1 / 22

UNCLASSIFIED

Adapting Missile Defense to Evolving Long-Range Threats Dr. Azriel Lorber, R.T.G. and Gil Naor, R.T.G. First Israel Multinational BMD Conference. Adapting MD Defense to Evolving LR Threats - 1 /22 MAY 5-6, 2010. UNCLASSIFIED. Introduction.

cathy
Download Presentation

UNCLASSIFIED

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Adapting Missile Defense to EvolvingLong-Range ThreatsDr. Azriel Lorber, R.T.G.andGil Naor, R.T.G.First Israel Multinational BMD Conference Adapting MD Defense to Evolving LR Threats - 1/22 MAY 5-6, 2010 UNCLASSIFIED

  2. Introduction • Current defence doctrines against ballistic weapons consist of Deterrence and Active Defense • Deterrence was eminently successful during the cold war and active defense will probably be as successful against current threats • However, worldwide social and technological developments pose some questions about the future viability of deterrence and point to the necessity of adapting active defense to future threats UNCLASSIFIED

  3. Some Comments on Past Defense Doctrines • Modern deterrence was formulated during the Cold War and was based on several generally accepted premises: • There existed a linkage between the adversary and his home territory and population • Both sides understood the danger of nuclear war as a tool of foreign policy • Both sides had similar concepts about what constitutes a “successful” war UNCLASSIFIED

  4. Some Comments on Past Defense Doctrines(Cont.) • Both sides had efficient intelligence and analysis systems • Leaders of both sides were careful and pragmatic • Because deterrence depended on MAD, both sides made efforts to reduce the danger of unsanctioned firing (culminating in the so-called ”Red-Line”) • Just to be credible, both sides also invested in massive second and third strike capabilities UNCLASSIFIED

  5. Some Comments on Past Defense Doctrines (Cont.) • Two more lines of action were considered: • Preemption - a surprise attack – sought to destroy the adversary’s strategic forces, including his second and third strike capability Although enticing, this could never be achieved because of a host of intelligence and operational problems • Active defense efforts were started but some regarded them as destabilizing the deterrence balance UNCLASSIFIED

  6. UNCLASSIFIED

  7. Current Strategic Defense Thinking • The SDI, based on a non-fatalistic approach to survival, brought Active defense back into the mainstream of defense thinking • Today, deterrence still serves as policy tool of the superpowers • Active defense is considered as a shield only against limited attacks against the US and its allies • However, accelerated proliferation of WMD and long range weapons throws this orderly world-picture into disarray UNCLASSIFIED

  8. Political Consequences of Technological Developments in the State of the Art • Until recently, guided artillery rockets and ballistic missiles were produced only in countries with the necessary infrastructure BUT • Indiscriminate terrorism created new trends: • “Home production” of solid fuels and rockets • Experimentation in order to improve performance • Advice and materièl support by rogue states UNCLASSIFIED

  9. Terrorist Rocket’ Solid Propellant Production UNCLASSIFIED

  10. Terrorist RocketsExperimenting With Various Nozzle Configurations UNCLASSIFIED

  11. Political Consequences of Technological Developments in the State of the Art (Cont.) • Long-range artillery rockets are openly marketed by many countries for ”business” reasons • Such weapons are also clandestinely supplied to various terrorist organizations UNCLASSIFIED

  12. UNCLASSIFIED

  13. A New Look at Emerging Threats • Video-Game Technology and eBay supplied components are now available for ”home” design of guidance systems for rockets • Thus, the transfer of guided artillery rockets (such as the SS-26 and the Fateh-110) and ”real” SRBMs to terrorist organizations, or ”home-made” upgrading of ”dumb” artillery rockets, cannot be ruled out • Finally, there is the danger that a country possesing ballistic missiles and WMD will collapse into a ”Failed State” condition, with its arsenals open for grabs UNCLASSIFIED

  14. A New Look at Emerging Threats (Cont.) • Whatever the mechanism, it can be safely predicted that it’s only a question of time until terrorist organizations will acquire long range, accurate ballistic weapons • Such organizations are not limited to specific territories or locations although they sometimes control enclaves within the borders of sovereign countries UNCLASSIFIED

  15. Some Problems in Coping with the New Threats - Deterrence • Current missile defence doctrines and systems are directed against ”State Threats”. But..... • Deterrence will not be effective against suicidal bent national leaders, or ones with alien perceptions about the desirability of aggression • Neither will deterrence mean anything to a terror organization which owes allegiance to nobody, is not acountable to anybody and does not shun any means to achieve its goals UNCLASSIFIED

  16. A Quote to Heed ”We are not bound by any circumstances, or to anybody, and will continue to fight as it is convenient and advantageous to us and by our rules.” Shamil Basayev, the Chechen commander and mastermind of the Beslan massacre (Quoted in ”Brave New War” by John Robb) UNCLASSIFIED

  17. Some Problems in Coping With the New Threats - Preemption • A large-scale preemptive strike against a rogue state is politically problematical • Nor will it be operationally simple against the assets of a terrorist organization sheltered by another country • In both cases it will require perfect up-to-date intelligence, may entail collateral damage and if performed on the high-seas will constitute an ”Act of Piracy” UNCLASSIFIED

  18. An Outline for Future Defense Measures • The multiplicity of globally widening threats will increase demands on defense resources • The problems of defense against coordinated attacks by both long-range and short-range weapons will have to be addressed • Some of these difficulties can be ameliorated by regional cooperation in defense efforts, which will become an absolute necessity • This cooperation should extend down to the operational level, including real-time sensor data sharing and integration of firing assets UNCLASSIFIED

  19. An Outline for Future Defense Measures (Cont.) • Further defense efforts can be shored up by the following measures: • For starters, ammendment of the MTCR guidelines to reduce permissible ranges and warhead weights UNCLASSIFIED

  20. An Outline for Future Defense Measures (Cont.) • It should be accepted that a major part of the blame is to be put at the door of the suppliers of such technology and hardware! This leading to - • A less lenient attitude towards suppliers of weapon systems that find their way to terrorist organizations UNCLASSIFIED

  21. An Outline for Future Defense Measures (Cont.) • While the above suggestions will be useful if adopted, there will be political difficulties in their actual implementation • As an interim measure, a worldwide ”Ballistic Threats Assessment and Analysis” dedicated body should be established..... • Leading to a worldwide real-time cooperation in pertinent intelligence • This will be politically more palatable, and if and when necessary, operationally very useful UNCLASSIFIED

  22. Thank you UNCLASSIFIED

More Related