Presentation Outline

1. Further Democratic Reform for Hong Kong –Reflections from International ExperiencesMing SINGCity University of Hong KongOct. 5, 2005

2. Presentation Outline • 1. Benefits of Full democracy for HK • 2. Costs of delay installing full democracy • 3. Problems of the 5th Report • 4. Legislative Reform: bicameralism • 5. Nomination & Election of CE

3. Benefits of Full Democracy • Democracy promotes freedoms, rule of law, political accountability, reduces corruption & eventually enhances political stability • Democracy favors economic development (Feng 2003) and need not lead to welfarism (esp. given Hong Kong’s culture and weak unions)

4. HK is now ready for full democracy with politicalstability • When GDP per capita > USD 10,000 probability of breakdowns of presidential democracies is virtually zero (my study of 79 nations between 1950 & 2000) • Hong Kong’s level of GDP per capita in 2003: US$28,800 (purchasing power parity) (IMF, 2004)

5. Costs of delaying full democracy • Lack of electoral legitimacy for Govt.  Reluctance to launch controversial yet urgent policies for HK’s development • Cronyism, inequality, executive-legislative tensions tend to persist: bad for stability & prosperity • Sluggish or pseudo democratic reform can undermine stability & prosperity

6. Support for full democracy persists • My survey in June, 2005: • 73.5% agree/strongly agree electing govt. by universal suffrage “may have problems but it is better than any other form of govt.” • After the Central Govt.’s rejection of universal suffrage by 2008, 61% & 62% of public prefer to have it held electing the legislature & CE respectively in 2012 -3 Surveys from early 2000’s to June 2005 find “Post-materialistic Culture” can explain mass support for universal suffrage

7. Post-materialistic culture and democracy • Emphasize freedoms, greater political participation & govt’s respect of public opinions in policy making. • Culture doesn’t change overnight: a solid basis of support for full democracy exists, regardless of economic conditions.

8. Hong Kong Ranked Sixth in Post-materialism

9. 5th Report: no clear +ve effect on HK’s democratization & development • CE can’t be affiliated with party • No specification Closed ballot in nominating CE • No specification of system for electing District Councilors to LegCo/ EC • No clear roadmap: can’t mobilize business sector and other interests to prepare for faster democratization • Maintain appointed DC members

10. 3 Crucial Obstacles for Faster Democratization • Business leaders prefer maintaining functional constituencies • When both CE & LegCo elected by universal suffrage  dual legitimacy and minority government possible • Central Govt.’s worries over HK’s becoming independent & subversion against PRC.

11. A Democratically Elected BicameralLegislature: its Relevance for HK • Some local business leaders accept a “Bicameral” Arrangement” • Bicameralism may reduce a key obstacle to democratization & encourage Central Govt. to speed up democratization

12. Bicameral Legislatures: In 1999, 38% (=67) of 178 legislatures in the world were bicameral:

13. Some justifications for bicameral system in Hong Kong • A middle-ground solution: enhance electoral legitimacy of LegCo while maintaining functional constituencies • Deepen debates on legislation • Reduce chances of reckless legislation and improve monitoring of the executive • Help boost party development & nurture political leaders

14. Composition & Powers of Upper Chambers’ Members • Among the 67 upper chambers on earth, • 23 were produced by direct election, in whole or in part in 2000; • 39 of them are directly or indirectly elected; • Others are by appointment/ mixture of appointment & elections. • Most lower chambers are more powerful than upper chambers because of the greater electorate mandate of the former.

16. Desirable Traitsof 2nd Chambers:Lessons from 17 OECD bicameral legislatures • Both strong and weak upper chambers undesirable: ideally they should force government to rethink problematic bills by power to delay passage of bills, without incessant legislative gridlocks • Second chambers have less powers over financial legislation & more power over constitutional amendments • Govt. should not control upper chamber to maintain its independent character

17. Roles and Functions of Second Chambers: lessons from overseas • Scrutiny of Legislation • A core function of upper chambers. • Based on 17 OECD countries, the upper house needs to have delaying powers up • to few months at a maximum for ordinary legislation, • to 20 days in case of urgency for ordinary legislation, • Constitutional and Human Rights Scrutiny • Reflect Territorial Perspective

18. Implications on HK: Composition & Powers of its Second Chamber • Small franchises, limited representativeness & “excessively” pro-government stance of FC members undercut their public support • If second chamber is composed entirely of the existing FCs, its power will be limited •  Reforms of FCs and introduction of other members required in order to boost public support and power of the upper chamber

19. i./ Reform existing Functional Constituencies to make them more democratic: • Replace corporate voting by individual voting • Abolish small FCs that represent insignificant sectors

20. ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper House: Indirect Elected Members • District Councilors will nominate and elect District & non-District Councilors for Upper House • As those elected by the District Councilors for the Upper House may not be District Councilors, they may bring broader views into upper chamber

21. ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper House: NPC and CPPCC delegates • Stronger links between HK and the Central Government: some seats be produced via elections among HK’s delegates to NPC/Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

22. ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper House: Appointed Members • Most if not all of appointed members are preferably independents (from parties) • Under-privileged groups championing for human rights & minority rights • Retired judges, academics, senior lawyers, senior politicians, top civil servants can also be included • An independent appointments commission with very strong public support will make appointments to the Upper House

23. Overall composition of the upper house • FCs & indirectly elected members: 40% each of the total seats • Appointees: 10% of the total number of members to avoid undermining public support of the entire chamber • 10% of the seats in the Upper House delegated members to the NPC / Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

24. Powers of Upper Chamber in HK • FC & appointed members in upper chamber v. directly elected nature of lower chamber  upper chamber should be mainly advisory & have the power to delay instead of that to veto: • Scrutiny and monitoring power • Some initiation power (non-financial only)

25. Scrutiny and Monitoring Power of Upper House in HK • Based on 17 OECD bicameral legislatures, HK’s Upper House can delay up to: • 6 months at a maximum for ordinary legislation, • 3 months for financial legislation • 20 days in case of urgency for ordinary legislation • Under adequate media attention, a short delay created by the 2nd chamber can force 1st chamber to rethink

26. Scrutiny and Monitoring Power of Upper House in HK • Arming the upper house with the capacity to veto bills easily enhances legislative deadlocks, dampen the monitoring power of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive as a whole, & slow down the party development. • The scrutiny function of HK’s Upper Chamber should remain its core one.

27. Bill initiation Power of Upper House in HK • Bills for ordinary legislation can be initiated in either Lower or Upper House • Bills for financial legislation, however, can only be initiated at the Lower House

28. Constitutional Guardian • An exception to the advisory role of the upper house lies in the constitutional arena • Upper Chamber Protect constitutional rights, by a veto or delaying power - amendments of the Basic Law need to be endorsed by 66.7% of members of both houses

29. How to Resolve Inter-cameral Conflicts • Formation of an equal no. of representatives of parties in each house based on percentage of seats • Final decision of each committee rests on the simple majority of it • If the proposed compromise is rejected by the Lower House, the Lower House will have the last word

30. Nomination & Election of CE • The CE candidate should be allowed to be affiliated with a political party to promote party development & fundamentally improve executive-legislative relationship

31. Nomination & Election of CE • Election Committee (EC) shall become Nomination Committee (NC) • Size of NC: 1600 in 2007, 3200 in 2012 • Same 4 sectors as in current EC, each sector with 400 members in 2007 and 800 in 2012 • 1st to 3rd sectors: same election method • 4th sector: add 200 members elected by directly elected District Councilors in 2007 via PR

32. Nomination & Election of CE: smoothen exe.-leg. relations • For NC elections, corporate voting should be abolished in 2012 • At least 12.5% of the total members (i.e. 200 in 2007; 400 in 2012) in NC required for nominating one candidate • For both 2007 and 2012 CE elections, each candidate should have nominations of at least 5% of members from each sector of the NC

33. Nomination & Election of CE • For both 2007 and 2012 CE elections, each candidate is required to secure the support of at least 25% of legislators (of Lower House if bicameral and of the whole legislature if unicameral) • In 2007 the NC will nominate and elect the CE. In 2012 the NC will only nominate and the CE will be elected by universal suffrage

34. Nomination & Election of CE • Both nomination and election will use closed ballot • One-round first-past-the-post system will be use: it is simple, efficient & can strengthen executive-legislative party ties and reduce chances of multi-partyism

35. Minority Govt./Divided Govt. – hurt democratic stability? • Empirically, minority govt. does not affect chance of democratic stability • Concurrent elections for CE and legislature, single-round plurality election for CE and a closed-list PR for electing some seats in legislature, diminish chance of a minority govt. and legislative-executive deadlock • In 2012 concurrentelections for the CE and LegCo and from then on the term of the CE will be shortened to 4 years

36. Central Government’s worries • Will HK become independent or subvert PRC’s rule? • Surveys since 1984 consistently show HK people agree HK belongs to China • in 2004 survey: 73% agree/strongly agree: “I am proud of being Chinese”. • HK depends on Mainland China: water, food and economic growth…...

37. Institutional Safeguards • CPG continues to have power of approval over appointment of CE & Principal Officials • A Nomination Committee including NPC & CPPCC members to guard against radical candidates unacceptable to Central Govt. • HK’s delegates in NPC & CPPCC are represented in Upper House • Amendments to Basic Law require endorsement of two-thirds of members from both chambers & that of NPC.

38. Conclusion • 1. Given benefits of democracy, implement full democracy in 2012; • 2. Consider bicameralism to accommodate to business sector & improve governance • 3. HK Community should discuss & hammer out detailed arrangements for 2012 as a roadmap to guide the political arrangements for 2007 & 2008. • 4. Therefore, Govt. should delay the LegCo voting on 5th report till mid-2006, or else HK will continue to pay a heavy price for wrangles over political reform