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Extranet for Security Professionals Intrusion Scenarios. Heather T. Kowalski Tong Xu Ying Hao Hui Huang Bill Halpin Nov. 14, 2000. Preview. Review of Project Progress Accomplishments Current Status What We Have Learned Today’s Focus: Intrusion Scenarios Future Steps . Review.
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Extranet for Security ProfessionalsIntrusion Scenarios Heather T. Kowalski Tong Xu Ying Hao Hui Huang Bill Halpin Nov. 14, 2000
Preview • Review of Project Progress • Accomplishments • Current Status • What We Have Learned • Today’s Focus: Intrusion Scenarios • Future Steps
Review • Business Mission • Central Repository of Security Information • Central Location for Information Sharing • Secure Environment, Manageable Resource • System Architecture • Essential Services/Assets • Normal Usage Scenarios
Primary Users DNS RedHat 6.2 Router (FW1) Cisco 7200 128.237.144.1 Client WorkStation IPchains IDS-1 Windows NT 4.0 (SP6) Hot Fixes Firewall-2 Windows NT 4.0 (SP6) Hot Fixes IDS-2 Windows NT 4.0 (SP6) Hot Fixes RealSecure 3.2 RealSecure 3.2 Guardian Pro V5 Web Server Windows NT 4.0 (SP6), Hot Fixes NES 3.63 Cold Fusion 4.5.1 DNS RedHat 6.2 Database IPchains ActiveState Perl 5.5 Tripwire 2.2.1 Visual FoxPro
Recreational/Casual Hackers Disgruntled Employee Organized Criminal Groups Nation/State ESP User VSO & CR Owners Site Manager Organizational Manager Site Administrator Attackers vs. Legitimate Users
Objectives of Attacks • Embarrassment of the Target Organization • Embarrassment of the Target User • Financial Gain by Selling Acquired Information • Improve Hacking Skill Set • Fun/Vanity • Publicity
Attacker Profile: Recreational/Casual Hacker • Resources: none or limited • Time: depends on opportunity • Tools: free/cheap and readily available tools • Risk attitude: unaware of consequences and risks • Access: from outside network • Objective: fun, vanity, skill test, or none • Damage: limited
Attacker Profile: Disgruntled Employee • Resources: enough to create a significant attack • Time: depends on malice • Risk Attitude: strongly risk averse • Access: from inside • Objectives: • Revenge through embarrassment • Financial gain
Attackers Profile: Organized Entity • Who: organized criminals, fanatics, enemy nations/states, etc • Resources and Time: unlimited • Risk Attitude: genuine risk seeker • Access: external or internal • Objectives: Publicity!!! Real Damage!!!
Potential Attack Pattern • Attack as User • Gain the illegal access as end user • Gain the illegal access as system administrator • Attack on Component • Disable or slow down the process ability of a component • Attack on Application • Induce system crash • Induce service failure • Induce assets damage
Route DNS Firewall Web Server Database IDS Sniffing, Scans, Enumeration, Malicious Code, Flooding Malicious Code, Buffer Overflow Time, Planning, Buffer Overflow, Password Compromisable Components
More Facts • No intrusion in ESP has been reported since date of establishment • ESP has strong physical security • Multi-layer protection • Dedicated room • Only few have physical access • Other protective efforts • Regular reconfiguration of firewall (once/ per month) • Virus signature files are updated daily
Recreational Hacker Router (FW1) Firewall-2 IDS DNS1 Database Web Server DNS2 IDS
Compromised User Workstation Router (FW1) Firewall-2 IDS DNS1 Database Web Server DNS2 IDS
Router (FW1) Firewall-2 IDS DNS1 Admin Console Database Web Server DNS2 IDS
Future Plans • Regular Saturday Team Meetings • Planned Meeting with Client • Final Presentation and Report • Summary of Findings • Recommendations
Type of DOS Attacks • Bandwidth consumption • Resource starvation • Programming flaws • Router attacks • DNS attacks
Examples of DOS Attacks • Network based DOS attack • ICMP traffics (PING, Echo flood) • SYN-flood • Windows NT Programming Flaw Attacks • Tools: TearDrop, OOB (port 139), Land, Ping of Death • Cisco Router Attacking Tools • Tool: Land