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The ESS Ion Source and LEBT Test Stand Safety Readiness Review from a Personnel Safety System Perspective. Stuart Birch ESS ICS Protection Systems Group Senior Engineer Personnel Safety Systems. ASW 2018-08-22. Contents. ISrc & LEBT System Overview PSS0 Overview
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The ESS Ion Source and LEBT Test Stand Safety Readiness Review from a Personnel Safety System Perspective Stuart Birch ESS ICS Protection Systems Group Senior Engineer Personnel Safety Systems ASW 2018-08-22
Contents • ISrc & LEBT System Overview • PSS0 Overview • Safety Readiness Review Lessons Learned
ESS layout (July 2018) Ion source and LEBT Target Local control room
ESS layout Cooling water skid Local control room Electrical power (racks) Ion source and LEBT
Ion Source and LEBT Sub-system overview EMU 1 EMU 2 Faraday cup Doppler shift NPM 1 ACCT NPM 2 Ion source Solenoid 1 Iris Chopper Solenoid 2 Collimator Electron repeller Electron repeller Gate valve Gate valve Pumping box Permanent tank Commissioning tank ACCT: AC current transformer EMU: Emittance measurement unit NPM: Non-invasive profile monitor
High level PSS0 system requirements The primary role of the PSS0 is to protect workers from being harmed by exposure to high voltage (HV) arising from the ISrc and LEBT test stand operation. This is achieved by preventing the access of workers to the PSS0 controlled area when a HV hazard is present and allowing safe access when the HV hazard is removed.
PSS0 Design interfaces Safety Fence High Voltage Platform PSS0 Safety switches & Lock Mounted on Ion Source Safety Fence Door H2 Gas Pumping Box LEBT Plasma Chamber Extraction System Magnetron 3 x Solenoid Repeller 2 x TMP Magnetron fast Shutdown Unit RGA Magnetron PS 3 x Solenoid PS Grounding Rod Repeller PS Controls High Voltage Power Supply Isolation Transformer Grounding Relay Ion Source Interlock PLC PSS0 Interlock Signal To High Voltage Power Supply Ion Source Mains Incoming Power 400Vac Contactor 1. Contactor 2
High level PSS0 system requirements - Functional safety standard PSS0 is developed and complies with IEC-61508/IEC 61511: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. • Designed, manufactured, commissioned and validated to IEC61508, using proven technology. • Designed as a two train system • Designed as fail safe system • Will include the following, in its design philosophy: • Single failure • Common Cause Failure • Redundancy • Diversity • Separation
PSS0 system documents and reviews Parent System Activities SRR ORR TRR SAR IRR Software Pre FAT Test Report Template SIT Test Report Template FIT Test Report Template Overall Safety Requirements and their Allocation Concept Scope Software Pre-FAT Pre-FAT Test Report Safety Requirements Specification Hazard And Risk Analysis Validation Report FIT Test Report SIT Test Report SAT Test Report Hardware SAT Validation FIT PDR SIT CDR Interface Control Document Hazard Register Software SAT Software FAT FAT Test Report Hardware FAT Con Ops Hardware Design Document V & V Plan SAT Test Report Template FAT Test Report Template Validation Report Template Software Design Document Electrical Drawings Mechanical Drawings Installation and Commissioning Plan Personnel Safety System System Activities
SRR REVIEW - Lessons learned First Safety Readiness Review at ESS! First review of this type which involved authorities! A steep learning curve for stakeholders and the facility itself. Was the PSS team really ready?
SRR REVIEW - Lessons learnedSRR Committee Comments • Committee Observations • PSS0 looks to be well organized and implemented. The system is designed as a redundant SIL 2 system exceeding what is required for a high voltage enclosure. PSS0 partially fulfils SSM requirements for radiation safety putting ESS in a stronger position for later phases. • Once PSS0 is commissioned, validated and released to operations, the system falls under formal Radiation Protection work control processes. • PSS software configuration controls will be needed for the next SRR covering PLC programming software, PSS code within the safety PLC and safety PLC firmware • Recommendations • Pre-start • PSS0 validation test procedures must be completed before beam commissioning • A mechanism is necessary for control of the HV Permit key between operating shifts • A mechanism is necessary for control of the primary Fortress key, if using the override key, to avoid access with the HV on • Internal Observations • The PSS team delivered a well structured set of PSS0 documents for the review. • Excellent system delivery, i.e. design, installation etc. etc. • System demonstration, Excellent. • Really good feedback from Committee and ESH&Q team.
SRR REVIEW - Lessons learned • Verification and Validation • Ensure that before any further SRR’s we shall complete SIT, FIT and Validation. This will require more effective communication and planning with CF and AD stakeholders. In the PSS0 case, late delivery of mains power, Safety fence and interface control systems cost valuable . • Include all completed verification test templates and documents (FAT, SAT, SIT, FIT, V&V) in the package for future reviews • Cyber security and software management. • Lacked information on how we introduce new software and firmware to the systems. • PSS shall create procedures and documentation to redress this and include in our documentation package for future reviews. • Ari Benderly (ESH & Q) is currently finalising the ESS cyber security policy and procedures PSS shall follow these procedures • Procedures • Ensure that before any further SRR’s we agree and approve all stakeholder operational procedure documentation. (key handling, alarm handling, system re-set etc. etc.)
Test stand status and plan for changes and extensionsstaged approach according to project needs Test Stand 2Change RF SC Cavity testNotification Q3 2018 OperationDec 2018 Test Stand 2 RF Klystron testPermit received Operation start Q2 2018 Ion Source and Low Energy Beam Transport (LEBT)Re-submission 16 May Safety Readiness Review18 July2018 Operation September 2018 Ion Source ExtensionKlystron test in gallery Submission TBD Operation Feb 2019 Ion Source ExtensionRF cavity test in tunnel Submission TBD Operation July 2019
Thank You Questions? Stuart Birch stuart.birch@esss.se Denis Paulic denis.Paulic@esss.se Morteza Mansouri morteza.mansouri@esss.se Yong Kian Sin Yongkian.sin@esss.se Alberto Toral alberto.toraldiez@esss.se Mattias Eriksson Mattias.Eriksson@esss.se Paulina Skog paulina.skog@esss.se Meike Ronn meike.ronn@esss.se