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COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MPA 503 LECTURE 30

COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MPA 503 LECTURE 30. ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN PAKISTAN. OMBUDSMAN.

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COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MPA 503 LECTURE 30

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  1. COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONMPA 503LECTURE 30 ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN PAKISTAN

  2. OMBUDSMAN • THE 1973 CONSTITUTION PROVIDED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTION OF OMBUDSMAN (WAFAQI MOHTASIB) BUT THIS DID NOT ACTUALLY COME ABOUT UNTIL THE 1983 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF WAFAQI MOHTASIB PRESIDENTIAL ORDER. • THE MANDATE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS TO ENSURE BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY: SPECIFICALLY ‘TO DIAGNOSE, INVESTIGATE, REDRESS AND RECTIFY ANY INJUSTICE DONE TO A PERSON THROUGH ADMINISTRATION’. • TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE, THE OMBUDSMAN IS APPOINTED FOR A FIXED FOUR-YEAR TERM BY THE PRESIDENT, CANNOT BE REAPPOINTED AND CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE EXCEPT FOR MISCONDUCT. • IT IS TO FUNCTION AS A NON-PARTISAN, NON-POLITICAL OFFICE. SERVICES ARE TO BE PROVIDED FREE OF COST AND WITHOUT FORMALITIES; ANY CITIZEN CAN MAKE A COMPLAINT TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND WHILE THIS SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE ‘GRIEVANCE’, THE OMBUDSMAN CAN USE HIS DISCRETION TO TAKE UP OLDER COMPLAINTS.

  3. OMBUDSMAN • IN RESPONSE TO A COMPLAINT THE OMBUDSMAN CAN CALL WITNESSES, DEMAND DOCUMENTS, AND CONSTITUTE AN INSPECTION TEAM TO SEARCH ANY PREMISES. • THE OMBUDSMAN HAS THE POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT ANY PERSON WHO OBSTRUCTS HIS WORK. WHERE A COMPLAINT IS FOUND TO BE JUSTIFIED, HE CAN AWARD COSTS AND COMPENSATION/REFUNDS TO THE AGGRIEVED PERSON. • THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN IS TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE NEXT CALENDAR YEAR. • THERE ARE MANY AGENCIES, NOTABLY THE DEFENSE SERVICES AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION, WHICH DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION. • IN THESE CASES, THE OMBUDSMAN CAN USE INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE.

  4. OMBUDSMAN • THE OMBUDSMAN IS SUPPOSED TO OPERATE INDEPENDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE, BUT ITS DEPENDENCE FOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES UNDERMINES ITS AUTONOMY. E.G. RE-APPROPRIATION OF AMOUNTS EXCEEDING RS.50, 000 FROM ONE BUDGET HEAD TO ANOTHER REQUIRED THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FINANCE DIVISION. • EARLY REPORTS INDICATE A LACK OF AWARENESS ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN, HOW IT COULD HELP THEM, AND HOW THEY COULD ACCESS IT. • AS A RESULT, THERE ARE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS REGISTERED WITH THE OMBUDSMAN WHICH FALL OUTSIDE THE OFFICE’S JURISDICTION.

  5. OMBUDSMAN • THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE WAS SET UP WITHOUT RULES AND PROCEDURES IN PLACE, INCLUDING ANY FOR PERMANENT STAFF, AND THESE WERE DEVELOPED MUCH LATER/ARE STILL UNDER PREPARATION. • WEAK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S RECOMMENDATIONS HAS BEEN A MAJOR PROBLEM. IN THE CASE OF FINDINGS FROM INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS, FEDERAL AGENCIES TEND TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT – A PRACTICE WHICH PERSISTS DESPITE REPEATED DIRECTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE NOT TO DO SO. THE AGENCIES IGNORE GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS. • WHILE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN, FROM THE MOMENT IT WAS ESTABLISHED IT RECEIVED MANY COMPLAINTS RELATED TO PROVINCIAL AGENCIES.

  6. OMBUDSMAN • AS PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN’S MANDATE, AND OF THE NEW PROVINCIAL INSTITUTIONS GREW, SO THE NUMBER OF PROVINCIAL COMPLAINTS RECEIVED BY THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN DECREASED. • THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN’S INFORMAL RESOLUTION EFFORTS ALSO SHIFTED FROM PROVINCIAL AGENCIES TO OTHERS OUTSIDE THE OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION, E.G. PIA, THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY.

  7. PAC • THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (PAC) SIGNIFIES ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF PARLIAMENTARY DOMINION WHICH IS THE CULPABILITY OF PUBLIC MONEY. • THE EXAMINATION OF AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORTS FOR THE MINISTRIES, DIVISIONS, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER INDEPENDENT AND SEMI- AUTONOMOUS BODIES, IS ONE OF THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE PAC. • THE PAC IS ONE OF THE STATUTORY ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE 171 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, THE REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL (AG) RELATING TO THE ACCOUNTS OF THE FEDERATION SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO SHALL CAUSE THEM TO BE LAID BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT

  8. PAC • THE STANDING PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEES (PAC) ARE ESTABLISHED BY FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS TO EXAMINE THE ACCOUNTS OF GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR AGENCIES AND OTHER MATTERS. • EACH PAC CONSISTS OF NOT MORE THAN 12 MEMBERS ELECTED BY THE ASSEMBLY AND THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE IS AN EX-OFFICIO MEMBER. • IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RULES OF PROCEDURE ON STANDING COMMITTEE, THE PAC IS REQUIRE TO ENSURE THAT: • THE MONEYS SHOWN IN THE ACCOUNTS AS HAVING BEEN DISBURSED WERE LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR, AND APPLICABLE TO THE SERVICE OR PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE APPLIED. • THE EXPENDITURE CONFORMS TO THE AUTHORITY WHICH GOVERNS IT, AND EVERY RE-APPROPRIATION HAS BEEN MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES FRAMED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE.

  9. PAC • THE FEDERAL PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SCRUTINIZING THE ACCOUNTS SHOWING THE APPROPRIATION OF SUMS GRANTED BY THE ASSEMBLY FOR EXPENDITURE BY THE GOVERNMENT. • ONCE THE ACCOUNTS FOR A GIVEN FINANCIAL YEAR ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN (AGP) HAS FINALIZED REPORTS ON THESE, BOTH ACCOUNTS AND AGP REPORTS ARE FORWARDED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THEREAFTER LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THROUGH A MOTION IN THE NAME OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE. • ONCE THE ACCOUNTS FOR A GIVEN FINANCIAL YEAR ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN (AGP) HAS FINALIZED REPORTS ON THESE, BOTH ACCOUNTS AND AGP REPORTS ARE FORWARDED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THEREAFTER LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THROUGH A MOTION IN THE NAME OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE.

  10. PAC • IN THE EVENT OF THE ASSEMBLY BEING DISSOLVED, THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE REFERS THE ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT REPORTS TO AN AD HOC PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT. • THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE COMPRISES NOT MORE THAN NINETEEN MEMBERS, AND IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. • ITS SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS ARE TO SCRUTINIZE THE APPROPRIATION AND OTHER ACCOUNTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS STATE CORPORATIONS, AUTONOMOUS AND SEMI-AUTONOMOUS BODIES, AND THE REPORTS OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL ON THESE, AND SATISFY ITSELF THAT EXPENDITURE WAS IN ACCORDANCE TO THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH FUNDS WERE PROVIDED.

  11. PAC • IF ANY MONEY HAS BEEN SPENT ON ANY SERVICE IN EXCESS OF THE AUTHORIZED GRANT OR APPROPRIATION FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE COMMITTEE IS TO EXAMINE THE CASE AND MAKE SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS AS IT MAY DEEM FIT. • THE REPORTS REPEATEDLY SHOW THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS FOR DELAYING INITIATION AND CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. • IN MANY CASES THESE LINGERED ON FOR SEVERAL YEARS, BY WHICH TIME THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED HAD RETIRED/PASSED-AWAY/ABSCONDED, AND RECOVERY OF STOLEN PROPERTY WAS IMPOSSIBLE.

  12. PAC • DELAYS IN CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR IN THE TENDENCY TO WRITE OFF LOSSES DUE TO THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ETC., AND NOT PUSH FOR RECOVERY OF THESE. • THE PAC REPORTS SHOW A RANGE OF ‘IRREGULARITIES’ COMMITTED BY STAFF OF MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS. • SOME INVOLVE PERSONAL GAIN, BUT OTHERS ARE SIMPLY A FAILURE TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTY PROPERLY. • IN MANY CASES WHERE IRREGULARITIES ARE IDENTIFIED BY A DEPARTMENT, RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT FIXED ON PARTICULAR OFFICERS/STAFF. WITHOUT THIS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE DISCIPLINARY ACTION,

  13. PAC • THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE IS REQUIRED TO BE PRESENTED WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE ASSEMBLY REFERRED TO IT UNLESS THE ASSEMBLY EXTENDS THE PERIOD BY RESOLUTION. • THE PAC SHOULD GIVE THE FINAL DECISION ON AUDIT REPORTS. • MOST OF THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED DUE MAINLY TO THE FOLLOWING REASONS: • PACS ARE NOT CONSTITUTED OR INTERMITTENTLY CONSTITUTED AFTER LONG DELAYS. • EVEN WHEN PACS ARE CONSTITUTED, MEETINGS ARE VERY SELDOM HELD. • IN SOME CASES, A CHAIRPERSON HAS NOT BEEN APPOINTED AND THEREFORE MEETINGS ARE NOT CALLED. • IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT RESPONSIVENESS TO AUDIT REPORTS HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED AS A PRIORITY.

  14. PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (PAC) • THE PAC REPORTS HIGHLIGHT POOR BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING PRACTICES, NOTABLY EXCESS EXPENDITURE, SAVINGS, NON-SURRENDER OF SAVINGS, UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATION, AND FAILURE TO RECONCILE DEPARTMENTAL FIGURES WITH THOSE OF THE AUDIT OFFICE. • THE PAC MAY EXAMINE THE EXPENDITURES, ADMINISTRATION, DELEGATED LEGISLATION, PUBLIC PETITIONS AND POLICIES OF THE MINISTRY CONCERNED AND ITS ASSOCIATED PUBLIC BODIES AND MAY FORWARD ITS REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTRY AND THE MINISTRY SHALL SUBMITS ITS REPLY TO THE COMMITTEE

  15. Auditor General of Pakistan • THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCOUNTING FUNCTION AND AUDITING FUNCTION OF THE FEDERATION AND PROVINCES. • THIS SITUATION GIVE RISE TO A SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHICH HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CRITICAL COMMENT BY ADB AND OTHER DONORS OVER RECENT YEARS. • TO THE CREDIT OF THE GOVERNMENT, A HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO REVIEW THIS SITUATION.

  16. Auditor General of Pakistan • THE AUDITOR-GENERAL OF PAKISTAN IS MANDATED TO ‘CERTIFY THE ACCOUNTS, COMPILED AND PREPARED BY THE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS OR ANY OTHER PERSON AUTHORIZED IN THAT BEHALF, FOR EACH FINANCIAL YEAR, SHOWING UNDER THE RESPECTIVE HEADS THE ANNUAL RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS. • THE AUDITOR GENERAL IS EXPECTED TO BRING ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE AND INTERNAL CONTROL ENVIRONMENT IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE POSSIBILITY OF WASTE AND FRAUD. • HIS DEPARTMENT IS NOMINATED AS THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN.

  17. Auditor General of Pakistan • THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN IS APPOINTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRY. • HIS REPORTS ARE LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES AND ARE CONSIDERED IN THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE OF THE RESPECTIVE ASSEMBLIES. • HIS MANDATE ENABLES HIM TO STRENGTHEN THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY PROVIDING AN INDEPENDENT AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS OF GOVERNANCE BOTH AT THE FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS

  18. Auditor General of Pakistan • THE BUDGET OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL IS CLASSIFIED AS “CHARGED” EXPENDITURE. • ALL CHARGED EXPENDITURES ARE NOT VOTED UPON BY THE PARLIAMENT. • THIS ARRANGEMENT LENDS HIS INSTITUTION A DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE. • ABOUT 1500 QUALIFIED OFFICERS ASSIST THE AUDITOR GENERAL IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. • THE DEPUTY AUDITOR-GENERAL AND THE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS REPORT TO THE AUDITOR-GENERAL.

  19. Auditor General of Pakistan • THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL PAKISTAN REVENUES AND THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL OF EACH PROVINCE REPORT TO THE CONTROLLER-GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS. • THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 11000 EMPLOYEES IN THE AUDITOR-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT WITH 60% WORKING FOR ACCOUNTS AND 40% WORKING FOR AUDIT. • THERE IS A CONCERTED EFFORT BEING MADE AT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS TO AT LEAST BRING INTO QUESTION THE POWERS OF AUDITOR-GENERAL.

  20. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) • THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1999, REPLACING THE EHTESAB CELL CREATED UNDER THE EHTESAB ACT 1997 TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION CASES. • THE NAB ORDINANCE WAS PROMULGATED ON 16 NOVEMBER 1999, SOON AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF THE NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT AND THE ONSET OF MILITARY RULE. • IN BROAD TERMS THE ORDINANCE PROVIDES FOR: • INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CASES RELATED TO CORRUPTION. • RECOVERY OF OUTSTANDING LOANS FROM DEFAULTERS. • RECOVERY OF STATE MONEY AND ASSETS MISAPPROPRIATED THROUGH CORRUPTION OR REMOVED ABROAD.

  21. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) • A KEY MANDATE OF NAB IS TO RECOVER STOLEN ASSETS TRANSFERRED ABROAD AND BRING TO JUSTICE ACCUSED PEOPLE WHO HAVE FLED ABROAD • NAB’S APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT HAS CHANGED OVER TIME: FROM THE INITIAL FOCUS ON HIGH-VALUE, HIGH-PROFILE CORRUPTION CASES; TO MAKING MORE USE OF PLEA BARGAINING; TO THE CURRENT THREE-PRONGED APPROACH OF AWARENESS, PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT. • OVERALL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS NAB’S FOCUS HAS BEEN ON RECOVERY RATHER THAN ACCOUNTABILITY

  22. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) • NAB HAS HAD AN IMAGE PROBLEM SINCE IT WAS CREATED. THIS PERSISTS DESPITE THE CHANGED APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO COMMUNICATE ITS WORK AND ANTI-CORRUPTION MESSAGES. • NAB HAS ALSO BEEN HAMPERED BY OTHER FACTORS INCLUDING DIFFICULTIES IN RECOVERING ASSETS/GETTING EXTRADITIONS FROM ABROAD; PAKISTAN’S ‘UNDOCUMENTED’ ECONOMY WHICH MAKES TRACING ASSETS DIFFICULT; AND LIMITED GOVERNANCE REFORM • THE NAB ORDINANCE EXTENSIVELY DEFINES CORRUPTION AND CORRUPT PRACTICES, AND LAYS DOWN APPLICABLE PUNISHMENTS. THESE INCLUDE IMPRISONMENT, IMPOSITION OF FINES, CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY, DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE.

  23. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) • NAB OPERATIONS FALL INTO THREE MAIN FUNCTIONS: IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE; INVESTIGATION; AND PROSECUTION. • THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU HAS ISSUED FIVE ANNUAL REPORTS SINCE IT WAS SET UP. • THESE REPORTS ASSESSES HOW THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED FROM YEAR TO YEAR WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC THEMES OR ASPECTS OF NAB FUNCTIONING, E.G. STAFF CAPACITY, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

  24. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) • IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, NAB COMPRISES SEVERAL WINGS: • IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE; • INVESTIGATION MONITORING; • PROSECUTION; • RESEARCH ANALYSIS TRAINING; • BANKING; • OVERSEAS OPERATIONS; • GENERAL ADMINISTRATION; • EXPERTS; • MEDIA.

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