טרור: מחלוקות סביב הגדרתו

2. טרור: מחלוקות סביב הגדרתו • מהו טרור? • טרור של מדינה • טרור של ארגונים ויחידים • מדוע "ארגוני טרור" לא נוטים לפתוח במלחמה?

3. מה ארגוני טרור צריכים ע"מ לשרוד?

5. הבסיס הכלכלי של הטרור • מאפיה מול ארגון טרור • הכנסות • הלבנת הון

6. The broker is given a code. It could be anything. It could be a string of numbers, or it could be a $5 bill with a specific serial number sent to him by his relative. Records are kept only until the transaction is completed. Then they are destroyed. The money does not move, either physically or electronically. Brokers dole out money from the same pool that they take it in. They make money from the fees they charge for the transactions. The system is built on the trust between brokers, a trust built up between generations of hawala brokers.

7. האם ניתן לנצח את הטרור באמצעים כלכליים ("ייבוש)"? .... האם בכלל ניתן לנצח טרור?!

8. היסטוריה, כלכלה והתקוממות

11. Uprising

16. There is a need to look at changes and expectations in both economic and non-economic spheres

17. There is a need to look at changes and expectations in both economic and non-economic spheres (Among These) Two socioeconomic matters: • Employment • The Logic of Collective Action

18. Labour: opposite tendencies, similar results During the Mandate Period: • Diminishing opportunities for Arab workers, especially due to land purchase and ‘avoda ‘ivrit policy  more tension Under the Israeli Rule: • No ‘avoda ‘ivrit policy, rather a high level of employment; yet many gaps tension “good” and “bad” areas of integration

19. The rebels of 1987: “When asked to explain their reasons for joining in the riots, all of them cited much the same motive: the feeling that they had suffered a grave personal injustice at the hands of their Jewish employers or colleagues. Each prisoner had his own story to tell, but the gist of their experiences was similar: at one time or another they had been subjected to verbal and even physical abuse, cheated out of their wages, set to work under inhuman conditions, and exposed to the sweep of the dragnet that followed every act of terrorism.” [Ze’ev Schiff & Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising – Israel’s Third Front, pp. 82-3.] Long term unequal employment is a time bomb

20. The Logic of Collective Action • The warriors were/are from low-paid sectors (unlike the senders)  focus on their economic conditions • Free time/unemployment encourages participationfull time employment “Jamal Ben Naji el Amar of our village would like to be taken in your gang [band] establishment. He has no work in these days and he is quite sufficient for such job. It is up to you to take him on strength or not. [sic]” "Harvesting being practically completed, more recruits are now available to take to the hills’ guerrilla operation.” • Profit-maximization behavior  keeping formal wages higher • Charge: Discharging a firearm at JAFFA on 3.9.1938. Additional information: hanged for shooting a leading Arab merchant in a barber shop in Jaffa. A fortune teller by profession, Ghazel [the accused] is known to have murdered a rival fortune teller from Egypt in 1938 and several other persons. He is said to have boasted, before his execution, of having committed 19 murders (this is thought to be an exaggeration).”