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Much Ado About Nothing?

Much Ado About Nothing?. Command Relations in Amphibious Operations CAPT Don Inbody, USN. “You can get your planes to do anything you want, but we can’t get the Air Force to do a goddam thing!” Lt. Gen. Patton to VADM Hewitt July 1943. At Issue.

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Much Ado About Nothing?

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  1. Much Ado About Nothing? Command Relations in Amphibious Operations CAPT Don Inbody, USN

  2. “You can get your planes to do anything you want, but we can’t get the Air Force to do a goddam thing!” Lt. Gen. Patton to VADM Hewitt July 1943

  3. At Issue • What is the best command relationship between CATF and CLF? • OPCON Command (Doctrinal) • Support Command (Test) • Joint Pub 3-02 • Test Pub 3-02

  4. OPCON Command

  5. Support Command

  6. Amphibious History • Historical Examples • Examine Command Relations • Landing Force Commander • Navy Force Commander • Determine major contentious issues for the commanders

  7. Historical Examples (33) • Veracruz Expedition • Civil War Western Campaign • Gallipoli • Guadalcanal • North Africa • Sicily • Salerno • New Guinea Campaign (15 landings) • Tarawa (2 landings) • Marianas (3 landings) • Normandy • Southern France • Leyte • Iwo Jima • Okinawa • Inchon

  8. Command Relations Regimes • Cooperation (Support Command) • OPCON Command • Expeditionary OPCON

  9. Gallipoli • Cooperation • Technical problems with landing • Technical problems with C2 • No problems related to command relations

  10. Guadalcanal • Expeditionary OPCON • Landing Force Opcon to ATF • Issue: CVs supporting ATF • Issue: CATF Controlling movements of landing force.

  11. Sicily • Cooperation • Issue: Air/CV Support • Airborne movements not coordinated

  12. Salerno • Cooperation (Support Command) • Withdrawal from landing beach • Issue: Air Support (cooperative) • CV Support

  13. New Guinea Campaign • Cooperation (3 landings) • OPCON (12 landings) • Issue: CV support • MacArthur presence (Strong CinC) Mitigated command relations problems

  14. Leyte • OPCON Command • Issue: CV Support of ATF

  15. Marianas • OPCON Command • Issue: Corps Control of Separated landings (resolved)

  16. Iwo Jima • Issue: Pre D-day NGFS • resolved for Okinawa

  17. Summary

  18. Cooperation (Support) Issues • Gallipoli C2 from ship to shore • New Guinea CV Support (x3) • Sicily Air/CV Support • Sicily Airborne coordination

  19. Expeditionary OPCON Issues • Guadalcanal CV Support

  20. OPCON Command Issues • Salerno Air Support • New Guinea CV Support (x8) • Marianas CLF Corps Cmd • Leyte CV Support • Iwo Jima Pre D-day Fires

  21. Summary of Issues

  22. Conclusions • Air/CV Support is principal issue • Large carriers never under CATF control • Land Based Air power not responsive to CLF control • CATF & CLF relationship • Different command relationship would not have solved most issues

  23. Conclusions (cont) • Landing Force Commander must have equal access to higher headquarters • Strong JFC can mitigate coordination issues • JFC’s presence • MacArthur (SWPA, Inchon) • Spruance • Clear commander’s guidance

  24. Conclusions (cont) • CATF will ultimately support CLF

  25. Implications for Joint Force Cdr • JFC must provide clear guidance for air support • JFC must provide clear commander’s guidance to CLF and CATF

  26. Much Ado About Nothing? Maybe so...

  27. “Land Officers have no pretense to command at sea. Sea Officers have no pretense to command on land.”Royal Navy Signal Book1744

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