Group formation, identities and mobilisation – Findings and policy implications

1. Group formation, identities and mobilisation – Findings and policy implications Yvan Guichaoua MICROCON workshop June-July 2011

2. Project’s organisation

3. A fast-growing research field • Dominant analytical framework when the project started: greed models, flawed in many respects • Role of natural resources dependence has been reconsidered • A-historical (no interaction with the state) • Absence micro-foundations (‘loose molecules’ assumption) • Need to know what armed groups are empirically made of • Weinstein’s more sophisticated account • Micro-level approach • Opportunists vs activists • The central role of finance • Still a very top-down, static approach, not fully valid empirically • Present research trends (inc. MICROCON) • In depth case studies, individual surveys, refinement of the Horizontal Inequalities’ approach  more complex yet more empirically accurate approaches

4. Articulating MICROCON’s findings • A major caveat: violence is a special kind of conflict • Users of force become prominent (veterans and sportsmen) • Rules of the game and dynamics are different • Armed groups consolidate through a matching process • First movers: entrepreneurs of violence • Rank-and-file: multiple logics of participation • Emerging research topic: armed groups’ behaviours

5. What do Entrepreneurs of violence do? • Collective action puzzle: attracting (the right) followers • Identity production: the cognitive dimension of violent enlistment • Top-down or bottom-up? • Which identities work? Religion v ethnicity • Performative repertoires? (Does Radio Mille Collines produce killers?) • Brokerage between violent actors • Horizontal networks (loyalty trading) and peer effects • Vertical (clientelistic) networks: Côte d’Ivoire Young Patriots, electoral violence in Nigeria

6. Mapping out (non rival) logics of individual participation Irregular armed groups stem from the percolation of heterogeneous logics

7. Armed groups’ behaviours • Armed groups are places where behavioural norms are produced through explicit training, collective learning and violent socialisation. Reasons why people stay in groups differ from the ones which made them join • A great variety of outcomes • Entrenchment in no war / no peace types of governance • Violent radicalisation / sectarian drifts • Political normalisation (e.g. today’s RENAMO) • Annihilation through repressive means • Factionalisation • Criminalisation • ‘Zombification’ / hijacking... • What shapes armed groups’ trajectories? • Internal match or mismatch • Interactions with civilians: civilians are not bystanders • Interactions with state actors

8. Some conclusions • Huge heterogeneity of causes, trajectories and outcomes • Collective violence is fundamentally an interactive process. States actions shape trajectories of irregular armed groups before, during and after violent conflicts. Groups’ evolution depend on outside influences  There is room for intervention • Tailored to address local demands (e.g. Liberia) • Timely (e.g. Niger)

9. Remaining challenges • Improving our understanding of heterogeneity • From a policy perspective. Integrating the micro and the macro. How can micro-level initiatives succeed in absence of macro-level will to make things change? • Nigeria’s dirty electoral politics • A Swiss initiative in Northern Mali