SPP Mission Assurance Tag-Up covering: Reliability, EEE Parts, CC, M& P…not a quarterly

1. SPP Mission Assurance Tag-Up covering: Reliability, EEE Parts, CC, M&P…not a quarterly March 13, 2013 Luke Becker SPP Mission System Assurance Manager

2. Topics • Goals for this “working meeting” • Luke Becker • Reliability • Clay Smith • Contamination Control • Tyler Langely (representing the SPP Project Contamination Control Engineer) • EEE parts • Dave Bonner • Materials & Processes • Tyler Langley

3. Contact Info: • Clay Smith, SPP Reliability Engineer • Email: Clay.Smith@jhuapl.edu • Phone: 240-228-3130 • Tyler Langley, SPP M&P Engineer • Email: Tyler.Langley@jhuapl.edu • Phone: 240-228-9078 • Dave Bonner, SPP EEE Parts Engineer • Email: David.Bonner@jhuapl.edu • Phone: 240-228-8943 • Luke Becker, SPP Mission System Assurance Manager • Email: Luke.Becker@jhuapl.edu • Office: 240-228-3913 • Cell: 240-472-3196

4. Agenda • 2:00 PartsTopics • -requirements • -partscontrolboards • -GIDEP reportingprocess • -partslistformat / delivery  • -System used for partscontrol • 2:30 MaterialsTopics • -requirements • -materialscontrolboards • -MUA's • -BakeOut's (TQCM vs RGA) • -Facilitiesreview • Location : Library ConferenceRoom • 3:00 Individual PartDiscussionForum 9:00 Reliability Topics -requirements -Instrument Provider intended implementations -clearly define what APL will require and when 11:00 Contamination Control Topics -cc plan development -cc questionnaire  -Facilities review (TOUR) 12:00 LUNCH (go out)

5. Meeting Goals • Allow SPP Project lead engineers for Reliability, EEE Parts, M&P, and CC to interface with their counterparts at each SPP instrument provider team. • Establish an open communication, good working relationship with their counterpart engineers. • Project Leads to better understand the environments and constraints that their instrument provider counterparts are working within. • End Goals • Fully understand the requirements • Does the Instrument Provider understand APL’s reporting requirements to NASA • Does JHU/APL SPP understand the instrument provider compliance and implementation of these requirements • Does the Instrument Provider understand the SPP PCB and PMPCB process and what information is required to be presented. • Clearly identify any actions requiring completion prior to Instrument PDR

6. Reliability EngineeringFor Instruments Clayton Smith, Ph.D. clay.smith@jhuapl.edu (443) 778-3130

7. Reliability RequirementsNASA Procedural Requirements • NPD 8720.1 “NASA Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Program Policy” • Establish reliability performance requirements • Integrate all reliability activities with systems engineering, risk management, and other processes, assessments, and analyses including, but not limited to, safety, security, quality assurance, logistics, probabilistic risk assessment, life-cycle cost, configuration management, and maintenance • NPR 8705.4 “Risk Classification for NASA Payloads” • Classification Level B • NPR 8705.5 “Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA Programs and Projects” • “Limited” scope • Same level of rigor as a full PRA focused on “mission-related end-states” instead of “all applicable end-states.”

8. Reliability RequirementsMission Assurance Requirements * Flow down to Instruments • Reliability Program Plan • Preliminary RPP (7434-9041) • Probabilistic Risk Assessment • Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) & Critical Items List (CIL) • To circuit level for entire spacecraft (Class B) • Address flight hardware and software • Fault Tree Analysis • Parts Stress Analyses • Worst Case Analysis • For all parts and circuits (Class B) • Reliability Assessments and Predictions • Reliability Analysis of Test Data • Trend Analysis • Analysis of Test Results • Limited Life Items • Limited Shelf Life Material

9. Reliability EngineeringPhilosophy • Redundancy as directed by Class B mission • Critical single point failures may be permitted but are minimized and mitigated by use of high reliability parts and additional testing • Essential spacecraft functions and key instruments are typically fully redundant • Other hardware has partial redundancy and/or provisions for graceful degradation • Design implementation • Block redundancy as much as possible • Less complex system • Fewer configurations to test • Cross-strap redundancy where timing, local control, or reliability issues warrant • Single point failures where unavoidable • Qualitative and quantitative assessments to identify risks and validate mitigation strategies

10. Reliability RequirementsMission Success Criteria • Mission objectives are defined in “Appendix E to the Living With a Star Program Plan” • Reliability - probability of meeting these criteria over mission life • Success criteria are mapped to Instruments measurements and then to PRA end-states • Probabilities (with uncertainties) will be calculated • Failure/fault sequences will be identified and analyzed • Alternative measurements exist to answer multiple sub-questions • Functional redundancy exists within/among instruments

12. Science Fault TreePreliminary Analysis • Combinations of failures (cut sets) leading to Loss of Science • 0 singles; 13 doubles; 34 triples; 77 sets of 4 or more • Next step is to model the electronics and mechanisms

13. Science Fault TreeIncluding FIELDS Boards • Mapped MEB into FTA based on conversation with Stu Harris • Magnetic Field: MAG1, MAG2, DCB, LNPS • Electric Field: DFB, AEB, DCB, LNPS • Plasma Waves: TDS, DFB, AEB, DCB, LNPS • QTN/Radio: RFS, AEB, DCB, LNPS • Also include Boom and Antenna deployments into FTA • Cut sets show 4 single point failures • AEB • DCB • LNPS • Partial Boom deployment • While not failing science requirements, a partial deployment is mission ending based on spacecraft considerations (preliminary results)

14. Science Fault TreeIncluding FIELDS Boards • AEB provide functionality in a “channelized” manner • Paired to a specific sensor • Loss of circuit results in loss of sensor not all sensors • Single point failure on boards still exist for those failures that are common to all channels (e.g., board delamination) • Probabilities are therefore reduced (not yet quantified) • QA attention to a limited set of components • LVPSand DCB single point failure are more problematic • LVPS provides power across all sensors and the MEB • Separating Mag and Search Coil dependency on board does not eliminate DCB as a single point failure • Still removes 3 science requirements if only supporting antenna sensors

15. Reliability ProgramFailure Modes and Effects Analysis • Primary purpose of FMEA activity is to identify failure modes and faults for Fault Management System • Provides input to PRA and system safety • Feedback to design team • Class B requires detail down at “black box (or circuit block diagram) level as minimum” • Functional FMEA (Phase B) • Detailed FMEA (Phase C) • FMEAs performed consistent with MIL-STD-1629A • Instrument providers to perform FMEAs to same level of detail • Customer for this product is Fault Protection lead

16. Reliability ProgramProbabilistic Risk Assessment • Identify risks to mission success and produce a quantitative risk profile of the mission • Performed in accordance with NASA NPR 8705.5A • Analysis will include: • Flight hardware and software • Operations (critical events, procedural workarounds) • Phenomenology models (radiation, dust, coronal brightness) • Ground segment • Data sources treated as prior distributions with large uncertainties • Sources: MIL-HDBK-217, EPRD-97, NPRD-95, mfg data, expert judgment • Bayesian updating with APL flight history, GSFC data if available for use, and SPP test data

17. Reliability ProgramWorst-Case Analysis • Evaluates circuit design margin against combinations of components parameter drift • Applies to • Electronic and electrical circuits • Electromechanical and mechanical items • Optics • Class B dictates WCA for all circuits • Implemented with a screening approach • Compare using Extreme Value Method against margin • Options should this indicated an issue • More detailed analysis (Monte-Carlo Method) • Redesign if necessary

18. Reliability ProgramPhase B Plan • Continue to support design trades • Develop PRA commensurate with design maturity • Expand to include scenarios, mission phases, instruments, etc. • Perform Functional FMEA • Create CIL (includes listing of single point failures) • Establish procedures and criteria for WCA

19. SPP Contamination Control Tyler Langely (representing the SPP CC Engineer)

20. Contamination Control Plan (CCP) The draft contamination control plan is in work Most instrument provider institutions have provided their responses to the CC questionnaire, this will help form the basis of the CCP Outgas modeling will begin soon, will pull from the thermal model and be used to establish the bakeout program Some preliminary requirements have been established

21. Surface Cleanliness From Delivery to APL for I&T Until Launch For general spacecraft surfaces (bus, box and instrument exterior surfaces, MLI, propulsion, solar arrays, TPS etc.) Particles: VCHS + UV inspection NVR: Level “A” (1µg/cm²) or (1mg/ft²) EOL: TBD For instrument, box and subsystem interior surfaces prior to final closeout: VCHS minimum. Contamination-sensitive instrument interior surfaces will have more strict self-imposed requirements

22. Outgassing Rate Requirement • The SPP S/C outgassing rate requirement is TBD (likely 5E-11g/cm²/sec or lower) • Contamination modeling will refine the bakeout requirements based on temperature predicts, S/C geometry, instrument cleanliness requirements and mission parameters • Subsystems targeted for bakeout include: flight harness, thermal, boxes, RF, solar arrays, structure/prop, instruments • Instrumented (TQCM for outgassing rate verification) bakeouts required for MLI, instruments, harness, painted taped radiators, thermal shunts, solar arrays. Additional hardware TBD.

23. Environment for I&T – Launch Processing Air Class requirement for cleanroom – Class 8 (100K) Cleanroom facility: APL Bldg. 23 (historically produces Class 7 environment) where MESSENGER, STEREO, New Horizons and RBSP were integrated. Mechanical upgrades to be undertaken this year will improve the air flow, temperature, RH and static pressure control. Preliminary cleanroom garment requirement: bouffant cap, facemask, frock, nitrile gloves, boots For instrument work at APL, a more strict garment requirement can be supported Cleanroom training is required for all cleanroom users

24. Cleaning Program The cleanroom will be cleaned on a weekly basis “GSE” cleaning will be performed on a weekly basis (work stands, table tops, racks, counter tops, other GSE The spacecraft will be cleaned/inspected on a monthly basis and after achieving some testing milestones (includes lights out UV inspection and spot cleaning) through the duration of ground operations All flight hardware and GSE must be cleaned prior to cleanroom entry Static dissipative clean bagging material will be used to protect flight hardware for transport or storage

25. Instrument Delivery Requirements Instruments will be required to meet the spacecraft cleanliness level at delivery SPP contamination control will perform a cleanliness inspection of all instruments as part of the receiving process After delivery to the spacecraft the instruments will be cleaned monthly as part of the routine spacecraft monthly cleaning The APL contamination control group will work with the instrument teams in order to ensure that requirements are being met and to ensure proper handling and care when cleaning. Instrument team representatives are invited to participate. Instrument teams are responsible for their hardware meeting the outgassing requirements prior to delivery and must show verification

26. SPP EEE Parts David Bonner SPP EEE Parts Engineer

27. EEE Parts Requirements for SPP • Use the SPP Parts Control Plan (7434-9001) • All EEE parts used for flight shall be screened and qualified to level 2 of EEE-INST-002 as a minimum. • Military parts are preferred due to their high reliability pedigree. • Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMS) are not prohibited, but are discouraged for use on SPP. • Commercial passive devices (capacitors, resistors, connectors, etc…) can be up-screened, however military parts are always preferred.

28. EEE Parts Requirements for SPP • All EEE parts used for SPP instruments shall be approved by the Parts Control Board (PCB). • It is up to the science investigation team to present them to the PCB. • Only active devices (excluding diodes) need an APL radiation approval prior to presenting to the PCB. • Any parts that have a non-standard package (i.e. CCGA) will need an APL packaging approval prior to presenting to the PCB. • Military parts (i.e. 5962R…, M55342…) can be approved without a formal PCB meeting. These typically can be procured to meet EEE-INST-002.

29. EEE Parts Discussion Topics • Are you planning to use any PEM devices? • It is strongly recommended that a constructional analysis be performed on these devices. They can exhibit workmanship defects that can cause issues latter. • How do you track your EEE parts? • Please describe your system. • Do you screen your EEE parts in house or sub-contract out? • How do you store your EEE parts? (Both screened and unscreened)

30. SPP Materials and Processes Requirements March 13, 2013 Tyler Langley SPP Lead Materials and Processes Engineer

31. Topics M&P Review Process General M&P Requirements Prohibited Materials Additional Materials Information Materials Lists

32. M&P Review Process • SPP Materials and Processes Control Plan (7434-9009) • Derived from GSFC MAR and JHU/APL Requirements • Draft plan is under review by GSFC Materials and Processes • Materials and Processes Control Board (MPCB) • Chair - Lead Materials and Processes Engineer – Voting Member • APL Systems Assurance Manager – Voting Member • SPP Mission System Engineer – Voting Member • GSFC Sponsor representative • Other subject matter experts invited as required • Materials and processes submittals and approvals are tracked in the Materials Identification List (MIL) • Metals • Nonmetals • Fasteners • Processes • Components (Off-the-shelf products made of multiple materials) • MPCB will also review and approve Materials Usage Agreements or elevate to Project when required • Materials and Processes Approvals will be recorded in the MPCB Minutes

33. General Materials Requirements • Metals and Alloys • Corrosion Control to minimize: • Stress Corrosion Cracking (MSFC-STD-3029A) • Galvanic Corrosion (MIL-STD-889B Dissimilar Metals) • Nonmetals • Outgassing • TML<1.0% or TML-WVR<1%, CVCM<0.1% • Contamination Sensitive areas may have more restrictive requirements as determined by the Contamination Control Plan • Flammability and Toxicity requirements • May have additional Radiation or dielectric requirements based on environment

34. Prohibited Materials • Cadmium, Selenium, Zinc • Unplated Brass (Copper-Zinc Alloy) • Pure tin plating • Tin Solders containing <3% Pb • Exception: 96%Sn 4%Ag High Temperature Solder • Mercury and its salts. • One-part RTV silicone sealants/adhesives that cure by reaction with atmospheric moisture and release acetic acid. • Plasticized polyvinyl polymers; e.g., polyvinyl chloride (PVC) • Exception: polyvinylidene fluoride (Kynar) • Hookup wire with insulation made from polytetrafluororethylene (PTFE), fluorinated ethylene-propylene (FEP), and other cold flow-susceptible fluorocarbons.

35. Additional Materials Information • Use of Flux other than ROL0, ROL1, ROM0 or ROM1 (R or RMA) requires PMPCB Approval • Certain forms of Titanium Alloy require additional consideration (related to Western Titanium) • Corrosion Prevention and Control • All Metals should have a surface treatment to prevent corrosion • Material screening requirements • All materials require Certificate of Compliance/Conformity • Additional Fastener Screening: • Requires, and sample based Visual and Dimensional Screening on all fasteners • Requires Materials test Reports and sample based Hardness or Tensile testing on Fasteners >#10 • Requires additional testing for fasteners deemed “critical” • Other materials may have additional testing and screening imposed by the PMPCB

36. Preferred Materials List This will be a list of materials that are likely to be easily approved when used in typical applications. This has not been approved by the MPCB The PML is NOT a blanket approval for the materials. They still must be added to applicable system/instrument materials lists and approved by the MPCB in specific applications.

37. Preliminary Materials List • Preliminary Materials List is due at least 60 Days prior to Instrument PDR • We will accept Preliminary Lists of Materials and Processes now • This will allow the MPCB to approve materials prior to submittal of • We will try to identify any materials or processes that may be problematic • No materials or process approvals will occur until MPCB starts meeting regularly later in Mid 2013 • See next slide for suggested formats

38. Examples of MIL Materials List Formats Nonmetals Metals and Alloys Fasteners Processes (Still determining which tool to use for maintaining MILs)