Global Climate Change as a “Wicked” Problem: Shifting Energy Systems and Managing Changing Rates and Magnitudes of Envir

1. Global Climate Change as a “Wicked” Problem: Shifting Energy Systems and Managing Changing Rates and Magnitudes of EnvironmentalChange ByEdward L. MilesBloedel Professor of Marine Studies and Public Affairs, School of Marine Affairs, and Team LeaderClimate Impacts GroupCenter for Science in the Earth System (CSES)University of Washington

2. Background Framing the Policy Problem

3. Theme : Energy & Environment: Crisis, Opportunities, and Challenges On the performance of the global regulatory system & the states within it: • How appropriate are the actions proposed or taken? • How effective are they likely to be? • What can we expect?

4. SCALE I: GLOBAL • What kind of problem is climate change? • Why is the global warming problem so difficult for the world, the U.S. and China, inter alia, to deal with?

5. Characteristics of Long Time Scale Problems [Decades to Centuries] (Brooks 1977 ) • Intergenerational trade-offs intrinsic. • Predicted effects highly uncertain; uncertainty erodes consensus re action. • Uncertainties cascade and increase from physical and chemical effects (lowest), to biological/ecological, to social. • When effects long term & cumulative, costs of delay appear small compared to potential immediate econ. costs and social dislocations (see point 1). • Long term envir. probs. require sustained effort; this in conflict with short term crisis orientation of politics.

6. Typical Human Response to “Long Wave” Threats, (Dyson 2005) • Rapid advance in scientific understanding (cf. HIV/AIDS). • But overall societal response characterized by avoidance, denial, & reproach. •  little behavioral change until…. • Evidence of damage plain.

7. Defining “Wicked” Problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) No definitive solution. No stopping rule. Solutions not true/false but better/worse. No ultimate test of solution. Every solution a “one-shot operation”; no learning by trial & error. Every solution essentially unique. Every wicked problem a symptom of another problem….

8. Critical Limiting Conditions for Societal Response

9. Critical Limiting Conditions for Societal Response

10. Why are these two sets of physical characteristics important for policy development? • They demonstrate that: 1. global climate change is a problem of long time scale; 2. all policy measures will be indeterminate in their ultimate impacts; 3. indeterminacy, when linked to issues of costs, changing lifestyles, and distributive inequities, creates large obstacles to significant short-run policy action; 4. benefit-cost analytics tend to discount the future heavily beyond 2 decades.

11. Uncertainty & International Regime Building • Uncertainty about seriousness & causes of a problem & malign configuration of actor interests are separately major hurdles in international regime building. In combination, results often lethal. • Global climate change the ultimate collective action problem (large disparities between private & social costs) but often the decision rules of int’l. law-making conferences stack the deck in favor of the least enthusiastic parties  the “Law of the Least Ambitious Program”. (Miles et al. 2006. Environmental Regime Effectiveness….).

12. Conditions Under which International System Responds Effectively to Global Environmental Problems • Available evidence suggests two conditions: a). Disaster; b). Consensus that disaster on significant scale highly probable in short run. • So system propensity to respond is hyperdependent on rate of envir. change & immediacy of perceived effects.

13. Policy Dynamics, cont’d. • Policy dynamics constitute a “prism”. Actions must be taken initially by gov’ts.  all global intergovernmental efforts re mitigation must be refracted through: • 1. dynamics of bureaucracy at nat’l. level; • 2. rates & magnitudes of envir. change; • 3. perceptions of winners & losers; • 4. differing discount rates; • 5. societal capacity to learn over timescales required. • 6. perceptions about national security. Those policy dynamics slow down rates of policy change.

14. Standards: The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), Art. 2 • The ultimate objective of this Convention …is to achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. • [Severe problems with this formulation: 1. Stabilization not the most appropriate objective; 2. No single measure of “dangerous interference” exists above 300ppm; 3. Assumptions about time to significant impacts false because ignoring internal feedbacks, nonlinearities, and thresholds in earth’s climate system].

15. Standards, cont’d. • Initial informal settling on x2 pre-industrial ambient concentration as standard = 560ppmv. [Impacts presumed manageable and effect on world GNP calculated on order of 1%]. EU later (2006) changing level to 2°C. • IPCC rev. BAU projections of >x2 CO2 world [575ppmv] by 2050 & >900ppmv by 2100,i.e., >x3 CO2 world. 2006 emissions already at 2GT/yr above worst case projections. • Current (2009) levels at >387ppmv. Note that between 1860 & 2009 anthropogenic inputs of CO2 now at max. level at onset of ice ages over last 650k yrs ( & maybe over last 20-22 million yrs.)

16. year ppm y-1 2000 1.24 2001 1.85 2002 2.39 2003 2.21 2004 1.61 2005 2.41 2006 1.79 2007 2.17 2008 2.28 • 1970 – 1979: 1.3 ppm y-1 1980 – 1989: 1.6 ppm y1 • 1990 – 1999: 1.5 ppm y-1 • 2000 - 2008: 2.0 ppm y-1 • 2008: 2.3 ppm y-1 Atmospheric CO2 Concentration Year 2008 Atmospheric CO2 concentration: 385 ppm 38% above pre-industrial Data Source: Pieter Tans and Thomas Conway, NOAA/ESRL

17. China USA Russian Fed. Japan India Fossil Fuel Emissions: Top Emitters (>4% of Total) 2000 1600 1200 Carbon (tons x 1000) 800 400 0 03 07 99 03 05 1990 95 01 2007 Time Gregg Marland et al., CDIAC; Global Carbon Project 2009

18. UK Denmark Fossil Fuel Emissions: Profile Examples (1-4% of Total) 160 Canada South Africa 120 Carbon (tons x 1000) Brazil 80 Australia Spain 40 0 03 07 99 03 05 1990 95 01 2007 Time Gregg Marland et al., CDIAC; Global Carbon Project 2009

19. Corell. 2006

20. Corell. 2006

21. Regional Shift in Emissions Share Kyoto Protocol 62% 57% 53% 49.7% 50.3% 43% 47% 38% Current Kyoto Protocol Enter into Force Percentage of Global Annual Emissions Kyoto Protocol Adopted FCCC J. Gregg and G. Marland 2008, CDIAC

22. SRES (2000) aver. growth rates in % y -1 for 2000-2010: A1B: 2.42 A1FI: 2.71 A1T: 1.63 A2: 2.13 B1: 1.79 B2: 1.61 2008 2007 2006 2005 Observed 2000-2007 3.5% Fossil Fuel Emissions: Actual vs. IPCC Scenarios (Avgs.) Raupach et al 2007, PNAS; Global Carbon Project 2009, update

23. Summary of IPCC AR4 Conclusions • Global atmos concentrations of CO2 , methane, & nitrous oxide have increased markedly as result of human activities since 1750; far surpassing pre-industrial levels. CO2 drivers principally fossil fuel use & land use change. Level highest in 650K years. • Very high confidence [=9/10 chance] that GHG increase resulting in warming, with radiative forcing of 1.6 [+0.6 - +2.4] W m-2. Warming now “unequivocal”. • Warmth in last half of 20th century unusual in at least the previous 1300 years. • For next 2 decades, warming of 0.2° C per decade projected. • Sea level projections do not include full effects of changes in ice sheet flow because basis in published literature lacking. • Very likely that hot extremes, heat waves, & heavy precipitation events becoming more frequent.

24. Implications of Standards • To achieve stabilization level of 550ppmv by 2100, IPCC WGI (1994) calculating need to cut aggregate world emissions of CO2 by 30% by 2050 and another 30% by 2100. [Required cuts 2008 at 50% levels]. • Enormous economic pain and personal suffering would ensue.  not doable. • Amended Kyoto-Marrakesh Protocol requiring < 5% cut by 2012, followed by progressive re-negotiations. • At current rate of action, impossible to stabilize CO2 level at doubling pre-industrial ambient concentration by 2100. Real question is whether we can avoid tripling or beyond.

25. So Where Are We at the Global Level? • Gridlock--global negotiationsunlikely to produce effective remedieson timescale required. Emissions likely to double by 2050 at present rate. • Global climate very sensitive to small changes in mean global T--1-2.5C. • Considerable uncertainty re magnitude, timing, type, and scale of impacts as result of warming. • Long time delays between action and consequences. • Need for collective action on global scale. • Severe distributive inequities, both present & intergenerational.

26. Some Major Policy Questions • How to de-carbonize global economies? • How fast is it possible to de-carbonize global economies? • What is the risk of irreversible changes in the planetary climate system? • How manage the intense conflict between short-term, medium term, and long term interests and values? • How to avoid being locked in to short term interests as prisoners of vested interests? • How to prepare to respond to low probability/high consequence events? (Cont’d.)

27. Sarachik, 2009

28. Major Policy Questions, cont’d. • Is there either a rate or a magnitude of change that X society at Y scale could not effectively adapt to? • If societal collapse is a real possibility, how will governments perceive the connections to national security and what are they likely to do?

29. Some Policy Implications of Changed Environmental Conditions • Going > BAU  faster rates & larger magnitudes of change. Raises questions about feedbacks, nonlinearities, & thresholds in planetary climate system. • Links to other external conditions—growth in world pop. UN projected stabilization at ~9b people by 2050. Increasing mega-cities (>8m people from 19 to 31, most on Asian Pacific Rim). Imps. Re urbanization & demands on energy. • Severe questions re environmental security—food, water, public health. Pressures on poorest states. Migrations & societal instabilities.

30. World Energy Usage 2005 = 463 Quads [Quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTU)] 87% fossil fuels Projections to 2030 = 702 Quads Non-OECD growth rate = ~3%/yr-_1 = additional input of 10 billion tons of carbon per year into atmosphere. US Energy Usage 2005 = 101 Quads 85% from fossil fuels (23% nat gas; 23% coal; 40% petroleum) Projections to 2030 = 1%/yr-1 growth rate Implications of a Carbon Constrained Future (Cicerone. 2008)

31. IV. So Why Now Major Cause for Concern? Growing Evidence 2006-2009 of “Slippery Slopes” and “Tipping Points”: Cumulative, Multiple Stresses and Changes Irreversible on Human Timescales

32. CONSIDER • At 380ppmv enormous increase in surface & sub-surface heat in ocean [14.5 x 1022J. Levitus et al., 2000,2005] & significant decreases in pH (Sabine et al., 2004, Feely et al. 2004).. • Both combine to dislocate marine ecosystems at almost all trophic levels & combine again with overfishing to deliver a triple whammy of multiple stresses. • Recent indications that both the oceanic (Feely et al., 2005) & terrestrial (Fung et al., 2005) carbon sinks slowing down rate of uptake. • If uptake slows, then projections of maximum temperature increases by 2100 significantly understated. • Clearly doubling cannot be a sensible standard. Do we then have to keep ratcheting down over the next 200 years to a level again <300ppmv??

33. IN ADDITION • Re glacier disintegration, Hansen (2005) poses & explores the question whether anthropogenic GW can cause ice-sheet melting measured in meters on timescale of centuries. The dynamics seem to be more than plausible, i.e., increased heat in mixed layer increases summer melt on the ice sheet  increased ice stream surges & massive iceberg discharges. Confirmed 2009 (Kerr; Pritchard et al). • Re increases in hurricane intensity (not frequency), suggestive recent work by Emmanuel (2005) appears to establish positive correlation with tropical SST’s. Not immediately a consensus, but similar findings by team using different approach (Webster et al. 2005). By 2007 consensus established. • Impacts of both of above combined mean greater hazards for growing global coastal populations and higher destructive potential. [>30 mega-cities (>8 million people), most in Asia, projected by 2050].

34. Problems in Tropical Agriculture (Battisti & Naylor, 2009 • Coping with challenge of price volatility (short term) combined with avoiding a perpetual food crisis under conditions of global warming (long term) a very serious matter. • Food crisis of 2006-2008 showing that extreme seasonal heat detrimental to regional agricultural productivity, human welfare, & to international agricultural markets when policy makers intervene to secure domestic food needs. • GCC presenting widespread risks of food insecurity in 21st century.

35. In the Mean Time, What is Nature Doing?? • Observed increase in GHG concentrations has most likely committed the world to warming of 2.4°C (1.4 – 4.3°C) above preindustrial surface T (Ramanathan & Feng, 2008). • Even most aggressive mitigation steps can only limit further additions beyond 2.4°C, not reduce that level. • Reason is in reducing cooling effect of various aerosols accompanying GW as result of anti-air pollution programs. • Planet can’t avoid entering into DAI zone. (Ramanathan & Feng, 2008). [Now facing need to avoid catastrophic anthropogenic intervention as target.]

36. More on Irreversible Climate Changes • Longevity of atmospheric CO2 perturbation as a result of pattern of atmospheric interaction with large ocean basins. Atmospheric temperature increases on millennial timescale. (Solomon et al. 2009). • Precipitation changes also long term and irreversible as is sea level rise. Latter may be much greater than estimated if polar ice sheets do indeed melt rapidly. Cannot yet be very precise in assessing effects. (Solomon et al. 2009).

37. Solutions Now (2009) Much Harder to Achieve • Growth in demand for electrification in developing countries, particularly in Asia, led by China & India. • Coal as primary alternative -- plentiful & cheap. • Chinese plans for bringing on-line a 1 GW-capacity coal-fired power plant per week for decades. • If growth in supply not accompanied by CCS technologies, very difficult to get control of the GW problem. • But energy technology changes slowly & it will take decades to spin up CCS technology to be fully operational & for a very large number of sites to be made ready.

38. So, Quo Vadis? • We seem to be stuck on the edge of a precipice. It appears to be impossible to avoid doubling CO2 concentration by 2050. This tips the odds in favor of extreme events. • The EU is ready to move, but, so far, neither the U.S. nor China has been willing to respond in kind. • There can be no global agreement without both those states. • Do they prefer the dance of coordinated unilateral movements while the global negotiation stalls? • We need rapid change, but what is the optimal path? • And will we assist poor, weak states to face the instabilities of a climate fed by such high concentrations of CO2? • Both China & the US face severe vulnerabilities as well.