • To assure US allies that their vital interests will be protected • To link the regional deterrent to the US strategic posture • General: • To ensure the American public that the costs and risks of international engagement and leadership are manageable • In the Gray Zone: • To counter nuclear coercion • To affirm US power and resolve • To ensure a durable balance of strategic power with Russia, China

21. BLUF: • 20th century: nuclear = strategic • 21st century: nuclear embedded in “transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain” • While the US and its allies innovated for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China (and others) innovated to counter US power projection and US-backed regional orders • They have developed theories of victory in peacetime, crisis, and war built on regional power projection backed by coercion and brinksmanship • The result is a new kind of regional conflict with new strategic dimensions in which nuclear weapons have an important role—but not exactly the role they had in the Cold War • US military has been reluctant to recognize this and adapt

22. Resources of the Center for Global Security Researchhttps:/cgsr.llnl.gov/ • Livermore Papers on Global Security • Dave Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds (2018) • John Warden, Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States (2018) • Michael Nacht et al, Strategic Competition in China-US Relations (2018) • Yukio Satoh, US Extended Deterrence and Japan’s Security (2017) • For 8 workshops per year, both rapporteur’s reports and annotated bibliographies, on topics such as: • Getting Innovation Right in the Strategy for Long-Term Competition • The New Challenges of Extended Deterrence in a Transregional Context • Multidomain Strategic Competition: Rewards and Risks • Adapting Deterrence Strategies to a Changing Security Environment • Additional links to video coverage of speakers, publications of CGSR staff, and related materials