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The LINEBACKER Air Offensives—1972

The LINEBACKER Air Offensives—1972. Karl J. Eschmann. OVERVIEW. Situation—1972 NVN Invasion US Reaction—LB I Intermission LB II Results. VIETNAM SITUATION. 3½ years since ROLLING THUNDER ops Vietnamization in process US troop pullout ongoing

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The LINEBACKER Air Offensives—1972

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  1. The LINEBACKER Air Offensives—1972 Karl J. Eschmann

  2. OVERVIEW • Situation—1972 • NVN Invasion • US Reaction—LB I • Intermission • LB II • Results

  3. VIETNAM SITUATION • 3½ years since ROLLING THUNDER ops • Vietnamization in process • US troop pullout ongoing • Remaining USAF units—largest forces in place

  4. ENEMY INTENTIONS • Since 1968 bomb halt—large buildups • 30 March 1972—full scale invasion of SVN • 13 divisions positioned in February • 3 major thrusts/poor weather • DMZ • Pleiku • Binh Long • SVN forces overpowered—in retreat • Air power needed to “turn the tide”

  5. US REACTION • First priority—close air support • B-52 Arc LIGHT/TACAIR Surge • Aggressive interdiction effort combined with CAS • Massive redeployments • Navy carriers • TACAIR • B-52s

  6. LINEBACKER I • Nixon plan to deny “means to wage war” • Main ports mined • Rail/road transportation system • Logistics system • No sanctuaries • 10 May Initiation • 1st mission, Doumer Bridge/Yen Vien railroad yard • 117 USAF aircraft • 1st of daily missions through 23 October

  7. NVN AIR DEFENSES • Integrated system • Ground radars (200) • 204 MIGs • 2000+ SA-2 SAMs • 4000+ AAA Guns, 23-100mm • RP 6 Strikes required heavy support effort • 4:1 ratio typical • SAMs—CHAFF, ECM, Wild Weasels • MIGs—MIGCAP, escorts

  8. LB I RESULTS • First two weeks NVN rail system shut down • Enemy forced to move bulk by truck • POL shortfalls • 70% of power grid destroyed • Less than 20% of required supplies reaching NVN frontline units • New NVN willingness to negotiate • Nixon re-election imminent • 23 October—LB I ends • Sustained combat in SVN/RP 1

  9. INTERMISSION • Peace talks drag on for two months • NVN forces reconstitute • Railroads repaired • SAMs replaced • Supplies resume buildups • Northeast monsoon season • Congress threatening funds withdrawal • NVN stalls on talk agreements • 13 December—NVN negotiators walk out

  10. LINEBACKER II • Nixon feels need to “re-motivate” NVN government • Congress on Christmas recess • 15 December—Nixon initiates JCS plan for “max effort” • 24 hour coverage • B-52, F-111, A-6 Radar bombing at night • TACAIR during day • Order of Battle

  11. LB II GAMEPLAN • SAC Plan—3 waves nightly • 30-50 B-52s each wave • Spaced 4 hours apart • Ingress from northwest • Supported by 39 TACAIR aircraft • Perform turn to west after bomb release • 100 MPH winds from northwest • B-52s relied primarily on cell ECM coverage • No radio calls • No IFF • TACAIR support rendezvous—T0T times only

  12. PROBLEMS • Threats overwhelmed TACAIR support • High winds blew away narrow CHAFF corridors • Post target turns degraded cell ECM patterns and exposed individual B-52s • Escort difficulties in join-ups with B-52s • New enemy SAM threat radar band used • Over 620 SAMs fired • 3 B-52s lost Day 1 • 6 B-52 lost Day 3 • New plan needed—end of Stage 1

  13. STAGE 2 • Days 4-7—Interim effort • 30 B-52s—Single wave (UTAPAO) • Periphery targets only • 60 support aircraft • More Hunter-Killer teams for escort • New CHAFF delivery techniques-box areas • New ARM missile deliveries with wider bands • Marine EA-6B coverage for increased jamming • TACAIR kept up pressure in Hanoi areas • Two B-52s down • Christmas Break—36 hours—24/25 December

  14. STAGE 3 • Single B-52 wave from multiple directions • 60-120 B-52s over target areas within 15 minutes • Over 100 support aircraft • Total warfare SAM site/support facilities • Four B-52s down—all major targets taken out • Day 10—NVN Air defense network broken and US aircraft roamed at will

  15. RESULTS • NVN decided wisely to return to peace table • 59 targets struck by 1364 USAF strike sorties (724 B-52) • 42,000 bombs dropped (15,287 tons) • 2066 TACAIR support missions • BDA • Complete destruction of rail system • All warehouse complexes seriously damaged • SAM system virtually nullified • NVN will to resist impacted • Cease-fire agreement signed 23 Jan 1973 • US POWs returned within 60 days • Significance of effort showed what air power could do when used in a wise and integrated fashion against an efficient and integrated threat system

  16. Lessons Learned • Do not use the same ingress and egress routes at same altitudes in target areas every time • The enemy will use the stereotyped tactics to their advantage for their air defense networks • Never perform PTTs over the enemy’s most well defended positions • Vary your routes differently on each mission • Do better coordination between strike cells and support aircraft other than a presumed TOT • Assure that your support elements are sufficient to suppress the enemy defense networks • Do not spend eight years of piecemeal attacks against the enemy allowing a war of attrition • Over 3734 fixed wing aircraft and over 8000 rotary wing lost • Go big at the beginning with overwhelming shock and awe

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