The worst thing about best practice in media self-regulation: pitfalls of selective borrowings and ad hoc tr

1. The worst thing about best practice in media self-regulation: pitfalls of selective borrowings and ad hoc transplants. Presentation by Guy Berger, at Colloquium “Media, democracy and transformation since 1994: an assessment” Grahamstown, 15-16 October, 2010

2. Coming up • Context • Best Practice • Finding filters • Guiding criteria • Application • Conclusion

3. 1. Context • ANC NGC: Parliament was requested “to conduct a public inquiry on: … media accountability mechanism in the public interest, including the investigations into the best international practices without compromising the values enshrined in our Constitution.” (my emphasis)

4. Eg. UK Press Complaints commission • A model of “shared commitment to the strengthening and further development of self-regulatory mechanisms”? (Mtimde) • Complexity is: should it also be a model for him in regard to being non-statutory? • “Most democracies do not have statutory councils” (Ayesha Kajee) • Complexity: is the majority always right?

5. Some problematic cases • The BBC and the UK PCC have high status, but like ties-and-jackets may have value outside their context mainly to colonised minds. • South Africa was a model for much of Africa – now countries with poor media policies (eg. Zambia) are opportunisticallyjustifying their bad practice by saying self-regulation has failed in SA. • Something like OBE schooling may work fine in New Zealand, but it mismatched SA conditions.

6. Billions to borrow from… For example: • Should the ombud be an advocate (Sweden)? • Should the SA broadcast model apply? • Should govt fund, but not appoint (Kenya)? • The issue is finding a way between: • Un-systematic and/or expedientborrowing, & • Adopting an entirely relativistic position in which no system is better than another.

7. 2. Best practice • Franz Kruger: Compare SADC councils to each other and “the international norm” and “a sense of best practice will emerge”. • But “best” also depends on knowledge about a practice having transcended the barriers of language, non-codification, inaccessibility. • Power colours whether we beg, borrow, steal mimic, create or export. • All the more cause for a conscious system!

8. 3. Finding filters Democratic governance is not a sure filter • SA does not emulate the UK’s democracy-sans-a-written-Constitution. • Nor do we trust in Holland’s giving the Queen the authority to approve broadcast licences. • Zimbabwe’s imperfect democracy still may exhibit models like ZBC’s cultural coverage. • Swazi monarchy has agreed to self- regulation.

9. Package deals or unbundling? • What is success in borrowing a part without the whole? iTunes single-songs vs DSTV bouquet? • Could we dis-articulate the different elements of “statutory” (which are often integrated together): • Arm of government (or Ch 9?) • State involvement in appointments (parlia/pres?) • Public funding (eg. Germany’s non-statutory council) • Official recognition (eg. of Code of Conduct) • Power (conditionally devolved or delegated)

10. 4. Guiding criteria Here’s my MAD proposal Subject all cases of borrowing to a 3 part test: • Match purpose and explore fit-for-purpose in original context. • Abstract, in search of generalizable rules. • Destination analysis – discern if there are convivial transplant conditions.

11. 4.1 Match purpose & fit-for-purpose • If it don’t work @home, can it elsewhere? • Assess the causes, and the contingencies. • NB: Does the purpose match our purpose: • Eg. PCC purpose is to reduce privacy invasions – hence it encourages people to complain • South Africa doesn’t have this as major problem. • But this criterion is only a necessary, and not sufficient, condition for successful borrowing.

12. 4.2 Abstract, for generalizable rules • Quantitative method: The majority do it. • (But are they right, and could we not do even better?) • Qualitative method: Weber’s ideal type model • Creates a logical coherent and aspirational checklist • (But where do you stop with features? And how do you sidestep non-consensual normative aspects?) • This criterion adds value to borrowing, but it is also insufficient on its own.

13. 4.3 Destination analysis: will it fit? • Local appetite and capacity for the borrowing? • Are there social, economic, cultural features in the destination context to support it? • Points us not just to adopting, but adapting! • Yet on its own, this criterion leans towards autarchy and xenophobia: “non-African” • It can lower aspirations to specific cases elsewhere and to general standards.

14. 5. Application My paper examines the validity of borrowing in four instances: • SA broadcasting regulation • Fiji’s “Media Appeals Tribunal” • India’s statutory council • Proactive vs reactive roles

15. 6. Conclusion • Tripartite test: (1) Match source, (2) Abstract a model (3), Destination fitness analysis. • Could MAD be a best practice for best practice? • Others borrowing from SA, should possibly borrow this methodology before utilising our experiences as best practices. • Everyone has power to not just copy the MAD method, but adapt it or develop a better one!

16. Thank you