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Optimal Defense Strategy Against Intentional Attacks

Optimal Defense Strategy Against Intentional Attacks. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 56, NO. 1, MARCH 2007. Instructor: Professor Frank Y.S. Lin Presented by Guan-Wei Chen 陳冠瑋. Outline. Introduction Model Defense Strategy Optimization Problems

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Optimal Defense Strategy Against Intentional Attacks

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  1. Optimal Defense Strategy Against Intentional Attacks IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 56, NO. 1, MARCH 2007 Instructor: Professor Frank Y.S. Lin Presented by Guan-Wei Chen 陳冠瑋

  2. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions and my work OPLAB IM NTU

  3. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions and my work OPLAB IM NTU

  4. Introduction • Intentional attacks V.S. Accidents • The attacker has always an advantage over the defender • Defender’s optimal policy should take into account the attacker’s strategy • Attackers maximize either the success probability of an attack, or expected damage OPLAB IM NTU

  5. Introduction • A survivable system is • “complete its mission in a timely manner, even if significant portions are incapacitated by attack or accident” • External factors (attacks) and internal cause (failures) • Each state can be characterized by a system performance rate, which is the quantitative measure of a system’s ability to perform its task OPLAB IM NTU

  6. Introduction • Defense strategy presumes separation and protection of system elements • Attackers maximize the expected damage of attacks • Using a universal generating function technique for evaluating the losses • Genetic algorithm for optimal strategy OPLAB IM NTU

  7. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  8. Component n Protected group m elements Model- Nomenclature OPLAB IM NTU

  9. Model - Nomenclature OPLAB IM NTU

  10. Model - Nomenclature OPLAB IM NTU

  11. ModelThe probabilistic distribution of system performance • For any given attacker’s α, and defender’s β, γ • A function of losses associated with thesystem performance reduction below the demand W OPLAB IM NTU

  12. Model- The loss cost • The expected cost of these losses • When the losses are proportional to the unsupplied demand OPLAB IM NTU

  13. Model - The loss cost • The system totally fails when its performance becomes lower than the demand • For variable demand with pmf OPLAB IM NTU

  14. Model- The total expected damage 成功攻克機率 Performance 沒達到所需的Demand下的損失。 PG內elements的本身價值 PG的本身價值 OPLAB IM NTU

  15. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Single attack • Multiple attack • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  16. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Minimize the expected damage and total defense investment cost • for constrained case • for unconstrained case 總投入防禦成本 expected damage OPLAB IM NTU

  17. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Single Attack • Single attack is realistic because of limited resources • The attacker being detected and disable • The attacks on different PG are mutually exclusive events OPLAB IM NTU

  18. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Single Attack (1) • The attacker has perfect knowledge and its defenses • Attacker’s strategy: • Optimal defender’s strategies: OPLAB IM NTU

  19. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Single Attack (2) • has perfect knowledge but not knows its defenses • Attacker’s strategy: • Optimal defender’s strategies: OPLAB IM NTU

  20. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Single Attack (3) • Has no information, and can’t direct the attack precisely (low-precision missile attack) • Choose targets at random OPLAB IM NTU

  21. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Single Attack (3) • Imperfect knowledge • Attacker’s strategy: • Optimal defender’s strategies: OPLAB IM NTU

  22. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Single attack • Multiple attack • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  23. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Multiple Attacks • Several targets can be attacked • Worst case is unlimited attacker’s resources • Any target is attacked with probability 1 • Attacker’s budget is limited, the most effective attack strategy: OPLAB IM NTU

  24. Defense Strategy Optimization Problems- Multiple Attacks • Under imperfect information, the attack probability can be positive or negative correlation with the damage • Different attacks are not mutually exclusive • The optimal defense strategy: OPLAB IM NTU

  25. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Universal Generating Function Technique • Incorporating PG Destruction Probability • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  26. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • To develop an algorithm for evaluating the expected damage D (α, β, γ) • The system performance distribution can be obtained using • The universal generating function (u-function) OPLAB IM NTU

  27. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance- Universal Generating Function • The pmf of a discrete random Y variable is defined as a polynomial • Two independent random variables are φ (Y, T) OPLAB IM NTU

  28. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance- Universal Generating Function • The composition functions φ depends on the type of connection between the elements, and on the type of the system • a pair of elements connected in parallel • a pair of elements connected in series OPLAB IM NTU

  29. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance- In our case • The u-functions can represent performance distributions of individual systemelements, and their groups • Element k of component n have two states • Nominal performance (probability ) • Total failure performance (probability ) η Performance 以elements來看 OPLAB IM NTU

  30. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance- recursive procedure 1 • Entire system performance can be obtain: • Find any pair of system elements connected in parallel, or in series. • Obtain the u-function of this pair using the corresponding composition operator over two u-functions of the elements, where the function is determined by the nature of the interaction between elements’ performances. • Replace the pair with a single element having the u-function obtained in step 2. • If the system contains more than one element, return to step 1. OPLAB IM NTU

  31. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Universal Generating Function Technique • Incorporating PG Destruction Probability • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  32. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance- Incorporating PG Destruction Probability • U-function represents the PG’s cumulative performance which is not destroyed • Protection of type β • Be destroyed probability • Normal working probability • The component u-function is The component performance 攻擊失敗機率 攻擊成功機率 OPLAB IM NTU

  33. Evaluating the pmd of System Performance- Procedure 2 計算elements所組成的PG的performance 計算PG所組成的component的system performance OPLAB IM NTU

  34. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  35. Optimization Technique • Exhaustive examinations of all possible solutions are infeasible • In most combinatorial optimization problems, the quality of a given solution is the only information available • A heuristic search algorithm is needed which uses estimates of solution quality OPLAB IM NTU

  36. Optimization Technique • Meta-heuristics: Genetic Algorithm, Simulated Annealing, Tabu Serach, Threshold Accepting • Defense strategy β, γ can be represented by concatenation of integer string Elements在PG內的分布情形 PG所被選擇的保護type OPLAB IM NTU

  37. Optimization Technique- GA implementation • An initial population of randomly constructed solutions (strings) is generated • new solutions are obtained by using crossover, and mutation operators • This procedure avoids premature convergence to a local optimum, and facilitates jumps in the solution space. OPLAB IM NTU

  38. Optimization Technique- GA implementation • Each new solution is decoded, and its objective function (fitness) values are estimated • The fitness values are a measure of quality, and used to compare different solutions • The comparison is accomplished by a selection procedure that determines which solution is better OPLAB IM NTU

  39. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions OPLAB IM NTU

  40. The series-parallel system (power substation) • Five component: • Power transformers • Capacitor banks • Input high voltage line sections, • Output medium voltage line sections, • Blocks of commutation equipment. • Within each component, the elements can be separated in an arbitrary way, and protected OPLAB IM NTU

  41. Illustrative Examples- Characteristics of system elements OPLAB IM NTU

  42. Illustrative Examples- power substation 五個電子component 系統脆弱度 Element 個別的保護cost 保護的類別 OPLAB IM NTU

  43. Illustrative Examples- power substation • The system demand is constant W = 120 • The cost is proportional to the unsupplied demand with ε= 85 • Three cases are discussed: • single attack with perfect attacker’s knowledge • single attack with no perfect knowledge • multiple attacks with unlimited attacker’s resources OPLAB IM NTU

  44. Illustrative Examples- Single without knowledge • Separation is very effective against single attacks because it reduces the damage caused • the total separation is used for a minimal defense budget OPLAB IM NTU

  45. Illustrative Examples- Single with knowledge • Find the most attractive PG to attack: The same PG with protection of type 1 OPLAB IM NTU

  46. Illustrative Examples- unlimited multiple attack • all the PG can be attacked simultaneously • the protection plays a more important role than the separation OPLAB IM NTU

  47. Illustrative Examples • The demand is relatively small, and the separation is efficient • The demand is close to the maximal possible system performance OPLAB IM NTU

  48. Illustrative Examples • The investment-effect relationship provides important information to decision makers • Knowing how the increase of the defense budget can reduce the expected damage Budget = 125 Damage= 4266.9 OPLAB IM NTU

  49. Outline • Introduction • Model • Defense Strategy Optimization Problems • Evaluating the pmd of System Performance • Optimization Technique • Illustrative Examples • Conclusions and my work OPLAB IM NTU

  50. Conclusions • Aimed at developing the optimal defense strategy under different: • conditions of the system functioning • scenarios of the attacker’s behavior • The universal generating technique used for evaluating the expected damage D • With optimization meta-heuristics used for solving complex optimization problems OPLAB IM NTU

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