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Response To Lost AmBe Source In West Texas George Brozowski, US EPA R6 – Dallas, TX Art Tucker – TX Department State Health Services John Cardarelli – CBRN Cons Mgt Advisory Team NREP Meeting Austin, TX April 9, 2013. Purpose Of Presentation.
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Response To Lost AmBe Source In West TexasGeorge Brozowski, US EPA R6 – Dallas, TXArt Tucker – TX Department State Health ServicesJohn Cardarelli – CBRN Cons Mgt Advisory TeamNREP MeetingAustin, TXApril 9, 2013
Purpose Of Presentation • Demonstrate the working relationship between the state (TX) and the Federal Government in locating a lost source
Initial Call – September 11, 2012 • The Agency was notified by the licensee that a 15 curie americium-241/beryllium (AmBe) source could not be located. • The source had been used earlier that day at a well site near Pecos, Texas. • The well logging crew left the Pecos site and went about 130 miles to a well site south of Odessa, Texas. • When the crew went to remove the source at the Odessa site they discovered the source was missing. Whether or not the shield plug was in place was disputed by the technicians. • The logging engineer returned to the well site near Pecos and searched for the source, but did not find it.
Initial Call – September 11, 2012 • The licensee sent out search teams to look for the source along the roadway between the two locations. • The licensee RSO interviewed the crew. • The crew didn’t stop anywhere along the route between the two locations. • The RSO stated they were verifying the crew’s route using the vehicle’s black box. • The RSO agreed to contact the appropriate local law enforcement.
15 Ci AmBe Source • Dose rate information (neutron-gamma): 36 inches - 75 mR/hr (measured) 24 inches - 150 mR/hr (measured) 18 inches - 245 mR/hr (measured) 12 inches - 475 mR/hr (measured) 6 inches – 1.3 R/hr (measured) 2 inches - 22 R/hr (calculated) 1 inch - 44 R/hr (calculated)
15 Ci AmBe Source • IAEA Category 3 Source • If not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. • It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks
State Response - September 14, 2012 • On September 14, 15 and 16 the Agency and a Civil Support Team (CST) looked for the source from the Pecos well site to the well site near Odessa, Texas. • Gamma and neutron detectors. • They did not find the source! • The licensee worked alongside the state and continued to search for the source. • They too did not find the source!
EPA R6 Involvement • R6 received TX press release concerning lost source and makes contact offering services • Conference call on Friday, September 14, 2012 between state, Region (Rad & SF) and ASPECT staff members • Flyover of route driven conducted on Saturday, September 15, 2012 • State and 6 CST in contact with ASPECT team and staged to respond. • Flyover did not find the source! • Did locate several logging companies in the area.
Why EPA Involvement? • Lead coordination role to support State, local and tribal response • Emergency preparedness planning • Development of Protective Action Guides (PAGs) • Provide recommendations during emergencies • Emergency response support (or lead) federal response to radiological emergencies • Monitoring and assessment of release impacts • Recovery, clean-up, & mitigation coordination
Nuclear facility accidents Nuclear weapon and device accidents Nuclear terrorism Satellite re-entry Types of Radiological Incidents and Emergencies Los Alamos Wildfires Lost Sources Three Mile Island Space Launches Contaminated imports Transportation accidents Sabotage Orphan sources* Foreign incidents*
EPA Response Assets • Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/ • National Decontamination Team (NDT) • Environmental Response Team (ERT) • Mobile laboratories and sample prep vehicles • On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) • RadNet - Nationwide radiation monitoring systemwww.epa.gov/radnet/
Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) • EPA’s radiological response assets include: • Trained responders • Team commanders and specialists • Equipment and mobile laboratory capabilities • RERT expertise includes: • Radiation monitoring • Radionuclide analysis • Radiation health physics • Risk assessment
Federal/State Regrouping • State interviewed the employees involved with the lost source. • There was a "convoy" of Halliburton trucks & employees at the well site in Pecos. • The logging truck was stripped down and searched. • Thesource was not found.
Federal/State Regrouping • Refinement on ASPECT flight path • Licensee along with ASPECT crew, would perform a “flyover” with a source out of the shield. • ASPECT crew would refine the instruments and record how an AmBe source is appearing to their instruments.
Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology - ASPECT • Rapid Response —Wheels-up within one hour • Direct Integration into the Local Incident Command • Standoff Chemical and Radiological Detection • Real Time Collection and Airborne Processing of Data • Aerial Photography/Situational Awareness Capability • Real-Time Data Distribution using Satellite Communication
ASPECT Neutron Calibration 15 Ci AmBe Source in Shield Identifical Source Multiple Altitudes Multiple Off-sets Ideal flight Param 200’ AGL Up to 600’ off-set ASPECT Calibration Flight • Installed, calibrated and operational in 1 week • Identical control source detected and located • 200’ AGL • 150 linear miles surveyed • Real-Time Observation
ASPECT Operational Concept • Provide a readiness level on a 24/7 basis • Provide a simple, one phone call activation of the aircraft • Wheels up in under one hour from the time of activation • Once onsite and data is collected it takes about…. • ~ 5 minutes to process and turn around data to first responders Base Map Aerial Photo IR Image Spectral Data Product • Deployment Simplified: • Once on-scene collect chemical, radiological, or situational data (imagery) using established collection procedures • Use tested automated algorithms • Extract the near real time data from the aircraft using a broadband satellite system and rapidly QA/QC the data by a dedicated scientific reach back team • Provide the qualified data to the first responder enabling them to make informed decisions in minimal time
ASPECT Neutron Detector RSN-4 Standard 4 Tubes 32” Active Length 2” diameter 2.7 atm Helium-3 Gas
Federal Regrouping • Discussions between Regional OSC, HP and RERT Team Commanders. • Were there cattle and goats in the area of the well? YES • Cattle will eat just about anything and goats certainly will. 15 Ci swallowed neutron source would have left the affected animal dead or nearly dead in short order. • The animal handling area is out of the search area and if the owner buried the animal, then that's why ASPECT (or anyone else) can't see it.
Federal Regrouping • Need to find out if any animals have gone down within the past two weeks that this source has been missing. • Hopefully a down animal didn't go to a rendering plant -- which would be a whole set of new problems! OSC mentioned the animal owners in the area probably have a usual area where they burn dead animals with tires and diesel. • The source is in a stainless container and could potentially rupture in fire. • That's not too good either!
October 4, 2012 • The source was found by a member of the general public. • The source was found on a road in the well field about 8 miles west of the well location. • This is the opposite direction from the route the employees stated that they had traveled. • The individual who found the source contacted the licensee, who then took possession of the source at 1800 hours.
Path traveled by individual Path traveled by logging crew
Dose Assigned To Individual Who Found The Source Licensee • Extremity 972 millirem • Whole body 51.3 millirem • DSHS dose estimates were consistent with the numbers assigned by licensee. Dose rates used were both measured by licensee and data provided in source manufacturer’s study.
Additional Meetings • The state and licensee met to discuss the event. • This meeting raised additional concerns for the Agency. The licensee agreed to investigate the areas of concern and report their findings to the Agency. • The licensee obtained a replica of the source and attempted to wedge it into various vehicle tire patterns including tandem and slotted wheels to determine if that could have been the mechanism for transporting the source to the location where it was discovered. • They were not successful. • At this date how the source ended up where it was found has not been determined.
ASPECT Points Of Contact • Mark J Thomas - Program Manager • 513-675-4753 - thomas.markj@epa.gov • Tim Curry - Deputy Program/Financial Manager • 816-718-4281 - curry.timothy@epa.gov • John Cardarelli - Radiation Program Manager • 513-487-2423 - cardarelli.john@epa.gov • Paul Kudarauskas - Logistics Manager & DC Liaison • 202-344-5382 - kudarauskas.paul@epa.gov • Readiness • 24/7 On-Call • Less than one hour departure (0700 – 1700) • Less than two hours departure (After Hours)
