Europe’s Past, Asia’s Future? 1914-2014

Europe’s Past, Asia’s Future?1914-2014 Dr Thomas French Ph.D (Southampton), MA (Durham),BA. Hons (London), PG Cert (Research), Dip. (Japanese), Cert. (TESOL), Cert. (Jpn Law), FRAS, FHEA http://ritsumei.academia.edu/ThomasFrench French@fc.ritsumei.ac.jp

Introduction • Background / Research • 1914 vs. 2014 -Flavour of the Month? • Analysis – similarities, differences and the role of globalisation • Problems: Alternative models / difficulties with analogies • Conclusion: Recommendations / Conclusions

Background Other Qualifications: PGCTLHE / FHEA membership – UK university teaching licence Certificate in Japanese law Part qualified accountant Trinity TESOL certificate

Professional Affiliations • EC Expert Candidature Number: EX2014D203374

Current and Future Research • Japanese Self Defense Forces • T French, National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan’s Self Defense Forces, Global Oriental / Brill, 2014. • 1st book length study of the NPR in any language • Japanese Arms Industry / Exports • Japan’s Foreign Relations • Security of Northeast Asia

1914 vs. 2014 Flavour of the Month? • Rising tensions and anniversary of start of WW1 • Useful / attractive analogy • Politicians / Policy Makers • Kevin Rudd • Henry Kissinger • Yoon Young – Kwan • Shinzo Abe

1914 vs. 2014 Flavour of the Month? • Journalism • Financial Times • The Economist • New York Times • Japan Times • Times of India • Foreign Policy (X2) • CBC • Washington Post • ISN / ETH Security Watch • National Interest (X2) • The Diplomat (X2) • East Asia Forum • Numerous other blogs etc

1914 vs. 2014 Flavour of the Month? • Writers / Academics • Amitav Acharya • Robert Dujarric • Robert D Kaplan • Joseph Nye • Hugh White • Margaret MacMillan

Selected Quotes • Kevin Rudd • “‘a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago — a tinderbox on water” • Joseph Nye • “We discussed the 1914 analogy . . . I don’t think any of the parties wants war, but we warned both sides about miscommunications and accidents. Deterrence usually works among rational actors, but the major players in 1914 were also rational actors” • Graham Allison • “The mechanism in 1914 is instructive. Who could imagine that Serbian terrorists could kill an archduke no one had heard of and trigger a great war, at the end of which all contestants were devastated? My view is that the Chinese leadership has no intention of challenging the US militarily, yet. But what about the hothead nationalists in China or Japan?”

Margaret MacMillan: • “We are witnessing, as much as the world of 1914, shifts in the international power structure, with emerging powers challenging the established ones. Just as national rivalries led to mutual suspicions between Britain and the newly ascendant Germany before 1914, the same is happening between the U.S. and China now, and also between China and Japan” • The Economist • “Disputes about clumps of rock could become as significant as the assassination of an archduke"

Friedberg’s – ‘Ripe For Rivalry’ • Not a new phenomenon - Aaron Friedberg • ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia’, International Security, Winter 1993 / 1994 • Harvard / Princeton scholar Served from 2003 to 2005 - deputy assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy planning • Claims similarities to late C19 / early C20 Europe: • Unstable Multipolar system • Rival Alliances • Minor crisis triggers conflict • Territorial disputes • Naval arms race • Advocates continued U.S. engagement in East Asia as a stabilizing force until regional institutions develop

Literature Analysis I: Similarities • Unstable multipolar system • Rising continental power arguably challenging the status quo • Declining naval Hegemon • Rival alliances [not balanced like 1914 -China vs. US-J-ROK-Aus] • Risk of ‘entrapment’ • Minor crisis triggers conflict (Taiwan, DPRK, accident) • Territorial disputes

Literature Analysis I: Similarities II • Seething state and non state nationalism – ‘war fever’ • ‘Middle class conflict’ – Eksteins • Literate demanding middle class – energies shifted away from reform into nationalism • Naval arms race • ‘Hothead’ parts of military pushing confrontation • Complacency – ‘sleepwalking’ into conflict (Christopher Clark) • Difficulty of compromise • Risks of miscalculation – over rivals not wanting to go to war over a point of principle as the cost is too high

Literature Analysis II: Differences • Most argue the risk of conflict is lowered due to these, some argue that it is higher • Differing international system • Age of imperialism [current ‘scramble’ for markets and materials in S America / Africa] • Acharya – muliplex not multipolar (multipolar and interconnected forms of restraint and interdependence) • Makes it harder to change system / for one power to become or challenge the hegemon • No LN / UN– [null due to P5 members on both sides?] • [Asian regionalism is under developed / dead end] • War less of a systemic certainty • Less of an air of inevitability • Higher risks • Economic • Nuclear weapons

Literature Analysis III: Differences • China doesn’t see military victory necessary for great power status • [internal prestige would be greatly enhanced through defeating old enemy – Japan – distraction conflict] • Balance of power • Less parity – PRC defence budgets still only 25% of US (+Japan, Philippines, ROK etc.) • ‘Peaceful rise’ of PRC = laying low until preventative conflict becomes unfeasible • Germany world leading tech, 3rd biggest economy – different to current PRC • Land based continental conflict vs. maritime Asian conflict • Reduces tensions / impedes aggression – difficulty in projecting power • Far stronger belief in in 1914 of the utility of offensive military operations (offensive Realist) as the best form of defence • PLA potentially weak vs. strong German army

Literature Analysis IV: Differences • Modern technology / communications – make war preventable even down to the last minute – unlike WW1 mobilisation / deployment timetables • China’s domestic situation is far less stable than Germany [Austria Hungary? – still differences in population] • Legitimacy based on economic growth – less likely to risk this [also based on nationalism] • Influence of history – reluctance to fight [lingering dislike arguably counters this • Time pressures • Germany seeking to fight quickly before Russian military modernisation complete / being overwhelmed by neighbours • Economically time seems to be on PRC’s side? • Demographically? – China aging vs. dynamic Germany

Analysis V: The Role of Globalization • US debt vs. US market access • US treasury bonds ($1.3 trillion in Nov 2013, 1/3 of PRC foreign exchange reserves • Heavily social / business integration • Trade, investment, currency holdings, supply chain, raw materials, students, business people • Could be more similar than different – Norman Angell - The Great Illusion, 1914 • [Pre WW1 -very close ties UK and Germany are each others largest trading partners] • [Family ties] • [Differing perspectives] – Ger – economic ties strong enough to get UK to accept naval ambitions. UK – in context of economic rise naval growth is unacceptable – Clear PRC / US parallels

Analysis VI: The Role of Globalization • Integration vs. vulnerability • Rising power seeks raw materials and navy • Increases concern of hegemon / threatens economic security • [now see Japanese investment in PRC decreasing – SEA / Africa - Reshoring]

An Alternative European Model? • WW1 is not the only model from European history currently being applied to Asia • Hugh White - ANU • ‘Concert of Europe’ / Vienna system • Peace - 1815-1854- GPs work together • An agreement – redlines and rules – in China and the US’s case these would be • Don’t use force without the other’s permission • China won’t use force against Taiwan • US agrees to unification of Taiwan / PRC • China agrees to US presence in Asia • US acknowledges and legitimises current PRC regime – no more complaints over human rights etc • [Unlikely, unrealistic, either side is even now unlikely to compromise] • [C19 broke down due to rising powers, and aimed at containing France- unifying aim] • [Australian influence – increasingly economically connected to China but an ally of the US]

The Problems of Historical Analogies I • Much of our view of IR is refracted through the ‘prism’ of such analogies • Munich = Appeasement • Suez = Collapse of Imperial prestige • Vietnam = Quagmire insurgency • The imperative to ‘Learn from history’ • Edmund Burke / George Santayana: 'Those who don't know history are doomed to repeat it’ • Yuen Foong Khong - Analogies at War - leaders use to analogies to understand / process the world • Events alike in one respect may be alike in others • A multipolar system pre 1914 resulted in war • A multipolar system in Asia post 2014 will result in war

The Problems of Historical Analogies II • Useful for: • Generating ideas and predictions – ‘anticipatory governance’ • Press and publicity – attractive / interesting • Framing debate / pushing policy • Political framing – argue / push a certain case • Friedberg – Neocon – UK decline vs. US and China today • Abe arguably wanted to frame the PRC as dangerous • Distortion of the past is already prevalent in NE Asia • Analogies between contemporary Japan and pre 1945 Japan • Risky to rely on – could result in miscalculation • Kim Stanley Robinson – ‘the last refuge of people who can’t grasp the current situation’ • Reductive • Hugely differing contexts • Applying a nineteenth century European model to twenty first century Asia • System / theory over real life conditions • Weakness of academic IR - cherry-pick historical situations to fit theory

Recommendations from the Literature • Avoid using nationalism as a diplomatic tool • Promote mutual understanding / shared narrative [very difficult– all use nationalism for domestic political gain / justification – can’t / won’t agree common history] • Redefine / clarify alliances to prevent entrapment / exploitation [Japan now strengthening commitment US Alliance to prevent ‘abandonment’] • Institutionalise economic interdependence • Clear definition of base interests [some of these clearly overlap]

Recommendations from the Literature II • Joint planning for future potential flashpoints – i.e. collapse of DPRK • Arms control agreements [acceptable for a rising power?] • Maritime code of conduct [acceptable for PRC?] • Agreement not to use force • Agreements on what to do if accidents occur • Joint management of resources [has already arguably failed] • US leadership- play hegemon – get parties talking and ensure freedom of the seas etc. • Economist “unless America behaves as a leader and the guarantor of the world order, it will be inviting regional powers to test their strength by bullying neighboring countries”

Conclusion • Historical analogies can be instructive / help generate ideas • They also can be twisted / misinterpreted both on purpose and due to a lack of understanding of either the past or present contexts • We can see from this case that the differences between two situations linked in this way often heavily outweigh the similarities

Conclusion II • Good historians acknowledge the complexities of their subject and don’t generally seek to ‘project forward’ or ‘project outside’ • Weakness of IR in its ‘scientific’ aspirations, reductive nature and Western centred theoretical tradition that such models are applied too readily to situations which bear only a one dimensional resemblance to their original context • Risk of conflict? Present but for now limited due to no side wanting war, however the risk of an accident / miscalculation remains

Thank you for listeningQ & A Dr Thomas French Ritsumeikan UniversityFrench@fc.ritsumei.ac.jp

Europe’s Past, Asia’s Future? 1914-2014