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Elliptic Curve Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol (ECAKA)

Elliptic Curve Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol (ECAKA). Introducer: Jung-wen Lo ( 駱榮問 ) Date: 2008/07/25. Outline. Introduction Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol Paper 1:

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Elliptic Curve Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol (ECAKA)

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  1. Elliptic Curve Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol (ECAKA) Introducer: Jung-wen Lo (駱榮問) Date: 2008/07/25

  2. Outline • Introduction • Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol • Paper 1: • An improved authenticated key agreement protocol with perfect forward secrecy for wireless mobile communication Authors: Ai-fen Sui, L.C.K. Hui, S.M. Yiu, K.P. Chow, W.W. Tsang, C.F. Chong, K.H. Pun & H.W. Chan Source: 2005 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, Vol. 4, pp. 2088 – 2093, 13-17 March 2005 • A-Key distribution in 3GPP2 • A-Key distribution using ECAKA • Paper 2: • An enhanced authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless mobile communication Authors: Rongxing Lu, Zhenfu Cao and Haojin Zhu Source: Computer Standards & Interfaces, Vol. 29, Issu. 6, pp. 647-652, Sep. 2007 • Off-line password attack 1 • Off-line password attack 2(Active) • Enhanced ECAKA Protocol • Conclusions & Comment • Improved ECAKA Protocol

  3. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol Alice Bob Random dA QA=dAP Random dB QB=dBP QA QB K=dAQB K= dBQA K= dAdBG=dBdAG ※P: Base point (Generator)

  4. An improved authenticated key agreement protocol with perfect forward secrecy for wireless mobile communication Authors: Ai-fen Sui, L.C.K. Hui, S.M. Yiu, K.P. Chow, W.W. Tsang, C.F. Chong, K.H. Pun and H.W. Chan Source: 2005 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, Vol. 4, pp. 2088 – 2093, 13-17 March 2005

  5. Notation Alice (A), Bob (B): two communication users E: an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fq with large group order n: a secure large prime P: a point in E with large order n D: a uniformly distributed dictionary of size |D| S: a low-entropy password shared between Alice and Bob, which is randomly chosen from D t: the value t is derived from the password S in a predetermined way, which is uniformly distributed in ℤn* H: a secure one-way hash function

  6. Sui et al.’s ECAKA Protocol Alice Bob dA [1,n-1] QA=(dA+t) P QA dB [1,n-1]QB=(dB-t)P Y=QA-tP=dAP QB,tY X=QB+tP=dBP KA=dAX=dAdBP tX KB=dBY=dAdBP

  7. Notation for 3GPP2 • MS: Mobile Subscriber • MSC: Mobile Switching center • OTAF: Over-the-Air Service Provisioning Function • HLR: Home Location Register • AC: Authentication Center • ACTCODE: ActionCode • AKEYPV: A Key Protocol Version parameter, indicates MS’s A-key generation capabilities • SRVIND: ServiceIndicator parameter • OTASPREQ: OTASPRequest • SMDPP; SMSDeliveryPointToPoint • SMS BearerData: Containing an OTASP data message • ACK: Acknowledging a message;ACTCODE: ActionCode • MODVAL: ModulusValue parameter (n) • PRIMVAL: PrimitiveValue parameter (g) • BSKEY: encryption key value from the network side. BSKEY= gxmod n , where x is randomly selected by AC • MSKEY: encryption key value from MS. MSKEY=gymod n . y is randomly selected by MS

  8. A-Key Distribution in 3GPP2

  9. A-Key Distribution using ECAKA

  10. An enhanced authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless mobile communication Authors: Rongxing Lu, Zhenfu Cao and Haojin Zhu Source: Computer Standards & Interfaces, Vol. 29, Issu. 6, pp. 647-652, Sep. 2007

  11. Off-line Password Attack 1 Alice Bob dA [1,n-1] QA=(dA+t) P QA dB [1,n-1]QB=(dB-t)P Y=QA-tP=dAP QB,tY Attacker: Off-linePasswordAttack-1(QA, tdAP, D) for i :=0 to |D| S’← D; t’← S’ [predetermined way] if t’(QA-t’P)=tdAP then return S’

  12. Off-line Password Attack 2(Active) Bob Alice Attacker dA [1,n-1] QA=dAP QA dB [1,n-1]QB=(dB-t)P Y=dAP-tP QB,tY=t(dAP-tP) Off-linePasswordAttack-2(QA, tdAP, D) choose dA[1,n-1], send dAP to B receive the value t(dAP- tP) for i :=0 to |D| S’← D; t’← S’ [predetermined way] if t’(dAP-t’P)=t(dAP-tP) then return S’

  13. Enhanced ECAKA Protocol Alice (A) Bob (B) dB1,dB2 [1,n-1]Y=QA1-tP=dAPQB1=dB1P+dB2YQB2=dB1Y+dB2QA2 dA [1,n-1] QA1=(dA+t) P QA2=dA2‧P QA1,QA2 HB=H(A||B||QA1||QB1||QB2),QB1 X=dAQB1H(A||B||QA1||QB1||X)?=HBKA=X HA= H(A||B||QB1||QA1||X) H(B||A||QB1||QA1||QB2)?=HAKB=QB2 ※ KA=KB=X=dB1dAP+dB2dA2P

  14. A-Key Distribution Using Enhanced ECAKA Protocol

  15. Conclusions & Comment • Conclusions • Authenticated key agreement • Off-line password attack prevention • Perfect forward secrecy • Comment • Reduce the computation load

  16. Improved ECAKA Protocol Alice Bob (S2) (S2) dA [1,n-1] QA=(dA+t) P QA dB [1,n-1]QB=(dB-t)P Y=QA-tP=dAP QB,H(Y||S2) X=QB+tP=dBP KA=dAX=dAdBP H(X||Y) KB=dBY=dAdBP

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