Uniting Irony, Metaphor and Hyperbole in a Pretence -Based, Affect- Centred Framework

1. UnitingIrony,Metaphor and Hyperbole in a Pretence-Based, Affect-CentredFramework John Barnden Emeritus Professor of AI School of Computer Science University of Birmingham, UK Plenary talk at FTL-4, Braga, Portugal October 2018

2. Plan of Talk • Introduction to the unification attempt. • One of the novel developments arising, about hyperbole and irony. • Some specifics of the approach taken, • with special attention to consistency of approach to the three figures, • and combinations of hyperbole with metaphor andwithirony. • See talk tomorrow at Theme Session: Figuratively Mixed and Massed … for further thoughts on metaphor/ironycombination. Notes • Entirely theoretical/conceptual. • Arose from an AI project on metaphor, but there’s no AI in this talk. • Would be fruitful to align/combine the approach with the “second(+)-order empathy” considerations in Dirk Geeraerts’s plenary.

3. Why Develop a Unified Model? Why Pretence-Based?What About Other Figures? • Intrinsic connections: • Hyperbole:often an intrinsic aspect of or intimately combined with metaphor and irony. • Pretence-Based and other accounts have been offered of all three, largelyseparately. • but with less detailed and systematic attention than I would like to CONSISTENCY between the figures and COMBINATIONS of the them. • Metonymy and various other figures seem orthogonal to pretence. • But, hope straightforward to encompass (at least) understatement.

4. Hyperbole in Metaphor • Hyperbole in / arising from metaphor is often pointed out • [e.g.: Brdar-Szabó & Brdar2010, Burgers, Konijn & Stein 2016, • Norrick 2004, Peña & Ruiz de Mendoza 2017] • “Albert’s an angel.” • He’s (e.g.) very kind / helpful / protective, • though not as much as a traditional angel.

5. Hyperbole in Irony • Hyperbole haswell-recognized importance in irony. • [See, e.g.: Athanasiadou2017, Carston & Wearing 2015, Dynel 2016, Kreuz & Roberts, 1995, McCarthy & Carter 2004, Ruiz de Mendoza2017, Sperber & Wilson 1995. See Kreuz & Roberts 1995 for hyperbole as irony cue.) • “Sure,great weather!”

6. Combination of Irony and Metaphor • Alan: “Joe’s a kind person.” • Beth [who finds Joe cruel]: “Yeah sure, he’s a real angel.” • [cf. example in Ruiz de Mendoza 2017] • [See also: Burgers, Konijn & Steen 2016, Colston & Gibbs 2002, Dynel 2016,Gioraet al 2013, Grice 1989/1975, Athanasiadou 2017, Musolff 2017, Popa-Wyatt 2017]

7. A Key Novel Developmentarising from theUnification Attempt Speaker affect (e.g. mocking, surprise) is the MAIN DRIVER, and not merely a reflection of or comment on, • Estimation of the “reversed” value addressed in a case of irony. • Estimation of the “reduced” value addressed in a case of hyperbole. And this driving works THE SAME WAY for hyperbole and irony. Representation of addressed values may even be IN TERMS OF the affect.

8. Pretence-Based Approaches to Irony • Speaker pretends (in a “light” sense of pretence) to believe a fictional (= pretended) scenario that contrasts with her view of the world, as a way of conveying (e.g.) that it is misguided to believe the fictional scenario or a relevant similar one. • Alan: “Nice weather today!”[sincere] • Beth: “[Yeah sure,] nice/great/… weather!”[ironic] • Beth is momentarily pretending to be a person (saying &) thinking it’s nice/great/… weather, where Beth considers the weather to be bad. • Some past accounts and discussion: • Colston (2017); Clark & Gerrig (2007/1995); Currie (2006, 2010), Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown (2007/1995) ; Popa-Wyatt (2014).

9. Pretence-Based Approaches to Metaphor • Speaker outlines/implies a fictional (= pretended) scenario, and there are mapping mechanisms that transfer selected information from that scenario and apply it (with suitable modification) to the target scenario. • “The idea was deeply buried in Joe’s mind.” • One might map the inferred lack of physical accessibility, to become lack of mental accessibility. • Accounts using pretence/fiction (possibly by other names) for metaphor: • ATT-Meta [Barnden 2008, 2015a, 2016]; blending theory [Fauconnier 2009]; games of make-believe [Walton 2004/1993]; metarepresentations added to Relevance Theory [Carston & Wearing 2011].

10. Pretence-Based Approach to Hyperbole[Peña & Ruiz de Mendoza 2017;pretences = their “imaginary situations”] • Speaker outlines/implies a fictional (= pretended) scenario, and there are mapping mechanisms that transfer selected information from that scenario and apply it (with suitable modification) to the target scenario. • “Poor Tim – his suitcase weighs a ton.” • One might map the weight and Tim’s frustration, attenuating it. • This talk will concentrate on hyperbole “from above” rather than “from below” as in “My piece of cake is infinitesimal!”.

11. (slightly modified)ATT-Metapretence-based approach to metaphor(for metaphor that is based upon but goes beyond known mappings)[e.g.: Barnden 2008, 2015a, 2016]

12. Simplified Treatment of an Example • “John’s exam marking broke into the weekend”: (I will assume the marking was originally in the working week) The hearer (as well as the speaker) momentarily considers a pretended/fictional scenario in which the marking (literally) physically broke into the weekend from the working week and hence the marking was a person, and those time periods were spatial containers. • I assume this rests in part on a familiar metaphorical view of TIME PERIOD AS SPATIAL CONTAINER.

13. some main features of the pretence WW = working week WE = weekend John John’s marking broke into … John’s marking J’s marking is a person WW is a phys region WE is a phys container [PRETENCE / FICTION] [REAL WORLD for speaker and hearer] (c) John’s marking was then physically in WE John was veryANNOYED about (c) speaker/hearer sorry about

14. plus a “traditional” EXPORT WW = working week WE = weekend John John’s marking overflowed … John’s marking J’s marking is a liquid; WW is a phys container; WE is … EXPORT via VIEW-SPECIFICmapping (cc) John’s marking occurred during the WE (c) John’s marking was then physically in WE John was veryANNOYED about (c) speaker/hearer sorry about

15. plus “generic” EXPORTs WW = working week WE = weekend John John’s marking overflowed … John’s marking J’s marking is a liquid WW is a phys container; WE is … (cc) some of John’s marking occurred during the WE (c) some of John’s marking was then physically in WE John was moderately…veryANNOYED about (cc) POTENTIALLY ATTENUATED EXPORT by VIEW-NEUTRAL mapping John was veryANNOYED about (c) (less) sorry sorry speaker/hearer

16. A View of Hyperbole AFFECT DIMENSION (well known) • “Poor Tim – his suitcase weighs a ton.” Arguably this is not just to convey something about the weight of the suitcase but also that • the speaker finds the weight notable/remarkable/surprising/ridiculous /… • to some degree and (it could well be that) • Tim is frustrated / annoyed / …to find how difficult it is to lift, etc. • [e.g., Carston & Wearing 2015, McCarthy & Carter 2004, Norrick 2004, Peña & Ruiz de Mendoza 2017]

17. SEVERAL SCALES involved • The addressed scale (e.g., weight scale) [the main focus in the literature] • The speaker-affect-intensityscale(s) • Protagonist-affect-intensityscale(s) • Consider especially: ABSURD hyperbole: • “I agree with you 200%”. [based on many similar examples in corpora] • Degree of agreement scale: stops at 100% ! ! • Degree of (e.g.) speaker’s eagerness to express the high agreement: different scale, and if it has a limit it has little to do with the agreement-scale limit. The speaker is saying: I’m even more eager to convey my agreement than would normally be appropriate for very high or even 100% agreement. • “I’ve had minus amounts of kip [sleep].” [real example, McCarthy & Carter 2004].Degree of (e.g.) frustration: greater than that appropriate for very little sleep.

18. FICTIVE ELABORATIONS, and more ABSURDITY [see, e.g.: Musolff 2017, Kapogianni 2011, Carston & Wearing 2015] • “The laughter in Brussels at Theresa May’s proposal was so loud you could hear it from London.” • The distant hearing (and possibly the laughter itself) are • fictive elaborations that provide hyperbole. The distant hearing is, moreover, absurd. • The laughter implies that the Brussels officials were amused. The speaker finds the intensity of laughter and amusement extremely notable and indeed ridiculous.

19. THE USUAL SORT OF VIEW OF THE ADDRESSED VALUE (e.g. suitcase weight) and its relationship to speaker/protagonist affect: • The hearer performs some cognitive operation (ATTENUATION or mitigation) of going down the weight scale from the overt value (“a ton”) to some lower but still reasonably high point or interval (perhaps vague: very heavy”). • The hearer estimates the speaker/protagonist affect in additional processing, • which is usually influenced BY the addressed value estimate, • But where the affect estimation does not itself influence the addressed value. • I WANT TO TURN THIS ON ITS HEAD.

20. NOTABILITY, NO-EXPLICIT-SCALE-POSITION, and AFFECT-DRIVENNESS • What the hearer gets fairly directly from the utterance is merely that the addressed value • is NOTABLY (EVEN RIDICUOUSLY, ..) HIGH UP, where • The notability can be because the addressed value is higher than normal and/or it’s enough to justify the apparent degree(s) of affect. • The hearer might be content just to know the value is notably high in some unknown way, but if he does choose an addressed value/interval, I claim: • He chooses it on the basis partly of how “affected” the speaker/protagonist is. • But even then he might be content just with a mental representation like: • the suitcase is so heavy that Tim finds it frustratingly difficult to lift. • Affect is central and fully integrated, and not just a reflection of or derivable from an addressed value (suitcase weight etc.) that is found separately.

21. POTENTIAL INCLUSION OF LITERAL VALUE (so merely-potential attenuation) • The range for the addressed value could or even should (if circumstances are right) include the overt (i.e. literal) value. • This could apply to “Mary has hundreds of living relatives.” •  Mary has many living relatives and possibly even hundreds. • “liberal” hyperbole. “Ordinary” hyperbolewhen the overt value is excluded by the hearer’s reasoning about the real situation. • The liberal possibility is not prominent in the hyperbole field, but to me it’s central. • See Barnden (2015b) for its importance based on other considerations.

22. Pretence/fiction-based proposal for hyperbole[see also Barnden, forthcoming][loosely derived from the Peña & Ruiz de Mendoza 2017 account; see also Ruiz de Mendoza 2014]

23. With speaker • affect only “… [Tim’s] suitcase weighs a ton” [REAL WORLD for Beth and hearer Alan] [PRETENCE/ FICTION] Tim’s suitcase is very…extremely heavy Tim’s suitcase weighs a ton POTENTIALLY ATTENUATED EXPORT by VNMAs finds ridiculous Finds the weight very notable …ridiculous Beth (speaker)

24. with speaker • and Tim • affect “… [Tim’s] suitcase weighs a ton” [REAL WORLD for Beth and Alan] [PRETENCE/ FICTION] Tim’s suitcase is very…extremely heavy Tim’s suitcase weighs a ton finds ridiculous Beth Tim is very…maximally unable to lift it Tim is maximallyunable to lift it POT’LY ATTEN’D EXPORT by VNMAs Tim is very…extremelyFRUSTRATED about that Tim is extremelyFRUSTRATED about that

25. HYPERBOLE in/withMETAPHOR

26. Hyperbolic metaphor “Albert is an archangel” [Real World] [Pretence] Albert is an archangel Albert Albert is QUITE……VERY kind, helpful, … ..…… POT’LY ATTEN’D EXPORT by VNMAs Albert is maximally kind, helpful, … Albert is QUITE….…MAX’LY kind, helpful, … strong APPROVAL extreme APPROVAL hearer

27. Which Metaphors are Hyperbolic? Just those where there are potentially-attenuated export operations where the attenuation happens to be preserved by the hearer’s target-side reasoning. That keeps the top source-side values (so the hyperbole may be “liberal”) unless excluded by such reasoning (in which case the hyperbole is “ordinary”).

28. A View of Irony AFFECT DIMENSION (well known) • Alan, sincerely: “Nice weather today.” • Beth, ironically: “Sure, nice/great/… weather!” • Beth conveys / comments on addressed value:the weather’s badness. • express (Beth’s) affect such as criticism of Alan • (this talk will concentrate on such critical cases) • [see, for importance and types of affect: e.g.: Dynel 2016, 2018, Herrero Ruiz 2009, Kumon-Nakamura et al 2007/1995, Katz 2017, Partington 2007, Ruiz de Mendoza 2017] SEVERAL SCALES involved • The addressed-value scale [the main focus in the literature] • The speaker-affect-intensityscale(s)

29. SCALAR HYPERBOLE and FICTIVELY-ELABORATIVE HYPERBOLE • Beth: “Sure, great weather, what with the burning sun and tweeting birds!” • The burning sun and tweeting birds arefictive elaborations that add hyperbole and heighten the effects. [cf. Carston & Wearing 2015, Herrero Ruiz 2009, Kapogianni 2011, Musolff 2017 ] • Together with great, they boost the overtly claimed weather goodness. • By increasing the contrast between the pretended believer’s belief and non-nice weather they increase Alan’s perception of the degree of Beth’s criticism of the pretended believer (who merely corresponds to Alan). • Here I assume that Alan has worked out that is being ironic and is therefore objecting to his claim that the weather is nice. • I unpack criticism (of people) in irony as: finding notable/ridiculous/… the cognitive defectiveness of the person.

30. AFFECT-DRIVENNESS • So, Alan infers a degree range for Beth’s OVERT CRITICISM OF THE PRETENDED BELIEVER, taking into account also additional evidence: “Sure…” / tone of voice / recent critical irony by this speaker / …. • [on such evidence see, e.g., Burgers & Steen 2017] •  • an attenuated estimate of Beth’s ACTUAL LEVEL OF CRITICISM OF HIMSELF •  • an impression of HOW WRONG HIS VIEW (that the weather is nice) must be, in Beth’s view •  • an opinion about degree of weather badness from Beth’s point of view, • which could even merely be like: • the weather is so bad for Beth that it makes her THAT critical. • Speaker affect is central to DRIVING the process of estimating the addressed value, and even to REPRESENTING it, not just a side-comment.

31. Divergence from Usual Assumptions • In existing theories, it is left quite vague or mysterious how the hearer is to get an impression of what value the speaker may be trying to convey. • Just negating the overt value (nice -> not nice, great -> not great) seems too weak [see e.g. Partington 2007]. • Although it’s often said (for brevity, it seems) that the addressed value (or an exaggerated form of it) is the “opposite” or the “reverse” of the overt value (“great”, “genius”), it’s generally recognized that there’s often/usually no well-defined opposite/reverse value. Hence: how find a more loosely contrasting value? [Burgers & Steen 2017, Colston 2017, Partington 2007]. • The affect-centred proposal provides a powerful, well-founded guide, and fully integrates the speaker-affect side of irony into the “addressed” side, • while also systematically taking care of hyperbole within the irony.

32. ABSURD FICTIVE ELABORATIONS [cf. Musolff 2017; “surrealist” irony in Kapogianni 2011] • Beth: “Sure, great weather for a picnic. Fun to sit in the pouring rain eating soggy sandwiches!” • The fun to sit … eating … is a (complex) absurdfictive elaboration that adds hyperbole, of a different sort from before (when the pretended believer thought there was burning sun and tweeting birds even though the weather was bad). • Now he KNOWS that there’s rain and soggy sandwiches, but thinks that that is fun!! He’s crazy! • This increases (more than before) Alan’s perception of the degree of Beth’s criticism of the pretended believer. • Hence his impression of how bad the weather is in Beth’s view will tend to be more intense than before (more sarcastic: Musolff 2017).

33. “ATT-Iro”account of (hyperbolic) ironybased on pretence/fiction[see alsoBarnden 2017 and Barnden, forthcoming]

34. IRONY AS DRAMA • I treat the pretended scenarios as (micro)dramas containing • a character that the speaker is acting [e.g. “Palan” for “pretend Alan”] • and who thinks that, e.g., the weather is good, and • who inhabits some environment in the drama – • the “setting” or “drama’s world". • [This follows one line in the field -- Clark & Gerrig 2007/1984, Carston & Wearing 2015, Popa-Wyatt 2014, 2017] -- but more thoroughly and systematically than before.] • The drama’s world is an enrichment going beyond other pretence approaches • [aside from something similar for another purpose in Récanati2007: 224–226].

35. “Sure, great weather for a picnic. Fun to sit in the pouring rain eating soggy sandwiches!” • Alan’s View [Real World for Alan] [Beth’s Drama’s World] [Real World for Beth] [Palan] Great Weather: [Alan] Fun: Sitting in rain, eating soggy sandwiches Good Weather (VERY) BIG CONTRAST from …. POTENTIALLY ATTENUATED EXPORT by VNMAs ABSURD contrast (Very) Bad Weather CRITICIZES very strongly CRITICIZES (very) strongly Normal reactions to sitting in rain, eating soggy sandwiches Beth Good Weather

36. Combination of Irony and Metaphor • Alan: “Joe’s a kind person.” • Beth [who finds Joe cruel]: “Yeah sure, he’s an archangel.” • [Also involves hyperbole]

37. “Sure, Joe is an archangel” • A metaphorical irony [Real World for Alan] [m4l pret] [Palan] [Real World for Beth] [m4l pret] Joe is an archangel [Alan] Joe is kind Joe is extr’ly kind [Beth’s drama’s world] Joe is very … extr’ly kind POT’LY ATTEN’D EXPORT contrastfrombadlyfailing to notice Joe is very unkind CRITICIZES (potentially) strongly CRITICIZES strongly Joe is not kind Beth Joe is kind

38. Conclusions • We are on track to achieving a unified account of hyperbole, metaphor and irony, and illuminating the nature of each separately and in combination, by • Adopting a particularly rich pretence-based approach • (especially: introducing and richly exploiting a setting or drama’s world). • Extending to hyperbole and irony some key features of the ATT-Meta pretence-based approach to metaphor (e.g. VNMAs). • Driving the estimation of addressed values in irony and hyperbole (partly) by means of speaker affect, giving a more central and integrated role to affect than heretofore. • Adopting a notion of “[merely-]potential attenuation” and • viewing (initial) hyperbolic interpretation as standardly allowing inclusion of the overt value.

39. thanks very much (without hyperbole, metaphor or irony!)

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