Major Events That Shaped Defense Acquisition, 1981-2018

1. Use slide show to view this presentation Date: 11 Dec 2018 Presented by: Pat Wills. Dean Defense Systems Management College, Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Patrick.Wills@dau.mil w. 703-805-4563 c. 703-615-5234 Major Events That Shaped Defense Acquisition, 1981-2018 v4.8, 11 Dec 2018

2. Major Events That Shaped Defense Systems Acquisition 1981 – 1990 Use slide show and select an event for details. Select Link to Timeframe 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2018 Public Law DoD External to DoD Live Fire Test & Evaluation Required Packard Commission Interim Report Weinberger’s Ten Commandments Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm NSDD 219 Directs Implementation of PM-PEO-SAE-DAE Construct Military Retirement Reform Act Creates USD(A) & DDR&E DOT&E Created Defense Management Report (DMR) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Packard Commission Final Report Nunn-McCurdy Act Services Create PEOs Grace Commission Report Section 800 Panel Goldwater- Nichols Act Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB) Established JRMB renamed JROC Defense Acq Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Competitive Prototyping Required Carlucci Initiatives “New Vision” PMC Gramm-Hollings-Rudman Act Project on Military Procurement Horror Stories Operation Ill Wind concludes PMs Of MDAPs Required to Attend PM Course (PMC) OFPP Act Amendments, and Procurement Integrity Act Competition In Contracting Act 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

3. Major Events That Shaped Defense Systems Acquisition 1991 – 2000 Use slide show and select an event for details. 2011-2018 Select Link to Timeframe 1981-1990 Public Law 2001-2010 DoD External to DoD National Performance Review (NPR) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program SECDEF Perry’s Mandate for Change Deputy USD for Acq Reform Created Acquisition Reform Process Action Teams Collapse of the Soviet Union IPT & IPPD Processes Adopted Section 800 Panel Report QDR 1997 Report Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) Defense Acquisition University Begins Operations PM Training Restructured Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) PM Training Re-engineered Report on the Bottom-Up Review Defense Acquisition Deskbook MOP 77, Requirements Generation System (RGS) Issued Single Process Initiative (SPI) JROC Codified in Title 10 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

4. Major Events That Shaped Defense Systems Acquisition 2001 – 2010 Use slide show and select an event for details. Select Link to Timeframe 2011-2018 1991-2000 Public Law 1981-1990 DoD External to DoD World Trade Center & Pentagon Attacked 2011-2017 Operation Iraqi Freedom QDR 2006 Report QDR 2010 Report QDR 2001 Report Services Acquisition Reform Act Congress Directs Requirements Management Certification Training Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) Weapon Sys Acq Reform Act (WSARA) SECDEF Directs Reform of Requirements Generation System Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project Report Joint Concept Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Defense Acq Workforce Development Fund Joint Defense Capabilities Study (Aldridge Study) Better Buying Power 1.0 Defense Acquisition Guidebook 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

5. Major Events That Shaped Defense Systems Acquisition 2011 – 2018 Use slide show and select an event for details. 2001-2010 1991-2000 Select Link to Timeframe 1981-1990 Public Law DoD Authority to Waive Acquisition Laws Linking & Streamlining Requirements, Acquisition, & Budget Section 809 Panel Established Chief Mgmt Officer (CMO) Established Congress Directs USD(AT&L) Eliminated Creates USD(A&S) & USD(R&E) QDR 2014 Report DEPSECDEF Establishes Offices of USD(A&S) and USD(R&E) Better Buying Power 3.0 Better Buying Power 2.0 Section 809 Panel Interim Report Middle Tier of Acquisition Section 809 Panel Vol I Report CCMD Commanders Members of JROC Cost & Fielding Targets Directed Middle Tier Interim Authority Section 809 Panel Vol II Report Budget Control Act of 2011 Requirements Process Modified CCDRs Advisors to JROC Chiefs Role in Defense Acquisition Enhanced Revisions to Authority for Cost & Fielding Targets for MDAPS MDAPs must be delegated to SAEs Senior Military Acquisition Advisors Cost, Fielding & Performance Goals for MDAPs Secretary & Chiefs Designated Customers of Acquisition System Most MDAPs Delegated to SAEs (ACAT IB) Contract Close Out Authority 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

6. Back to timeline Carlucci Initiatives (Apr 1981) Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, created an Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) to reform the acquisition process. Vincent Puritano, Carlucci’s assistant, was the architect. The AIP was designed to mitigate the effects of political and institutional constraints on the acquisition process. Carlucci’s thirty-two AIP initiatives sought to streamline the process by reducing weapon program costs and shortening acquisition cycle time, both of which had increased sharply since the 1960s. 1. Reaffirm Acquisition Management Principles 2. Increase Use of Preplanned Product Improvement 3. Implement Multiyear Procurement 4. Increase Program Stability 5. Encourage Capital Investment to Enhance Productivity 6. Budget to Most Likely Costs 7. Use Economical Production Rates 8. Assure Appropriate Contract Type 9. Improve System Support and Readiness 10. Reduce Administrative Costs and Time 11. Budget for Technological Risk 12. Provide Front-End Funding for Test Hardware 13. Reduce Governmental Legislation Related to Acquisition 14. Reduce Number of DoD Directives 15. Enhance Funding Flexibility 16. Provide Contractor Incentives to Improve Reliability 17. Decrease DSARC Briefing and Data Requirements • 18. Budget for Inflation • 19. Forecast Business Base Conditions • 20. Improve Source Selection Process • 21. Develop and Use Standard Operation and Support Systems • 22. Provide More Appropriate Design-to-Cost Goals • 23. Implement Acquisition Process Decisions • 24. Reduce DSARC Milestones • 25. Submit MENS with Service POM (MENS later called JMSNS) • 26. Revise DSARC Membership • 27. Retain USDR&E as Defense Acquisition Executive • 28. Raise Dollar Thresholds for DSARC Review • 29. Integrate DSARC and PPBS Process • 30. Increase PM Visibility of Support Resources • 31. Improve Reliability and Support • 32. Increase Competition • 33. Enhance the Defense Industrial Base • (added in 1984) Source: Acquisition Reform, This Too Shall Pass…?, Major Curtis K. Munechika, Research Dept. Air Command and Staff College, March 1997

7. Back to timeline • Nunn-McCurdy Act (Dec 1981) • The Nunn–McCurdy provision. “Reports on Unit Costs of Major Defense Systems”, introduced by Senator Sam Nunn and Congressman Dave McCurdy in the 1982 National Defense Authorization Act, is designed to curtail cost growth in weapons procurement programs. • Amended by NDAA 2006, Sec. 802, to prevent DoDD from avoiding a breach by re-baselining. Added new terms, Original Baseline Estimate, Significant Cost Growth and Critical Cost Growth. • Currently 10 USC 2433 - Unit Cost Reports (UCRs) and 10 U.S. Code 2433a - Critical Cost Growth in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. The current statutes require: • Quarterly reports from the PM to the SAE on unit costs of the program • Procurement cost estimates (program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) and average procurement unit cost (APUC) only); not RDT&E or Operations & Support • Requires reporting to the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for significant unit cost breaches • Requires SECDEF reporting to the Congress for critical unit cost breaches Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC). Calculated by dividing total procurement cost by the number of items to be procured. Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). Computed by dividing the Program Acquisition Cost by the Program Acquisition Quantity. Sources: a. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982 (Public Law 97-86, Dec 1, 1981, Sec. 917). b. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006 (Public Law 109-163, Jan 6, 2006). c, House Report 109-360, Dec 18, 2005.

8. Back to timeline Project on Military Procurement Horror Stories (Summer 1982) The Project On Military Procurement released information from Pentagon whistleblowers in the mid-1980s uncovering Pentagon waste and fraud, exposing $640 toilet seats, $7,600 coffee makers, $436 hammers, $1,118 for two plastic stool caps and other overpriced spare parts used by the military. The group was renamed Project on Government Oversight in the late 1990s. This so-called “spare parts scandal” caused President Reagan to charter his Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management in 1985, better known as the Packard Commission. Sources: a. Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor, United States Army Center of Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 2005. b. “Boeing's two-bit caps an outrage,” by James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Milwaukee Journal, Sunday, August 28, 1983.

9. Back to timeline DOT&E Created (Sep 1983) Congress established the Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) in the Fiscal Year 1984 DoD Authorization Act, effective Oct 1, 1983. The first DOT&E was Hon. John E. Krings, April 18, 1985 – June 30, 1989 DOT&E is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director reports directly, without intervening review or approval to the SECDEF, and is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the SECDEF on OT&E matters, ensuring effectiveness and suitability of weapons systems and equipment prior to a production decision. The DOT&E, following consultation with the program manager, determines the number of production or production-representative test articles required for live-fire test and evaluation and initial operational test and evaluation of programs on the DOT&E Test and Evaluation Oversight List. Sources: a. HR 98-352, DoD Authorization Act, 1984 Conference Report, Sec. 1211. b. PL 98-94, DoD Authorization Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-94, Sep. 1983). b. 10 USC 139 and 2399. c. DoDI 5000.02

10. Back to timeline • Grace Commission (Jan. 1984). • Formally known as the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control in the Federal Government, the Grace Commission was directed by Executive Order 12369, 30 June 1982. J. Peter Grace, the president of W. R. Grace & Co., led the commission’s executive committee. • Twenty-two task forces studied departments and agencies, including the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), while fourteen studied functions cutting across government, such as personnel, data processing, and procurement. • The OSD Task Force found two causes blocking efficient management of the acquisition process. • The first was the lack of cooperation between the services and the OSD. The Task Force wrote, “The military services have never really bought into the need for central management by the Secretary of Defense. DoD has been in place for thirty-five years, but the services still resist its authority. . . , While no intellectual arguments to this effect were presented to the OSD Task Force, it is evident that the emotional undercurrent exerts a constant tug.” • The second impediment was Congress. “Congress continually constricts DoD’s management prerogatives. Weapons choices, base deployment, and other major management decision cannot be made in isolation from home district political pressures from throughout the country. This creates an environment which favors expansion of programs; the management efficiencies of contraction or consolidation are seldom attainable.” • The OSD Task Force made nine recommendations to improve the acquisition process. First was the consolidation of “the management of the acquisition process within OSD” under a single senior acquisition executive, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)), separated organizationally and functionally from the existing USD (Research and Engineering). A second key recommendation was the establishment of “a stable five-year spending plan for the acquisition of weapons systems at economical production rates. Sources: a. J. Peter Grace, War and Waste: President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (New York: Macmillan, 1984). b. Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor

11. Back to timeline Weinberger’s Ten Commandments Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger announced a ten-point program in August 1983 commonly known as Weinberger’s Ten Commandments, to fight price abuse. The program included offering incentives to increase competitive bidding and to reward employees who pursued cost savings, as well as taking “stern disciplinary action, including reprimand, demotion and dismissal, against employees who are negligent in implementing Defense Department procedures.” The Ten Commandments were less harsh on contractors. They advised “alerting defense contractors to the seriousness of the problem and asking them to take disciplinary action when necessary and rewarding employees when appropriate.” The tenth directive reminded defense employees, “The many corporations not involved in spare parts overcharging should not be maligned because of the failures of a few.” Source: Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor, United States Army Center of Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 2005

12. Back to timeline Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB) Established (Mar 1984) As a result of a summer 1983 Defense Science Board (DSB) recommendation, on 20 March 1984 the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB). The purpose of the JRMB was to monitor the development and acquisition of joint programs. The board would evaluate potential joint military requirements; select candidates for joint development and acquisition; oversee cross-Service requirements and management issues; and resolve Service differences arising after initiation of joint programs. Members: Vice Chiefs of the Services and the Director, Joint Staff. Chairman rotated among the four vice chiefs with the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, designated as the first chairman for a term of one year. In June 1986, the Deputy Secretary of Defense renamed the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) the JRMB, and the Joint Staff renamed the JRMB the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Sources: Defense Acquisition: a. Observations Two Years After the Packard Commission, Volume I, Main Report, Nov. 1988, Institute for Defense Analysis Report R-347. b. Joint Staff, J-8, presentation to APMC 99-1, A Joint Perspective on Acquisition. c. DEPSECDEF Memo, 3 June 1986, subject: Joint Requirements and Management Board.

13. Back to timeline Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (Effective April 1, 1984) The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was established for the codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies. The FAR System does not include internal agency guidance of the type included in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and companion resource, Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) Background: After World War II, Congress enacted the Armed Services Procurement Act to govern how DoD procured supplies and services. DoD implemented the Act with the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). In 1949, NASA established a NASA Procurement Regulation and the GSA established the Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR). In March 1978, DoD changed the name of the ASPR to the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR). The FAR was published in the Federal Register on Sep. 19, 1993 and was effective on April 1, 1984. The FAR and agency supplements replaced the DAR, FPR, and the NASA regulation. Statutory authority to issue and maintain the FAR resides with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the Administrator of NASA, subject to the approval of the Administrator of Federal Procurement Policy. Revisions to the FAR are prepared and issued through the coordinated action of two councils, the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council (DAR Council) and the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAA Council). Sources: a. FAR subpart 1.101 and 1.102. b. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy web site. C. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009 An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

14. Back to timeline Competition In Contracting Act (Jul 1984) The Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) was enacted as Sec. 2701 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, July 18, 1984. CICA has been amended many times since 1984. See 10 USC 2304, 41 USC 3304, FAR Part 6, and DFARS 206. Requires full and open competition by using the competitive procedures best suited under the circumstances. CICA established advocates for competition in DoD and each military department. CICA reduced the 17 exceptions to competition under the DAR to seven: (1) there is only one source and no substitute for the property or service needed; (2) unusual or compelling urgency; (3) to achieve industrial mobilization, maintain an essential engineering, research, development capability, or expert services; (4) an international agreement; (5) authorized or required by statute; (6) the agency needs to procure a brand name commercial item for authorized resale; (7) written determination of public interest by the SECDEF. Prohibits awarding a contract using other than competitive procedures unless: (1) the contracting officer justifies the use of such procedures in writing; (2) certifies the accuracy and completeness of the justification; and (3) obtains the approval required by FAR 6.304. Sources: a. CRS Summary, H.R. 98-861, Division B, Title VII. b. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-369, Jul. 18, 1984). c. FAR Part 6. c. DFARS 206/PGI. d. 10 USC 2304.

15. Back to timeline Live Fire Test & Evaluation Required (Nov 1985) As a result of survivability issues with the Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) during a 1984 Joint Live-Fire test program, the DoD Authorization Act for 1986 required the Army to submit reports on the results of the live-fire testing program. The Act also required all major wheeled or tracked armored vehicle programs to include live-fire testing prior to awarding a contract for procurement, and results reported to Congress. The two versions of the BFV were the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV). Both vehicles have a 25mm cannon, a TOW missile launcher, and a coaxial machine gun. The basic vehicle’s highly explosive 25-mm ammunition and TOW missiles were stowed mainly in the troop compartment. If an anti-armor round were to penetrate the vehicle’s relatively light armor and strike this stowed ammunition, a loss of the vehicle and crew could result. During the live fire tests, shots representing Soviet anti-armor weapons were fired into BFVs that were carrying their full load of ammunition and fuel. These tests indicated how vulnerable the vehicle was and what vehicular damage and crew casualties would likely result if these weapons hit the Bradley. At the conclusion of tests completed in Oct 1985, the GAO reported’ that even though the tests were structured to avoid catastrophic losses of the vehicles, they showed that the basic Bradley was highly vulnerable to all anti-armor weapons. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 required additional live fire and operational testing of the BFV, and established a new section 2366, Title 10, Major Systems and Munitions Programs: Survivability and Lethality Testing; Operational Testing. Sources: a. DoD Authorization Act, 1986, (Public Law 99-145, Nov 8, 1985), sections 122 and 123. b. GAO/NSIAD-87-179, July 1987. c. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 (Public Lay 99-661, Nov. 14, 1986).

16. Back to timeline • PMs of MDAPs Required to Attend the Program Managers Course (PMC) at DSMC (Nov 1985) • DoD Authorization Act, 1986, November 1985, required the Secretary of each military department to establish the following requirements for the education, training, and experience of any person assigned to duty as the program manager of a major defense acquisition program (10 USC 1622): • Must have attended the Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) or a “comparable course” at another institution; and have at least eight years of experience in acquisition support and maintenance of weapon systems, with at least two of those years performed while assigned to a procurement command. • The Secretary of the military departments were also directed to establish education, training, and experience requirements for general or flag officers assigned to duty in a procurement command. Any general or flag officer assigned to duty in a procurement command also had to meet the same education and experience requirements for program managers. • Background: The Defense Weapons Systems Management Center (DWSMC) was established as a project management educational and training institution on Oct. 24, 1964, located at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in Dayton, Ohio. In June 1971, DEPSECDEF Packard disestablished DWSMC and concurrently established the Defense Systems Management School (DSMS) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Recognizing the demonstrated excellence of DSMS graduates, DEPSECDEF Clements decided the school should be a college, and on July 16, 1976 DSMC was founded. From 1976 to 1994 the DSMC PMC was a 20-week course. Today, the statutory requirement for training of PMs and Deputy PMs of ACAT I and II programs is in 10 USC 1735, and is met by two courses, the 10-week Program Manager’s Course (PMT-401) and the 4-week Executive Program Manager’s Course (PMT-401). Source: DoD Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145, Nov. 8, 1985), Section 924.

17. Back to timeline Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1985 (Dec 1985) The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known as "Gramm-Rudman Hollings," created a series of deficit targets meant to balance the federal budget by 1991. If the spending targets were not met, a series of across-the-board spending cuts would automatically take place. The legislation was sponsored by Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX), Senator Warran Rudman (R-NH), and Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), and was signed into law by President Reagan in December 1985. Gramm-Rudman Hollings created a five-year deficit reduction plan, with decreasing deficit targets each year, until the budget was balanced in FY 1991. If deficit goals were not met in any given year, a process of automatic spending cuts termed "sequestration" would take place. Fifty percent of the cuts would come from domestic discretionary spending and fifty percent from defense. Social Security, Medicare, several anti-poverty programs, and interest on the debt were exempted from a potential sequester. In 1986 the Supreme Court ruled the Act unconstitutional, because the sequestration process gave Congress undue budgetary implementation powers over the executive branch. In 1987 the Act was passed again, with a new sequestration process and deficit numbers; the revised legislation also pushed back the date the budget was to be balanced to 1993. Sources: a. Section 200, Public Law 99-177, Dec 12, 1985. b. Regional Oral History Office, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/ROHO/projects/debt/1985grammrudmanhollings.html

18. Back to timeline • Packard Commission Interim Report (Feb 1986) • The President’s Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management was established by President Reagan in July1985 to study defense management and organization, including: the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command system, the Military Departments, and the Congress. • The Commission, Chaired by David Packard, released an Interim Report in Feb 1986. The report contained four parts: National Security Planning and Budgeting, Military Organization and Command, Acquisition Organization, and Government-Industry Accountability. • The acquisition organization part of the report recommended that: • A new position of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) be established, with a solid industrial background and who would be a full-time Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). • Each military department appoint a Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), who would appoint Program Executive Officers (PEOs), each responsible for a reasonable and defined number of acquisition programs. Program Managers would be responsible directly to their PEO and report only to him on program matters. • All federal procurement statutes be combined into a single government-wide procurement statute. • An alternate personnel management system be established to include senior acquisition personnel and contracting officers as well as scientists and engineers. • The Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB) be co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JRMB would define weapons requirements and select programs for development (Milestone II - now Milestone B). Sources: a. Executive Order 12526, President's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, Jul. 15, 1985. b. Interim Report to the President by the President’s Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, Feb 28, 1986

19. Back to timeline • National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 (April 1986) • Based on the Packard Commission Interim Report, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 219, April 1, 1986, directing implementation of initial recommendations for National Security Planning and Budgeting; Military Organization and Command; Acquisition Organization and Procedures; and Government, Industry, Accountability. • NSDD 219 directed the following actions regarding defense acquisition: • SECDEF issue a DoD Directive outlining the roles, functions and responsibilities of the USD(Acquisition), with immediate implementation by the current Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) pending congressional action to authorize appointment of a USD(Acquisition). • Military departments were directed to establish Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) who would appoint Program Executive Officers (PEOs) responsible for a reasonable and defined number of acquisition programs. PMs for those programs would be responsible directly to their respective PEO. “Thus, no program manager would have more than one level of supervision between himself and his SAE, and no more than two levels between himself and the DOD Acquisition Executive.” • Some studies and reports indicate that the PM-PEO-SAE-DAE construct was enacted in the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 – this is a myth. It was directed by NSDD 219 and implemented in DoDD 5000.01, Sep 1, 1987. • Administration and Congress recodify all federal statutes governing procurement into a single procurement statute. • SECDEF strengthen personnel management policies for civilian managers and employees having contracting, procurement, or other acquisition responsibilities. • SECDEF directed to establish procedures for the Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB), a military panel of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be co-chaired by the USD(Acquisition) and the Vice Chairman of the JCS. The JRMB would define weapons requirements and select programs for development. Source: National Security Decision Directive Number 219, Implementation of the Recommendations of the President’s Commission on Defense Management, The White House, Washington. (declassified/released on 10/18/95 by the National Security Council)

20. Back to timeline • Services Create PEOs (1986-1989) • The 1986 Packard Commission report recommended streamlining the PM’s reporting chain, with clear lines of authority from the USD (Acquisition), through Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) to the PMs of major acquisition programs. At that time PMs were reporting through two or more intermediate layers of command (and the staffs that supported those commands) before they reached their SAE. • National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, April 1, 1986, directed the Secretary of Defense to implement the Packard Commission’s recommendations for the streamlined reporting chain. Implementation was contained in DoDD 5000.1, Sep 1, 1987. • The Army created a PEO structure, independent from, but co-located with its acquisition commands. The Navy and the Air Force implemented the PEO requirement by dual-hatting the commanders of their acquisition commands (systems commands in the Navy; Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Logistics Command and their subordinate product and logistics centers in the Air Force) as PEOs. • In July 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney submitted the Defense Management Report (DMR) to the President. The DMR stated the following: “Within each Military Department, the SAE will manage all major acquisition programs through PEOs, each of whom will have a small, separate staff organization and devote full-time attention to management of assigned programs and technical support resources. PEOs will be relieved of other responsibilities.” Shortly after issuance of the DMR both the Navy and the Air Force created a PEO structure independent of their acquisition commands. • Today, the Army and Navy still have PEOs independent from their acquisition commands reporting direct to the SAE. Some Air Force PEOs are dual-hatted as heads of the “PEO Directorates” of the Air Force Materiel Command’s Life Cycle Management Center, reporting direct to the SAE under their PEO hat. Other Air Force PEOs are also dual-hatted, or direct reporting to the SAE. Sources: a. National Security Decision Directive 219, April 1, 1986. b. Secretary of the Army memo, subject: Implementation of the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Concept, 30 Jan 1987. c. SECNAVINST 4210, subj; Acquisition Organization and Procedure, 4 Aug 1986. d. Secretary of the Air Force memo for AF/CC, subject: Implementing National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-219), Action Memorandum, 10 Jul 1986. e. DoDD 5000.01, Sep 1, 1987. f. Defense Management Report, July 1989

21. Back to timeline • Packard Commission Final Report (Jun 1986) • A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the President's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, June 1986, mostly reinforced recommendations issued earlier as separate reports: • Interim Report, Feb 1986. • A Formula for Action, A Report to the President on Defense Acquisition, April 1986. • Conduct and Accountability, June 1986. • National Security Planning and Budgeting, June 1986. • Only Chapter 2, Military Organization and Command, of both interim and final reports, was not issued as a separate report. • Implementation: A few major recommendations, some of which had already been in place, are highlighted here: • National Security Planning and Budgeting: A National Security Strategy (NSS), coordinated with the Congress, and a biennial budget were recommended by Packard. A National Security Strategy report was implemented in Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. A biennial budget had already been directed by Congress in 1985, and was partially implemented by biennial authorizations for 1988-1989, 1990-1991, and 1992-1993. However, Congress never provided for biennial appropriations. DoD went to a biennial program budget process in 1987 and returned to the annual process in 2010. • Military Organization and Command: The Packard recommendation for a Vice Chairman of the JCS was implemented by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. • Acquisition Organization and Procedures: The Packard recommendation for a USD(Acquisition) was implemented by the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986. NDAA 1987 spelled out the authority of the position. Packard mentioned requirements for Defense and Service Acquisition Executives (SAE); however, the requirement for a Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) had been directed 10 years earlier by DoDD 5000.30, Aug 20, 1976. The Components were directed to appoint acquisition executives by DoDD 5000.1, Mar 19, 1980. Packard’s recommendation for a streamlined reporting chain, and creation of Program Executive Officers (PEOs) was implemented by Jan 1987 as required by NSDD 219. DoDD 5000.01, Sep 1, 1987, institutionalized the streamlined reporting chain, PM to PEO to SAE to DAE. Source: A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the President's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, June 1986

22. Back to timeline JRMB Renamed JROC (Jun 1986) From the Packard Commission's viewpoint the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) (OSD review panel for major defense acquisition programs) was not achieving an "informed trade-off between user requirements, on the one hand, and schedule and cost on the other". The Commission recommended that the existing Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB), composed of the Service vice chiefs, be restructured to make necessary trade-off decisions between operational judgment and technical sophistication. The Packard Commission's restructured JRMB would have become the review panel for Milestone II, approval for full-scale engineering development (now called Milestone B, approval for Engineering and Manufacturing Development), and at Milestone III (now called Milestone C), approval for full-rate production, for all joint and selected major programs. In June 1986, to comply with the Packard recommendations, the Deputy Secretary of Defense changed the name of the DSARC to JRMB and added the Director of the Joint Staff as a member pending congressional authority to appoint a Vice Chairman for the JCS. All civilian members of the DSARC stayed on with the "new" JRMB. What had been the military JRMB was re-titled Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) by the Joint Staff, which continues as a Joint Staff organization today. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 provided authority for a Vice Chairman of the JCS, who today chairs the JROC. In 1987, the new JRMB was renamed the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Sources: a. A Formula for Action - A Report to the President on Defense Acquisition, by the President's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. b. Defense Acquisition: Observations Two Years After the Packard Commission, Volume I, Main Report, Nov. 1988, Institute for Defense Analysis Report R-347. c. DEPSECDEF Memo, 3 June 1986, subject: Joint Requirements and Management Board.

23. Back to timeline Military Retirement Reform Act (Jul 1986) Section 501 of the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)) and downgraded the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) to a Director for Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The position of USD(A) was recommended by the Packard Commission Interim Report, February 1986. The conferees for the Military Retirement Reform Act realized that other legislation to create an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was pending; however, in order to speed up the nomination process they decided to proceed with creating the position. The first USD(A) was Hon. Richard P. Godwin, Sep 30, 1986 – Sep 30, 1987. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 (NDAA 1993) changed the title to USD(Acquisition & Technology) (USD(A&T)). NDAA 2000 changed the title to USD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)). NDAA 2017 eliminated the position of USD(AT&L) and created two new positions, USD(Acquisition & Sustainment) (USD(A&S)) and USD(Research & Engineering) (USD(R&E)). The myth that the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433, Oct 1, 1986), created the USD(A) persists. Sources: a. House Report 99-695, June 25, 1986. b. Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (PL 99-348, 1 July 1986). c. NDAA 1993. d. NDAA 2000. e. NDAA 2017.

24. Back to timeline • Goldwater- Nichols Act (Oct 1986) • The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 contains six titles: • Title I - DoD Generally - Powers and functions of SECDEF and OSD • Title II - Military Advice and Command - Composition and functions of the JCS and combatant commands; created position of VCJCS • Title III - Defense Agencies and Field Activities - provides for oversight; defines combat support agencies; requires Service Secretaries and CJCS to study agencies organizational effectiveness and report findings to SECDEF. • Title IV - Joint Office Personnel Policy - created new chapter in Title 10, Joint Officer Management • Title V - Military Departments - Directed that selected functions be conducted only in the office of the Secretary, including Acquisition. Capped military and civilian billets. Required implementation within 180 days. • Title VI - Miscellaneous - reduction of management HQ personnel; reduction of reporting requirements; requires annual report to Congress on national security strategy from President. • Title V, made significant revisions to the responsibilities of the Secretaries and the Chiefs for each Service: • (1)The Office of the Secretary shall have sole responsibility within the Office of the Secretary and the Service Staff for the following functions: • (A) Acquisition. (B) Auditing. (C) Comptroller (including financial management). (D) Information management. (E) Inspector General. (F) Legislative affairs. (G) Public affairs. • (2) The Secretary of the Service shall establish or designate a single office or other entity within the Office of the Secretary to conduct each function specified in paragraph (1). No office or other entity may be established or designated within the Chief’s Staff to conduct any of the functions specified in paragraph (1). Sources: a. House Report 99-824, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Sep 12, 1986. b. Public Law 99-433, OCT. 1, 1986

25. Back to timeline • Competitive Prototyping Required (Nov 1986) • The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1987, required a competitive prototyping strategy for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The Act required that: • Contracts be entered into with not less than two contractors, using the same combat performance requirements, for the competitive design and manufacture of a prototype system or subsystem for developmental test and evaluation; • All systems or subsystems be tested in a comparative side-by-side test designed to reproduce combat conditions to the extent practicable; and determine which system or subsystem is most effective under such conditions • Each contractor that develops a prototype system or subsystem, before the testing is begun, submit— cost estimates for full-scale engineering development and the basis for such estimates; and production estimates, whenever practicable. • The requirement was repealed by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. The conferees expected DoD to continue considering prototyping as an option in the acquisition planning process and to use competitive prototype strategies where appropriate. However, revisions to DoDI 5000.02 did not reflect this policy (although competitive prototyping was common for major platforms). • In Sep. 2007, USD(AT&L) issued a policy memorandum requiring competitive prototyping through Milestone B. • The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, established a requirement for competitive prototyping before Milestone B approval for MDAPs. The Act provided for milestone decision authority waiver on the basis of cost vs. expected life-cycle benefits, and required that Congress be notified of the waiver. • NDAA 2016 requires the acquisition strategy to include competitive prototyping where appropriate, eliminates the requirement for a waiver and to notify Congress. 10 USC 2431a, 10 USC 2431b, and DoDI 5000.02 reflect this policy. Sources: a. National Defense Authorization Acts for 1987 (Public Law 99-661, Nov. 14, 1986, and NDAA 2016 (Public Law 114-92, Nov. 25, 2015), and their conference reports. b. Federal Streamlining Act of 1994. c. House Report 103-712. Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. d. DoDI 5000.02. e. USD(AT&L) memorandum, subject: Prototyping and Competition, 19 Sep 2007.

26. Back to timeline • OFPP Act Amendments, and The Procurement Integrity Act (Nov 1988) • The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act Amendments of 1988 amended the authority and functions of the OFPP Administrator and established the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council to assist in the direction and coordination of procurement policy and procurement regulatory activities. The Act provided that the Council consist of the Administrator of OFPP, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Administrator of General Services. • The Act directs the Council to issue and maintain a single Government-wide procurement regulation, to be known as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and declares that any other procurement regulations be limited to additional policies and procedures designed to satisfy the specific needs of an agency. • Section 6, Procurement Integrity, provided for (among other provisions): • Prohibited conduct by competing contractors • Prohibited conduct by procurement officials • Prohibited disclosure to unauthorized persons • Certification and enforcement matters • Restrictions on government officials and employees, to include both civil and criminal penalties. • Statutory provisions for OFPP are currently in Title 41 United States Code (USC), Division B. Restrictions on obtaining and disclosing procurement information and prohibitions for former government officials are in 41 USC 2101 through 2107. FAR Subpart 3.1, as supplemented by DFARS Subpart 203.1, direct additional safeguards and standards for procurement integrity. Sources: a. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988 (Public Law 100-679, Nov. 17, 1988). b. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Summary: S.2215 - 100th Congress (1987-1988)

27. Back to timeline “New Vision” Program Management Course (PMC) (1988-1990) In 1988, “New Vision” PMC was introduced, consisting of a six-week foundation or “basics” course called PMC Part I, followed by a 14-week advanced application segment called PMC Part II. The six-week segment was offered at Fort Belvoir, VA, and the DSMC regional locations in Boston, MA, Huntsville, AL, St Louis, MO, and Los Angeles, CA. The 14-week segment was only offered at Fort Belvoir. Students could test-out of the six-week segment, with proctored tests periodically conducted at all five locations. Due to very negative student feedback, New Vision PMC was cancelled, and by 1990 PMC had reverted to a twice-a-year, 20-week course only offered at Fort Belvoir, VA. Sources: a. From Packard to Perry, A Quarter Century of Service to the Defense Acquisition Community, DSMC, 1971-1996, Wilbur D. Jones, Jr., The DSMC Press, June 1996. b. Email discussion with the 1988 Course Manager, PMC Part I, 24 Jun 2017

28. Back to timeline Operation Ill Wind Concludes (1989) Operation Ill Wind was a three-year investigation launched in 1986 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation into corruption by federal government, military officials, and defense contractors. Convicted of various crimes were: 9 government officials, 42 consultants, 7 contractors as well as executives at GE, Unisys, Boeing and United Technologies. Top level political appointees convicted included: an Assistant Secretary of the Navy who pleaded guilty to bribery and served four years in prison. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, convicted of accepting an illegal gratuity and theft and conversion of government property and sentenced to six months in prison. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, pleaded guilty to accepting bribes and conspiring to defraud the government. The scandal led to the 1988 Procurement Integrity Act which constrains the actions of government officials after they leave government and work for private companies. Sources: a. Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor. b. Inside the Biggest Pentagon Scam, Irwin Ross, Fortune Magazine, Jan 11, 1993. c. Paisley Gets 4-Year Term in Ill Wind Case, Douglas Frantz, New York Times, Oct 19, 1991

29. Back to timeline • Defense Management Report (DMR) (Jul 1989) • In early 1989, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney requested an analysis of major actions to improve overall management of the Department of Defense. Completed in July 1989, the Defense Management Report (DMR) recommended streamlining operations by reducing overhead, consolidating or eliminating redundant functions and improving business practices. • One of the more significant initiatives was “Streamlining Contract Management”. For many years, contract administration services were performed separately by the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This initiative consolidated the contract administration function under a single organization—the DLA. • The Secretary determined that the full intent of the Packard Commission had not been implemented with regard to Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and the Service acquisition commands. Clarifying direction was provided: • Program Executive Officers. Within each Military Department, the SAE will manage all major acquisition programs through PEOs, each of whom will have a small, separate staff organization and devote full-time attention to management of assigned programs and related technical support resources. PEOs will be relieved of other responsibilities. • Systems and Materiel Commands. Consistent with this structure, these Service commands will be organized with a primary focus on three roles: providing necessary logistical support; to the extent appropriate, managing programs other than those conducted under the PEO structure; and providing a variety of support services to PEOs and PMs, while duplicating none of their management functions. • Based on this direction, the Air Force and Navy stopped the practice of dual-hatting acquisition command commanders as Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and appointed PEOs independent of these commands. Source: Defense Management Report to the President, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, July 1989

30. Back to timeline Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Aug 1990 - Mar 1991) On 2 August 1990 Iraqi forces crossed the border and seized the Emirate of Kuwait. The resulting coalition operations, Desert Shield (August 1990–January 1991) and Desert Storm (January–March 1991), also called the First Gulf War, represented the largest American military buildup and operations since Vietnam. The war saw the first use of stealth aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Laser-guided bombs struck fixed targets and stationary vehicles. Night vision and thermal imaging equipment gave Coalition armored forces a decisive advantage over the Iraqi tanks. Forward-looking infrared sensors gave Apache helicopters the same advantage. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) (still a prototype when Desert Storm began) tracked moving targets on the ground. Unmanned aerial vehicles provided tactical reconnaissance. Satellites provided high-resolution surveillance imagery, navigation data, and instant communications. Combat units and individual troops navigated in the desert using the new Global Positioning System (GPS). The successful use of this technology led to adoption of a concept known as a “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).” After the war, the Services began to realize RMA concepts. The Army, envisioned a “digitized” Army called Force XXI. In 1992, the Army ran a series of exercises called the Louisiana Maneuvers to explore the impact of the new information technology on Army organization and doctrine The Air Force emphasized stealth, precision munitions, and command and control networks as part of its “Global Reach, Global Power” concept. The Marine Corps tested concepts for fast, mobile operations called “Operational Maneuver From the Sea” and “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver.” The Navy embraced the system-of-systems approach with its concept of Network-Centric Warfare. In 1997, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally endorsed a variation of RMA doctrine with the publication of Joint Vision 2010 Sources: a. Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor, United States Army Center of Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 2005. b. The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs, Barry D. Watts, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011.

31. Back to Desert Storm/Desert Shield Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Characterized by a major, discontinuous leap in the effectiveness of military organizations in a short period of time (a few decades). Typically comprised of four elements: • Rapidly emerging technologies make new military systems possible • These new systems provide commanders new tools/options for solving strategic & operational problems • New operational concepts are developed to exploit these new tools/options • New organizations are created to execute the new operational concepts Summarized from a paper by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. (Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Marine Corps Gazette, November 1996

32. Back to timeline • Section 800 Panel Established (Nov 1990) • Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, directed establishment of an Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Laws. The Panel operated under the sponsorship of the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) which established a Panel Task Force of DSMC, military department and Defense Logistics Agency representatives to provide research and administrative support to the Panel. • Duties of the panel: • Review the acquisition laws applicable to the Department of Defense with a view toward streamlining the defense acquisition process; • Make any recommendations for the repeal or amendment of such laws that the panel considers necessary, as a result of such review, to— • Eliminate any such laws that are unnecessary for the establishment and administration of buyer and seller relationships in procurement; • Ensure the continuing financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs; and • Protect the best interests of the Department of Defense; and • Prepare a proposed code of relevant acquisition laws. • Final report was due to the USD(A) NLT Dec. 15, 1992. The final report of the USD(A), “together with such comments as he deems appropriate” was due to Congress NLT Jan. 15, 1993. Sources: a. Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, Public Law 101-510, Nov. 5, 1990. b. GAO/NSIAD-94-5, Acquisition Reform: DOD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel’s Operations and Report, December 1,1993 (B-255112)

33. Back to timeline • Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) (Nov 1990) • The DAWIA was enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1991. The 1986 Packard Commission had encouraged the president and Congress to “amend civil service laws to permit flexible personnel management policies for acquisition professionals, and to expand opportunities for the education and training of all acquisition personnel.” • A 1990 House Armed Services Committee report, The Quality and Professionalism of the Acquisition Workforce, found that all three services failed to appoint program managers and deputy program managers who had professional backgrounds that reflected the appropriate combination of training and experience. The lack of a college educated contracting workforce was also identified as a serious problem. Major provisions of the original DAWIA legislation included: • Authority for supervision of the acquisition workforce was placed under the USD(Acquisition) and the Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs). • Requirement to establish a Defense Acquisition University. • Requirement to establish Acquisition Corps, with Acquisition Career Boards within military departments to advise the SAEs. • Education and experience requirements for members of an Acquisition Corps, with additional mandatory training and experience requirements for PMs and Deputy PMs of major (now ACAT I) and significant non-major (now ACAT II) programs, and Program Executive Officers (PEOs), and GO/Flag officers and civilian equivalent in critical acquisition positions. • Baccalaureate degree or 24 semester hours in business disciplines for contracting personnel. • Prohibition against preference for military personnel in filling acquisition positions, unless required by law, or essential for performance of the duties of the position. Sources: a. Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor, United States Army Center of Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 2005. b. Section 1201, Public Law 101-510, Nov. 5, 1990 (NDAA 1991).

34. Back to timeline Collapse of the Soviet Union (Dec 1991) In late 1988 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev began withdrawing forces from Eastern Europe. This created an independent, democratic momentum that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the overthrow of Communist rule throughout Eastern Europe, and Germany reunified nearly a year later. The Warsaw Pact existed in name only, and it was finally dissolved formally in July 1991. An unsuccessful August 1991 coup against Gorbachev planned by hardline communists sealed the fate of the Soviet Union. The coup diminished Gorbachev’s power and propelled Boris Yeltsin, at the time the president of the Russian republic, one of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union, to the forefront of Soviet and Russian politics. Gorbachev resigned his leadership as head of the Communist party shortly thereafter. The Central Committee was then dissolved and Yeltsin banned communist party activities. A few days after the coup, Ukraine and Belarus declared their independence from the Soviet Union. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet hammer and sickle flag was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin, replaced by the Russian tricolor. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned his post as president of the Soviet Union, leaving Boris Yeltsin as president of a newly independent Russian state. Sources: a. Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor, United States Army Center of Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 2005. b. Department of State Historian, Milestones 1989-1992, The Collapse of the Soviet Union.

35. Back to timeline Defense Acquisition University Begins Operations (Aug 1, 1992) A Defense Acquisition University (DAU) structure was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, in Title XII of the Act cited as “Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act”. The Act specifies that the DAU includes the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). DAU was initially established in 1992 as the head of a consortium of training organizations that included courses taught by the military departments, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Contract Audit Institute, the Information Resources Management College, and DSMC. Both the President of the University and the Commandant of DSMC reported directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (now the USD(AT&L)). The reporting chain changed in 1994 with both reporting to a newly created Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition Reform. In July 1999, the DAU consortium transitioned to a unified structure, with all facilities, personnel (including faculty and staff) becoming direct employees reporting to the President. In June 2000, the DAU headquarters staff merged with the DSMC staff, completing the consolidation. DAU today consists of five campuses: Capital North East and DSMC at Fort Belvoir, VA; DAU South, Huntsville, AL; DAU West, San Diego, CA; DAU Mid-West, Kettering, Ohio; and DAU Mid-Atlantic, California, MD. The President of DAU currently reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. Sources: a. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, Title XII. b. The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce, 1992-2003, Evelyn Layton, The Defense Acquisition university Press, Jan 2007

36. Back to timeline Requirements Generation System (RGS) (Sep 1992) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 77, 17 Sep 1992, was issued to establish policies and procedures for the Requirements Generation System (RGS) called for by DODD 5000.01. MOP 77 provided the procedures for developing, reviewing, validating, and approving Mission Need Statements (MNS) and Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) required by DODI 5000.02. The 1991 DOD 5000.2-M contained the formats for the MNS and the ORD. This standardized requirements documents DOD-wide across all acquisition categories. The ORD contained Key Parameters (also referred to at the time as key performance parameters by DODI 5000.02) and Critical System Characteristics. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated potential ACAT I MNS and designated the validation authority for ORDs (normally a Service Chief). The JROC reviewed the key parameters extracted from the ORD and listed in the Acquisition Program Baseline before Milestone II, and each subsequent milestone review. Sponsoring Components assigned a Joint Potential Designator (JPD) to their MNS. The assigned JPD (Independent, Joint Interest, or Joint) was an assessment of the potential for joint development, joint procurement and joint program management. If the JROC determined that the JPD indicated a joint acquisition program was appropriate, the JROC recommended a lead service to the milestone decision authority. In June 1997 MOP 77 was replaced by CJCS Instruction 3170.01. In June 2003 RGS was replaced by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), CJCS Instruction 3170.01C Sources: a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy No, 77, 17 September 1992, Requirements Generation System Policy and Procedures. b. DoDI 5000.02, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, Feb. 23, 1991. c. DoD 5000.2-M, Defense Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports, Feb. 23, 1991.

37. Back to timeline • National Performance Review (NPR) (1993) • The goal of the National Performance Review initiated in 1993, and led by Vice President Al Gore, was to “reinvent government”. Procurement reform was at the center of the effort. • President Clinton had pledged to reduce President Bush’s last defense budget by at least $60 billion. A budget that had already been in decline since 1985. • Secretary of Defense Perry was the driving force behind the reform effort. The position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform was established with a staff to oversee all reform activities. Each military department established similar acquisition reform offices. Several important measures grew out of DoD efforts under the NPR: • SECDEF Perry’s 1994 plan, Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change. • The DoD Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group (ARSSG) • Legislative proposals based on the Section 800 Panel report • The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 • The Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995 • Interagency groups of experts called Process Action Teams (PATs) • The Single Process Initiative • The DAU Acquisition Reform Communications Center (ARCC) • The Acquisition Deskbook • Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) • Military Department initiatives, such as the Navy’s Acquisition Center of Excellence and Air Force “Lightening Bolts”. Source: Providing the Means of War, Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, Shannon A. Brown General Editor, United States Army Center of Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 2005.

38. Back to timeline • Section 800 Panel Report, Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws (Jan 1993) • The Section 800 Panel, the DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, was directed by section 800, Public Law 101-510, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991. • The Panel was chaired by RADM W.L. Vincent, Commandant of the Defense Systems Management College. Their report was transmitted to the congressional defense committees on Jan. 14, 1993 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. • Of particular importance were the Panel’s initiatives in three areas: • Streamlining: The detailed changes recommended for almost 300 statutes would result in a streamlined system of acquisition laws, more easily understood, administered, and implemented. • Commercial Items: The Panel recommended significant legislative changes in order to improve the Department's access to commercial technologies. Those recommendations are reflected not only in the Panel's analysis of the basic procurement statutes, such as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) and the Competition in Contracting Act, but they are also addressed in an entire chapter of its Report highlighting the extensive reforms needed to enhance the acquisition of commercial items, both as end-items and as components of DOD systems. • Simplified Acquisition: The Panel determined that the creation of a new "simplified acquisition threshold" - initially to be set at $100,000 - would streamline more than 50 percent of all DOD contract actions over $25,000, while affecting less than five percent of its contract dollars. Integral to these recommendations is a continued preference for small business, as well as measures needed to simplify contract management for both the Department and its suppliers. Sources: a. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009, An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox, Center of Military History, U.S. Army. b. Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws, Executive Summary: Report of the DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, Jan. 14, 1993.

39. Back to timeline Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform Created (May 1993) In 1993 the Clinton administration created the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) (ODUSD(AR)). The DUSD(AR) was chartered to direct “fundamental and far-reaching acquisition and procurement reform measures” with oversight responsibilities for the Acquisition Education Training and Career Development Directorate, the DAU, and the DSMC. Ms. Colleen Preston, a long-time staff member of the House Armed Services Committee was appointed as the DUSD(AR). In 2001 the DUSD (AR) was renamed DUSD (Acquisition Initiatives). In 2002, the offices of Director, Acquisition Initiatives and Director, Defense Procurement were merged into a new office, Director of Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). In 2018 DPAP was renamed Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC). Sources: a. USD(A) Memorandum for Director, Administration and Management, subject: Establish Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, May 14, 1993. b. Defense Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Report, Final Report, June 2007, Chapter 2, Organizations, Structure and Evolution of DoD Organizations, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics. c. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009, An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox, Center of Military History, U.S. Army.

40. Back to timeline • Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Oct 1993) • Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s October 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review provided direction for shifting America's focus away from a strategy designed to meet a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward the new dangers of the post-Cold War era. The review used the underlying strategy that the U.S. “must field forces sufficient to fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.” • The force modernization decisions included: • U.S. force structure enhancements by 1999: Army, 10 active and 5 reserve division; Navy, 11 active and 1 reserve carrier, 45-55 attack submarines, 346 ships; Air Force, 13 active and 7 reserve fighter wings, up to 184 bomber; Marine Corps, 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces, 174,000 active and 42,000 reserve personnel; Strategic Nuclear (by 2003), 18 ballistic missile submarines, up to 94 B-52H bombers, 20 B-2 bombers, and 500 Minuteman III ICBMs. • Equipment decisions included: • Develop and procure F/A-18E/F aircraft and terminate production of the F/A-18 C/D • Retire al A-6 aircraft by 1998 • Upgrade F-14 with limited ground attack capability • Develop and procure the F-22 aircraft • Cancel the A/F-X and the Multi-Role Fighter • Launch the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program • Field both the TAH-66 Comanche and AH-64 Longbow helicopter • Pursue a theater missile defense program that includes Patriot PAC-3, Standard Missile Block IVA, THAAD, and the Sea-based Upper Tier System; defer major work on Corps SAM until 1998 • Aircraft Carriers: Proceed with construction of CVN-76; defer long-lead funding for CVN-77 until 1999 • Attack submarines: Production of third Seawolf in FY1995 or 96, begin construction of follow-on to Seawolf class in FY1999 or 98 • V-22 Osprey, look at a range of options, tilt rotor and medium-lift helicopter alternatives. Source: Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993.

41. Back to timeline • SECDEF Perry’s Mandate for Change (Feb 1994) • Secretary of Defense Perry issued a white paper on Feb. 9, 1994, “Acquisition Reform A Mandate for Change.” The paper contained broad statements of principles and overall goals for acquisition reform during the Clinton administration. Secretary Perry considered the paper the effective start of the acquisition reform program. The paper discussed the following principles or themes: • Examples of the Need For Change • DoD is Often Unable to Acquire State-of-the-Art Commercial Technology • DoD is Often Unable to Buy from Commercial Companies - Even When Their Costs are Cheaper or DoD Must Buy a Commercial Product Because it is the Only One They Can Get. • DoDs Costs of Doing Business are Too Great • Maintaining Technological Superiority and a Strong National Industrial Base • Reducing Acquisition Costs Through Adoption of Business Practices Characteristic of World Class Suppliers • The Solution - A Vision for the Future • How to Re-Engineer the Acquisition System (Focus Areas for the soon to be established Process Action Teams (PATS) • Making Reform a Reality • Implementation Source: Acquisition Reform, A Mandate for Change, Feb. 9, 1994, Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense.

42. Back to timeline • Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Oct 1984) • The Section 800 Panel report became the basis of broader reform legislation. The result was the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). Congress accepted the bulk of the Section 800 Panel’s recommendations, supplemented by a few reform proposals from the vice president’s National Performance Review and some congressional ideas left over from the previous term. The provisions of FASA are scattered in sections of Title 10, U.S. Code for the military agencies and in Title 41 of the Code for civilian agencies. The FASA’s primary thrusts included: • The use of commercial products and simplifying the process of awarding and managing contracts in the hopes of luring more commercial firms into the defense market. • A broader definition of commercial items and reduction of requirements placed on offerors of such items. • Amendments to the Truth in Negotiations Act to relax the requirement for bidders to reveal cost or pricing data. • Requirements for the government to increase its use of electronic commerce and electronic data interchange and create the Federal Acquisition Network (FACNET), which would ease public access to the acquisition system. • Assigning responsibility for Live Fire Test and Evaluation to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). Subsequently the Live Fire Test Office was moved from USD (AT&L)’s Director, Developmental T&E to DOT&E. • Authority for the Secretary to waive full live-fire testing under certain circumstances Sources: a. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009, An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox, Center of Military History, U.S. Army. b. Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws, Executive Summary: Report of the DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, Jan. 14, 1993. c. Federal Streamlining Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355, Oct. 13, 1994)

43. Back to timeline • Acquisition Reform Process Action Teams (PATs) (1994-1996) • SECDEF Perry had outlined specific focus areas for re-engineering the acquisition system to be assigned to Process Action Teams (PATs) or workgroups in his 1994 White Paper, “Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change.” • The PATs were each chartered to investigate and make specific recommendations for improvement. Members were assigned from the military departments, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Acquisition University. They interviewed experts and senior officials from within and outside DoD. The following PATs were chartered and provided reports to the SECDEF from 1994 to 1996: • Acquisition Reform • Streamlining Regulations • Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange In Contracting • Military Specifications and Standards • Contract Administration • Procurement Process Reform • Communication and Outreach • Reducing Regulatory Cost • Acquisition Pilot Programs • Protest Reform • Strategic Outcome Metrics • Automated Acquisition Information Sources: a. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009, An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox, Center of Military History, U.S. Army. b. DoD Press Release 542-96, Sep. 20, 1996.

44. Back to timeline Program Management Training Restructured (1994-1995) Starting in 1994, the Defense Acquisition University redesigned certification training for the PM Career Field. In 1995, the mandatory 20-week Program Management Course (PMT-301) was replaced by a new 14-week Advanced Program Management Course (APMC) (PMT-302) for Level III Certification. This reduction was combined with a new requirement for students to satisfy mandatory Level I and II training requirements as a prerequisite for attendance at the Level III course. Concurrent with the development of APMC, DAU also developed a new “beyond Level III certification” 4-week Executive Program Management Course (EPMC) (PMT-303). EPMC was designated as mandatory to satisfy the public law requirement (10 USC 1735) for attendance at the DSMC Program Management Course for PMs and Deputy PMs of ACAT I and II programs, and PEOs. Background: The first public law requirement for PMs of MDAPs to attend the DSMC PMC, 10 USC 1622, was created by the DoD Authorization act for 1986. This requirement was expanded by the 1991 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) (National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991), as 10 USC 1735, to include PMs of ACAT II programs and Deputy PMs of both ACAT I and II programs and PEOs. The first major restructuring of PM training took place in 1988 with a division of PMC into 6 and 14 week segments. The two segments were still considered a collective 20-week program. The 6 week segment (Part I, fundamentals) was offered at the DSMC remote campuses. Students had the opportunity to “test-out” of the 6-week segment. The 14 week segment (Part II, advanced knowledge, case studies and exercises) was only offered at Fort Belvoir. By 1990, due to very negative student feedback, the two segment approach was eliminated, and the traditional 20-week course was again established at Fort Belvoir. Sources: a. From Packard to Perry, A Quarter Century of Service to the Defense Acquisition Community, DSMC, 1971-1996, Wilbur D. Jones, Jr., The DSMC Press, June 1996. b. Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce, 1992-2003, Evelyn Layton, The Defense Acquisition university Press, Jan 2007. c. DAU Catalog, 1994-1995.

45. Back to timeline • IPPD and IPT Processes Adopted (May 1995) • Secretary of Defense Perry chartered the Acquisition Reform Process Action Team (PAT) on Sep. 6, 1994. The PAT final report, Dec. 9, 1994, recommended that Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) be institutionalized to do oversight and review. • Our model abolishes the notion that advice to the decision maker should be functionally focused. Rather, we believe that the process will be more effective if oversight staffs use the Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach that Component program offices are currently adopting. Central to this approach is that advising staff would be organized into integrated product oversight teams led by program integrators. These integrators would have Program Executive Officer (PEO) qualifications and be accountable to the decision maker for providing integrated advice. • We recommend that there be only one formal review before a milestone decision meeting. The CAE will chair that review. An Integrated Product Team, comprised of users, OSD and Component staffs as well as program office staff, will prepare for the meeting. The team leader should be the product-focused, OSD Oversight IPT leader. The leader’s responsibilities are to accomplish all prerequisite activities and to resolve issues within the IPT. • The SECDEF directed implementation of Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) and IPTs in DoD Acquisition on May 10, 1995. USD(A&T) and ASD(C3I) released a guide for leading successful IPTs in Nov 1995. The guidance applied to program office IPTs, working-level IPTs (WIPTS), and Overarching IPTs (OIPTS). • Direction on the use of IPPD and IPTs was included in the March 15, 1996 DoDD 5000.1, and DoD 5000.2-R Sources: a. Acquisition Reform Process Action Team, Reengineering the Acquisition Oversight and Review Process: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 9 December 1994. b, Use of Integrated Product and Process Development and Integrated Product Teams in DoD Acquisition,” William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 10 May 1995. c. Rules of the Road, A Guide for Leading Successfully Integrated Product Teams, USD(A&T) and ASD(C3I). Nov. 1995

46. Back to timeline Single Process Initiative (SPI) (Dec 1995) In December 1995 DoD established an initiative aimed at reducing or eliminating multiple, government-unique management or manufacturing requirements to enable the establishment of common, facility-wide systems. This “block-change” process is known as the Single Process Initiative (SPI). Contractors could submit proposals/concept papers to reduce multiple, Government-directed business or manufacturing processes at a given site to a single process, where possible. The SPI program modified all applicable Government contracts via block change procedures to ensure that the benefits are not offset by administrative expense. The first two SPI agreements were with Texas Instruments. Within nine months, 103 contractors submitted 341 proposals covering 426 process changes, of which 349 process changes were accepted. DoD believed this approach was critical to the success of military specifications reform. Sources: a. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009, An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox, Center of Military History, U.S. Army. b. GAO/ NSIAD-97-48 Acquisition Reform, January 1997. c. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy web site, SPI Concept Paper, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/uid/spi_concept_paper.html#risk_documentation

47. Back to timeline • JROC Codified in Title 10 (Feb 1996) • The JROC was first established in 1986. Ten years later, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 (NDAA 1986) created 10 USC 181, which codified the JROC in Title 10. • Section 181, at the time, provided that the JROC members were: • The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is the chairman of the Council; • An Army officer in the grade of general; • A Navy officer in the grade of admiral; • An Air Force officer in the grade of general; and • A Marine Corps officer in the grade of general. • NDAA 2011 amended 10 USC 181 to designate the Vice Chairman as Chair of the JROC (although the Vice Chair had been delegated this function since inception). Sources: a. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 (Public Law 104-106, Feb. 10, 1996) Section 905. b. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011 (Public Law 111-383, Jan 7, 2011) Section 841.

48. Back to timeline Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) (Feb 1996) The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996, Division D (Federal Acquisition Reform Act, or FARA), and Division E (Information Technology Management Reform Act, or ITMRA) are collectively known as the Clinger - Cohen Act (CCA). Named after Rep. William Clinger, who authored FARA, and Senator William Cohen who drafted ITMRA. ITMRA repealed Section 111 the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (i.e., the Brooks Act), eliminating GSA’s role in the oversight of information technology acquisitions. ITMRA authorized the use of modular contracting for acquisition of information technology, established the Chief Information Officer (CIO) structure, and contains other requirements for the management of information technology within the government. FARA exempted commercial items acquisition from the application of cost accounting standards, authorized the use of efficiency criteria in competitive range determinations, and made numerous amendments to FASA. FARA also established a requirement for a professional acquisition workforce in non-DoD federal agencies modeled after DAWIA. DoDI 5000.02 summarizes the CCA certification requirements for all programs that acquire information technology in Table 10, CCA Compliance. Enclosure 11 of DoDI 5000.02 provides additional detail for CCA compliance in accordance with Subtitle III, of Title 40 U.S. Code. Sources: a. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 (Public Law 104-106, Feb. 10, 1996), House Report 104-450, Jan. 22, 1996. b. DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Jan. 7, 2015, with change 2, Feb. 2, 2017

49. Back to timeline Defense Acquisition Deskbook (Jul 1996) To help implement the results of acquisition reform, the nearly 900 pages of DoD Directive 5000.1, DoD Instruction 5000.2, and DoD Manual 5000.2M were replaced by two new documents: DoD Directive 5000.1 and a regulation, DoD 5000.2-R, about 160 pages with mandatory policy and procedure. Discretionary practice and optional document formats were issued in a CD-based Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD) on July 31, 1996. The Deskbook was managed by an Air Force led joint program office reporting to the DUSD(Acquisition Reform). The Deskbook was available on CD, or via download from the Deskbook Website. The Deskbook CD was updated periodically with the current and complete body of acquisition information including the FAR, DFARS, the DoDD 5000.1 and 5000.2- R, and every statute and document reference in the two 5000 documents, and numerous Service and Agency documents. Deskbook was replaced by an interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) in 2002, and a final DAG posted to the DAU web site in 2004. Defense Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Report, Final Report, June 2007, Addendum, Annex K, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics.

50. Back to timeline • QDR 1997 Report (May 1997) • Secretary of Defense Cohen’s QDR Report, May 1997, determined that U.S. forces must be capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars simultaneously (as did Secretary Aspin’s Bottom-Up Review). QDR 1997 placed more emphasis on the need to maintain continuous presence overseas to shape the international environment and be better able to respond to smaller-scale contingencies and asymmetric threats. Highlights of the QDR decisions included: • Army retains 10 active divisions, but with a reduction of 15,000 active duty personnel • Navy retains 12 carrier battle groups, and 12 amphibious ready groups; reduces surface combatants form 128 to 116. Attack submarines reduced from 73 to 50. Procurement of F/A-18 e/F aircraft cut from 1000 to 548 with the transition to the Joint Strike Fighter, with an option to procure additional F-18 E/F up to a maximum of 785 if JSF development requires more time. Streamlining of overseas infrastructure and transfer of some ships and functions to the Military Sealift Command will allow the Navy to reduce active strength by 18,00 and reserve personnel by 4,100. • Air Force consolidates fighter and bomber units to streamline its command structure, and shifts one active component fighter wing to the reserves. Fighter forces will be 12 active and 8 reserve fighter wing equivalents to allow a reduction of 27,000 active duty. F-22 procurement will proceed to replace the F-15 C/D; total number of F-22 to be procured reduced from 438 to 339. • Marine Corps will make modest reduction in end strength by restructuring support responsibilities, and will maintain a three Marine Expeditionary Force capability. V-22 tilt rotor aircraft procurement will be accelerated, while total number will be reduced to 360. • Total active strength will drop to 1,360,000 (down 36% from 1989P with 835,000 in the reserves (down 29% from 1989. Civilian personnel drop to 640,000 (down 42% from 1989. • Army procurement of Theater High Altitude Air Defense System slows due to technical problems, deployment delayed from 2004 to 2006. • National Missile Defense (NMD) remains a high priority, but FY 2000 targets cannot be met with current budgets. NMD will remain a program of high schedule and technical risk • Increased focus will be placed on asymmetric threats ranging from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to attacks via information warfare and terrorism. • Strategic nuclear forces are on track, no change in policy or strategy needed. • Two additional rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) will be requested Source: Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, May 1997.