What Can Pricing Do In Wireless Networks?

1. What Can Pricing Do In Wireless Networks? Jianning Mai and Lihua Yuan {jnmai,lyuan}@ece.ucdavis.edu

2. Outlines • Introduction • Pricing-based Approaches for: • Spectrum Allocation • Power Control • Cooperation Incentives • Conclusion ECS 289L Project Report

3. Introduction • Pricing for communication networks • Applied to both wired and wireless networks: • Congestion control • Call Admission Control (CAC) • Quality of Service (QoS) • Wireless network specific issues? ECS 289L Project Report

4. Issues • Spectrum allocation for wireless communication • Power control for mobile hosts in CDMA data networks • Interference • Battery life • Incentives to collaborate in MANET ECS 289L Project Report

5. Outlines • Introduction • Pricing-based Approaches for: • Spectrum Allocation • Power Control • Cooperation Incentives • Conclusion ECS 289L Project Report

6. Spectrum Management • Players –regulators, operators, manufacturers, and end users • Cost –negotiations, administration of the frequency table, surveillance, compatibility, and so on • Generally the regulators set the rules and prices ECS 289L Project Report

7. Methods • Auction –operators bidding for a license • Lottery –qualified operators with little technical differences • Sharing –new technologies • User fee –pay per use ECS 289L Project Report

8. Outlines • Introduction • Pricing-based Approaches for: • Spectrum Allocation • Power Control • Cooperation Incentives • Conclusion ECS 289L Project Report

9. Pricing-base Power Control • Utility– QoS (Signal-to-Interference ratio) ECS 289L Project Report

10. NPG • Non-cooperative Power Control Game • Nash Equilibrium– a power vector p = (p1, p2, ··· , pN) such that for every j in N, uj(p) >= uj(p’) for all p’ in P. ECS 289L Project Report

11. NPGP • NPG with pricing –Pareto Improvement ECS 289L Project Report

12. Extensions • Multi-cell–interference from mobile hosts in adjacent cells taken into consideration as well • Base Station–a normalization of the received power at base station to improve the system performance ECS 289L Project Report

13. Outlines • Introduction • Pricing-based Approaches for: • Spectrum Allocation • Power Control • Cooperation Incentives • Conclusion ECS 289L Project Report

14. Incentives or Disincentives • Disincentive approach– to detect and isolate the selfish nodes to make the misbehavior unattractive • Incentive approach– to promote or reward cooperations using pricing mechanism ECS 289L Project Report

15. Bandwidth Sharing • Problem definition: • Unique solution– iterative algorithm to maximize the sum of users’ utility ECS 289L Project Report

16. Power Constraint • To relay, or not to relay? • Mobile hosts’ battery life as a constraint • Normalized Acceptance Rate (NAR) - the number of successful relay requests generated to the number of relay requests made by the node. • Tradeoff between the NAR and lifetime • Optimal NAR–a node cannot improve its NAR without decreasing some other node’s NAR ECS 289L Project Report

17. BW and Power Constrains • Credit Scheme • Relay fee is calculated from both BW and power consumption • Users’ prices and credit balances stabilize for a static ad hoc network • Mobility through the center of the network can increase an individual user’s as well as increase the overall throughput ECS 289L Project Report

18. Conclusion • Spectrum allocation for wireless communication • Power control in CDMA data networks • Incentives to collaborate in MANET • Relations between the various pricing-based approaches • http://www.ece.ucdavis.edu/~jnmai ECS 289L Project Report