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Network Security. Ryan Greer CCNP, CCDP, MCSE Pat Bittner Keller Schroeder & Associates, Inc. Evansville, Indiana. Evaluating Network Security Threats. Module 1. Primary Reasons for Security Issues. Technology Weakness Configuration Weakness Policy Weakness. Technology Weaknesses.
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Network Security Ryan Greer CCNP, CCDP, MCSE Pat Bittner Keller Schroeder & Associates, Inc. Evansville, Indiana
Evaluating Network Security Threats Module 1
Primary Reasons for Security Issues • Technology Weakness • Configuration Weakness • Policy Weakness
Technology Weaknesses • TCP/IP • Operating System • Network Equipment Weaknesses
Configuration Weakness • Insecure default Settings • Misconfigured network equipment • Insecure user accounts • System accounts with easy to guess password • Misconfigured Internet services • Java & JavaScript
Policy Weakness • Lack of security policy • Internal Politics (political battles, turf wars) • Lack of business continuity (high turnover) • Poorly enforced • Inadequate monitoring • Lack of awareness of being attacked • Installations that do not follow policy • Security incident and DRP not in place
Types of Threats • Internal Threats • External Threats
Internal Threats • Current employees with less-than-honorable intentions • Current complyees pursing unintentional activities • Employees who mismanaged environment • Use insecure passwords • Misconfigure equipment out of ignorance
Spies Hostile ex-employees Others Intrusion for sport Intrusion to learn External Threats • Thrill Seakers • Competitors • Enemies • Thieves
Security Threat Types • Reconnaissance • Unauthorized Access • Denial of Service • Data Manipulation
Reconnaissance • Target Discovery • Eavesdropping • Information Theft
Unauthorized Access • Gaining Initial Access • Password-Based Attacks • Gaining Trusted or Priviledged Access • Misuse of Systems after gaining access • Counteracting Remote-Access Attacks
Denial of Service • Resource Overload • Out-of-Band Data DoS Attacks • Others • Counteracting
Data Manipulation • IP Spoofing • Session Replay and Hijacking • Rerouting
Securing the Network Infrastructure Module 2
Securing Physical Devices • Establish Configuration and Control Policy • Properly lock, power, wire and cool equipment • Control direct access to all network equipment • Secure access to network links • Plan for Disaster Recovery
Securing Administrative Interface • Setting Console Access • Using Password Encryption • Fine-Tuning Line Parameters • Setting Multiple Privileged Levels • Setting Device Banner Messages • Controlling Telnet Access • Controlling SNMP Access
Setting Console Passwords • Tips • Immediately configure • Make privileged and user passwords different • Use mixed characters • Do not write down
Setting Console Access User Mode Passwords router(config)#line console 0 router(config-line)#login router(config-line)#password ruHamlet User Access Verification Password: ruHamlet router>
Setting Console Passwords Privileged Mode Passwords router(config)#enable secret 2br!2b@? router> enable Password: 2br!2b@? router#
Using Password Encryption Using Service Password Encryption router(config)#service password-encryption line con 0 password 7 094F471A1A0A line vty 0 4 password 7 05080F1C2243
Fine-Tuning Line Parameters Unattended Timeout router(config)#line console 0 router(config-line)#exec-timeout 2 30
Setting Multiple Privilege Levels Setting Privilege Levels for Commands router(config)#privilege exec level 2 show startup-config router(config)#privilege exec level 2 show debug ip rip router(config)#privilege exec level 2 show ping router(config)#enable secret level 2 2kdo40d Logging into Privilege Level router> enable 2
Setting Device Banner Messages • Banner Messages • Do not use “Welcome” • Banner command router(config)#banner exec $ Session activated. Enter commands at the prompt $
Controlling Telnet Access • Considerations • telnet ports called virtual terminal (vty) ports • Enable password must be configured to enable via Telnet • Should restrict telnet access by using ACL • Configure all vty ports (as many as 15) • Limit, block, disable aux ports with “no exec”
Telnet Examples VTY Configuration router(config)#line vty 0 4 router(config-line)#login router(config-line)#password shakespeare Restricting Access router(config)#access-list 21 permit 10.1.1.4 router(config)#line vty 0 4 router(config-line)#access-class 21 in
Controlling SNMP Access • SNMP Overview • Configuring SNMP Agent • Controlling SNMP access with community strings • Configuring Traps and Informs
SNMP System • Components • Managed device (router or switch) • SNMP agents and MIBs running on managed device • SNMP management application (CiscoWorks 2000)
SNMP Agent Functions • MIB variable access • MIB variable setting • SNMP trap • SNMP community strings
Controlling SNMP Access with Community Strings Nonprivileged SNMP Access router(config)#snmp-server community secure ro Privileged SNMP Access router(config)#snmp-server community semisecure rw Access List SNMP Access router(config)#access-list 1 permit 10.1.1.4 router(config)#access-list 1 permit 10.1.1.5 router(config)#snmp-server community semisecure rw 1
SNMP Traps and Informs Trap router(config)#snmp-server host 10.1.1.4 trap Inform router(config)#snmp-server host 10.1.1.4 inform
Controlling router-router Communications • Routing Protocol Authentication • Secure router Configuration Files • Controlling Traffic Using Filters
Routing Protocol Authentication • Plaintext • Neighbors must share authentication key • Key sent in plainttext • Message Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5) • Hash of key • Key not actually sent over wire • Prevents eavesdropping
Securing Configuration Files • TFTP • Not secure protocol, no password required • Anyone with access to TFTP server can modify the configuration file • TFTP server can be detected with port scans • Recommendations • Manually enable/disable TFTP software when needed
Controlling Traffic Using Filters • Access Lists • Filtering Routing Updates • Incoming Network Filters
Access List Tips • Use ACL to control whether traffic is forwarded or blocked at the router interface • ACL do not authenticate individual users but filter based on information in the packets
Filtering Networks in Routing Updates • Helps secure networks • Increases security • Increases stability • Configuration router(config)#access-list 45 deny 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 router(config)#access-list 45 permit any any router(config)#router eigrp 200 router(config-router)#distribute-list 45 out serial0
Suppressing Updates from Being Processed Suppress Updates from Being Processed router(config)#access-list 46 permit 10.2.0.0 0.0.255.255 router(config)#router eigrp 200 router(config-router)#distribute-list 46 in serial0 Suppress Updates through Interface router(config)#router eigrp 200 router(config-router)#passive-interface ethernet0
Incoming Network Filters Deny Spoofed Packets from Internal Network router(config)#access-list 102 deny ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any log router(config)#interface serial0 router(config-router)#ip access-group 102 in
Cisco AAA Security Technology Module 3
AAA Security Architecture • Authentication • Requires users to prove that they really are who they say they are • Authorization • Decide which resources the user is allowed to access and which operations the user is allowed to perform • Accounting • Records what the user actually did, what was accessed, and how long it was accessed • Counteracts repudiation
Authentication Methods • Username and Password Authentication • S/Key Authentication • Token Cards and Servers • PAP and CHAP Authentication
Usernames and Passwords • No username/password • Username/password – static • Username/password – aging • S/Key one-time passwords • One-time passwords • Token cards/soft tokens
PAP & CHAP Authentication • Important component of dialup access • Authentication accomplished by PAP or CHAP • PPP – standard encapsulation protocol for transport of different L3 protocols across serial or point-to-point links (PSTN,ISDN)
PAP Authentication over PPP • Two-way handshake only after initial PPP link establishment • Client sends username and password • NAS accepts or rejects • Not a strong authentication method • Username and password sent in cleartext • No protection against playback or repeated trial-and-error attacks
CHAP Authentication over PPP • Stronger than PAP • Password never crosses network • 3-way handshake • NAS sends challenge message to client • Client replies with one-way hash value • NAS processes hash and compared to NAS’s calculation
CHAP Cont’d • Protection against playback • Constantly changing string prevents eavesdropping and replaying • Problem – not supported in NT (NT uses MS-CHAP)