Towards Differentiated Identity Assurance

1. Towards Differentiated Identity Assurance as a collaborative effort David Groep, Nikhef and NL-NGI for EGI global task O-E-15 This work is supported by EGI-InSPIRE under NA2 davidg@nikhef.nl, orcid.org/0000-0003-1026-6606 http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.678640

2. Outline • Aims of a global trust fabric • Elements of trust: technical, vetting, auditing • Participants in the trust fabric • Assurance levels • IGTF ‘common criteria’ • Current APs • Towards collaborative differentiated LoA • Distributing elements of trust decision • Light-weight Identity Vetting Environment: towards LoA 1+ • Limitations of a ‘LIVE AP’ and new LoA levels • Federated MICS and SLCS authorities today Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

3. Overlapping Communities – Common Trust Reduce over-all policy burden by adhering to common criteria • Goals • allow multiple sources of authority: User, Institute, Community • acknowledge both long- and short-term community structures • enable access to services and resources • and at the same time enable security incident response &c • to • provide basis for access control decisions by resources providers (both generic and community based) Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

4. Participants Many participants contribute to access control with trustworthy identity and attributes decision rests with the resource… service, site, &c … Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

5. Requirements to fulfil • Privacy and data protection • important ‘unalienable right’ for research • correlation of PII amongservice providers could allow profiling • exchange of PII often fraught with issues • Incident Response • long-term* traceable • independent from short-lived community • must be revocable • correlate with other information sources • banning and containment handle • Measurement andAccounting • publication metrics • usage metering, billing • auditing and compliance monitoring • Regulatory compliance • need to know who you let in beforehand • Access Control Attribute handle • unique binding • never re-assigned identity lives in a policy ecosystem to protect all participants commensurate to their risk level Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

6. Redistributing responsibilities • Subject (ID) based • EffectiveLoA is retained • For given actions, resources, and acceptable residual risk, required ID assurance is a given • can shift ‘line’ in identity trust level • Action (app) based • More constraint actions can lower need for identity LoA • (J)SPG VO Portal policy did just that: 4 levels of actions • Resource (value) based • e.g. access to wireless network does not pose huge risks, so can live with a lower identity LoA (eduroam) Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

7. Trust Element Distribution • Technical elements • integrity of the roots of trust • integrity of issuance process • process incident response • revocation capabilities • key management • credential management • incident response • Identity elements • identifier management • re-binding and revocation • binding to entities • traceability of entities • emergency communications • regular communications • ‘rich’ attribute assertions • correlating identifiers • access control IGTF Classic elements RP, Community elements Verifiability & Response, mitigation, recovery Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

8. IGTF Assurance Process Type and sensitivity of e-Infrastructure servicesdrives the level of assurance required • Security and assurance level set to be commensurate • not overly high for ‘commodity’ resources • not too low, as resource owners/providers otherwise start implementing additional controls on top of and over the common criteria • defined in collaboration withresource providers • using transparency and a peer review processes • leveraging our own community organisation mechanisms Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

9. Assurance levels Trust in the assertions by resource and service providers is key • Until now, our e-Infrastructure used a single ‘level’ • there are also well-known ‘government’ standards for LoA(US: OMB M-04-04 & NIST SP800-63, Kantara) • but 95/46/EC and 1999/93/EC are not of much use to us and the Nice treaty states that identity is a national matter … • there is rough but not 1:1 correspondence between balanced needs of the providers and users and the KantaraLoA levels For your interest: Kantara Assurance Levelshttp://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/download/attachments/38371432/Kantara+IAF-1400-Service+Assessment+Criteria.pdf Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

10. IGTF Trust Structure • Common criteria and model • globally unique and persistent identifier provisioning • not fully normative, but based on minimum requirements • Trust is technology agnostic • technology and assurance ‘profiles’ in the same trust fabric • ‘classic’ traditional public key infrastructure with near-realtime identity betting • ‘MICS’ dynamic ID provisioning leveraging federations • ‘SLCS’ on-demand short-lived token generationa basis for ‘arbitrary token’ services • + experimental, or even new profiles … if there is interest inside IGTF scope! For your interest: IGTF Authentication Profiles http://www.eugridpma.org/guidelines/ Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

11. From IGTF to RP • IGTF Distribution is not monolithic • Authorities comes in ‘bundles’ for each profile • RPs select one or more ‘profiles’ as sufficientand may add their own authorities as well • e.g: “EGI policy on trusted authorities” accepts Classic, MICS and SLCS And there is no ‘IGTF all’ distribution – on purpose! • With more diverse profiles (and LoAs) RPs will make more diverse choices For your interest: EGI SPG policy on Approval of Certification Authorities, https://documents.egi.eu/document/83 Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

12. Collaborative assurance I’m hopefully not misrepresenting Jules Wolfrat for PRACE here … • PRACE T1 (“DEISA”) centres • Users run applications across the infrastructure • All originate from a home site inside the infrastructure where they are fully known personally and have gone through a thorough vetting process • Home site distributes this knowledge actively towards the other centres (through a central LDAP) So some of the identity elements of trust already done • XSEDE is likely be similar • even wLCG is somewhat similar … through CERN HR redistribution of responsibilities: a new profile Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

13. An IGTF Profile to match ‘Light-weight Identity Vetting Environment’ • as seen from the IdP/authority side • complemented by the RP to profile full vetting …3,4 LoA 2: 1, 2-factor vetting, verified traceability, externally audited as matter of course 2 MICS, Classic: identified naming, traceability, longer-term, limited auditing VettingLoAscale SLCS: identified naming, point-in-time traceability, time-limited Live AP: unique identification, no identity , limited traceability LoA 1: verified email address with mail-back 1 * somewhat my personal view … sorry for bias LoA 0: ‘like conventional unsigned email’ Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

14. LiveAP and its Caveats • Live AP assurance level is different, and rest must be taken up by somebody else • But e.g. in EGI • many communities rely on names to enrol people • communities do not keep much of auditable records • users are a-priori unknownto the resource owners • RPs support loosely organised communities • RPs thus need independent authoritative real names • Identity elements • identifier management • re-binding and revocation • binding to entities • traceability of entities • emergency communications • regular communications • ‘rich’ attribute assertions • correlating identifiers • access control Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

15. Light-weight Identity Vetting Environment The Profile Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

16. Disclaimer • LIVE AP is not ready, and IGTF will make significant changes • Needs global consensus • Target date: ~ Q1 2014 • Input, specifically from RPs, very welcome! Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

17. LIVE AP Identity • Persistency of name binding • any single subject name in a credential must be linked with one and only one entity for the whole lifetime of the service • Naming • name elements […] sufficient to uniquely identify individual • sourced from ‘reasonable’ systems • real name or pseudonym with compensatory controls: • only in conjunction w/verified name element allowing contact to subject -- and the pseudonymity should be ‘obvious’ • Re-issuance, renewal and re-keying • authority should keep enough data to re-vet use of name • Tracability requirements • at issuance time the authority should identify user, and that relationship should be documented and verifiable DRAFT Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

18. LIVE AP Technical • We expect a secure, on-line CA system • Long-term commitment, security controls and trained personnel • With FIPS140-2 level 3 or equivalent HDM controlling key • 2+ tier system on monitored controlled network • revocation capable • so at least better than ssh ;-) • Documented, transparent, policy and practices • Including provisions for auditing by peers • Some requirements propagate back to upstream IdPs! • Credentials in common recognisable formats • Initially X.509v3 certificates, but profile is mostly generic! DRAFT Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

19. http://wiki.eugridpma.org/Main/LiveAPSecuredInfra DRAFTwill change

20. What Happens Next • together with the cross-national RPs and national members (proxying national RPs) ‘LIVE AP’ will be developed to full AP guideline • this will introduce a truly new LoA for the first time • LoA higher than Kantara LoA 1, but much lower than 2 (and also lower than classic and MICS, and even <SLCS) • contributions welcome through your RP or national authority membr • once reasonable consensus is achieved … • RPs may decide to accept authorities under this profile for (some) of their services. Or not. • don‘t automatically expect all RPs to treat it as equivalent to MICS … unless the RP does its own vetting already Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

21. Today’s Federated e-Science ID Promo… Map colour coding Green: classic accredited authority Blue: federated (+classic) authority Yellow: pending classic accreditation Federated ‘translating’ authorities: integrity requirements propagate to all data sourcese.g. TERENA Certificate Service eScience MICS, the DFN-AAI SLCS, SWITCHaai SLCS Also in USA: CILogon based on InCommonin Japan: new SLCS by NII Towards differentiated collaborative LoA

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