Sextus Empiricus , Montaigne and Bayle on Pyrrhonian scepticism

1. SextusEmpiricus, Montaigne and Bayle on Pyrrhonian scepticism

2. Historical Context • Pyrrho lived 360-270 BC (roughly) • Aristotle lived 384-322 BC • Alexander died in 323 BC • The school of Pyrrhonism was not founded until almost 200 years later, by Aenesidemus • It flourished for a while, but the dominant schools were Academic, Epicurean and Stoic • Around the beginning of the 3rd century AD, two important records of Pyrrhonism were created: • Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers • SextusEmpiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism

3. Second Flourishing • In 1562, Sextus’sOutlines was translated into Latin by Henri Estienne (aka Stephanus) • While Diogenes Laertius and Sextus in greek had been available for a over a century, this seems to have been a seminal moment in the history of western philosophy • Influence increased by Montaigne’s great sceptical work Apology for Raymond Sebond (1580) • Ambivalent relation to church (sceptical fideism) • Endorsed by some 17c. philosophers of science as congruent with scientific method (e.g. Gassendi) • Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697) shows Pyrrhonist character of new science

4. Lecture Plan • From curiosity to tranquillity (ataraxia) • The goals of Pyhrronian scepticism • The Ten Modes • Causing perplexity (aporia) and suspension of belief (epoche) • The Problem of the Criterion • The impossibility of ever finding truth • Sceptical Fideism • Custom and Revelation

5. Zetetikos • Sextus tells us that the sceptic starts as someone who wants to know the truth • A rational enquirer uneasy with a state of ignorance • “Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly in things and puzzled as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things is true and what false, thinking that by deciding these issues they would become tranquil.” I.12

6. Ataraxia • The zetetikos then discovers that for every question she investigates, there are equally good (‘equipollent’) arguments on both sides (‘opposed accounts’). • This causes puzzlement (‘aporia’) not tranquillity (‘ataraxia’) • However, for one with a true sceptical disposition, the puzzlement gives way to tranquillity by accepting that she should simply suspend belief (‘epoche’)

7. The story of Apelles • Apelles “was painting a horse and wanted to represent in his picture the lather on the horse’s mouth; but he was so unsuccessful that he gave up, took the sponge on which he had been wiping off the colours from his brush, and flung it at the picture. And when it hit the picture, it produced a representation of the horse’s lather.” I.28 • Tranquillity (ataraxia) “followed fortuitously” I.26 from suspension of judgement (epoche)

8. 2. The Ten Modes • To help others reach epoche (suspend judgement), sceptics offer ‘Modes’ • These are techniques for finding opposing accounts which will appear equipollent

9. 2. The Ten Modes • “I make no affirmation about their number or their power – they may be unsound and there may be more than those I shall describe.” I.35 • And equipollence does not mean that both sides will seem equally evident (convincing) to you: • “what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent … if we do propound arguments directly against what is apparent, it is not because we want to reject what is apparent” I.19-20

10. 2. The Ten Modes • To help others reach epoche (suspend judgement), sceptics offer ‘Modes’ • These are techniques for finding opposing accounts which will appear equipollent • They are not offered as traditional philosophical arguments for a sceptical conclusion (cf. Descartes’ evil demon) • But ways of bringing about the psychological state of puzzlement (aporia)

11. The List: • Variations among animals • Differences among humans • Differing constitutions of the sense-organs • Circumstances • Positions, intervals, and places • Admixtures • Quantities and preparations • Relativity • Frequent or rare encounters • Persuasions and customs and laws

12. Mode One: Animals • “But if the same objects appear dissimilar depending upon the variation among animals, the we shall be able to say what the existing objects are like as observed by us, but as to what they are like in their nature we shall suspend judgement. For we shall not be able ourselves to decide between our own appearances and those of other animals, being ourselves a part of the dispute and for that reason more in need of someone to decide than ourselves able to judge.” I.59

13. Pre-modern biology • Some examples of physiological variation: • “Of those [animals] produced without copulation, some are produced from fire, like the little creatures which appear in ovens, some from stagnant water, like mosquitoes, some from wine turning sour, like gnats … some from slime, like frogs, some from mud, like maggots, some from donkeys, like dung beetles, … some from rotting animals, like bees which come from bulls and wasps which come from horses.” I.41 • Some examples of behavioural variation: • “Vipers are numbed by the mere touch of an oak-branch, just as bats are by the touch of a plane-leaf. Elephants avoid rams, lions avoid cocks, sea-beasts avoid the crackling of beans as they are pounded, tigers avoid the noise of drums.” I.58

14. The argument explicated • Animals have different physiology to us, so it is highly likely things appear differently to them • Behavioural differences back this up • There is no reason to think our appearances are true and theirs false = aporia • So we must treat ours as mere appearances and suspend judgement = epoche

15. “Irrational animals” • “For good measure” (I.62), Sextus goes on to counter the suggestion that because we are rational and other animals not, our appearances – or the judgements we make on their basis – are to be preferred. • Here he points out that one can point to appearances of rationality in animals and irrationality in humans to create another aporia.

16. Mode Two: Humans • Sextus starts by noting that – while not as extreme as with animals – there are also considerable physiological diversities amongst humans • But his main argument rests on difference of preferences

17. “Since, therefore, choice and avoidance are located in pleasure and displeasure, and pleasure and displeasure lie in perception and appearance, then when some choose and others avoid the same things, it is apposite for us to deduce that they are not similarly affected by the same things, since otherwise they would have chosen and rejected the same things in similar ways.” I.87 • And try to say they are right and the others wrong, we make no progress because there is disagreement about who is right and no way to decide ‘for they themselves are part of the dispute’ I.90

18. Ideal Observers and 3rd Mode • Some Dogmatists – e.g. Stoics – say that we can conceive of a Sage – an ideal person – and it is their appearances which are true. • To this Sextus replies: “that the senses disagree with one another is clear” I.91 • E.g. perfume “gratifies the sense of smell but displeases the sense of taste” I.92 • And there may be more senses than we conceive I.97

19. Mode Nine: Frequency and rarity • I skip to the 9th and 10th modes because of their importance in religious and moral debates, but the fourth should not be ignored since it builds upon the 2nd and 3rd by noting other sources of inter and intra-personal variation • The 9th notes that what we experience often we find less surprising and less valuable than what we experience rarely.

20. “The sun is surely a great deal more striking than a comet; but since we see the sun frequently and comets only rarely, we are so struck by comets that we actually think them to be portents, but are not struck at all by the sun.” I.141 • While a good way of inducing aporia about value judgements, this mode was also used to threaten rational basis of Christianity: miracles only seem miraculous because of their rarity

21. Mode Ten: Cultural variation • In many ways this is the most modern of Sextus’s modes, and one which gained greater power as more of the world was explored in the 17th century • In it he notes that both what is socially acceptable and what is legal varies across cultures • Most of his examples have to do with sexual and marital relations, something which particularly challenged the political power of the church, which controlled these things.

22. Moral epoche • It is important to note that his conclusion from the 9th and 10th Modes is not relativism or nihilism, but suspension of judgement • But what should one do if one has suspended judgement on what is right and wrong, what is valuable or not? • The sceptic says: whatever appears right to you, which will probably be what accords with your culture, upbringing and past experience • NOT: whatever you want to do • Pyrrhonists do not question the appearances

23. 3. The criterion of truth • Much of Book II of the Outlines is devoted to a discussion of the problem of the criterion of truth • Though he has been using the argument in Book I. • Views about this vary wildly: • some think it so obvious that as soon as pointed out, it forces la crisepyrrhonienne • Others that it is incredibly difficult to make convincing

24. The Problem of the Criterion • If you want to claim that one account/appearance is true (= apprehending it) and the opposing one false, then you must cite some criterion of truth which one possesses and the other lacks. • But your criterion must also be the true criterion and not a false one • To make this clear, Sextus notes that there are opposing accounts of the criterion of truth

25. Book II 18-20 • So you must apprehend your criterion of truth on the basis of some criterion. • Either this is the same one or a different one. • If it is the same one, then you are saying that the criterion is apprehended in virtue of itself, which is circular. • If it is a different one, then GOTO 3 – infinite regress is inevitable.

26. For Sextus, • Either this argument moves you and you suspend judgement about everything and attain tranquillity (ataraxia) • Or it doesn’t and you are ‘perpetually troubled’ (I.27) • He is just the doctor offering us medicines • But we might think its ability to move people is not arbitrary

27. Pyrrhonism first flourished in the late Hellenistic period when there were several rival ‘schools’ of philosophy: Academics, Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans to name just the major ones • It saw a massive resurgence in the Reformation when there were rival epistemologies backing religious disagreements • The rise of modern science was initially thought to support Pyrrhonism but in fact it did the opposite • Since the 18th century, the problem of the criterion has been largely ignored

28. Scientific Realism • In our time, the criterion of truth is science • or more precisely: being established by scientific method (including logic) • Scientific method is massively successful • There seem to be no alternatives • except, perhaps, for a specific class of religious beliefs • So the problem of the criterion doesn’t seem pressing • But note that the problem as formulated doesn’t rely upon ‘opposing accounts’

29. Is Scepticism Self-defeating? • Sextus distinguishes between Academics and Pyrrhonists (I.3-4) • He reserves the word ‘sceptic’ for the latter, but we use it for both • Academic Sceptics assert that nothing can be known • Thus they seem to contradict themselves • More generally, if you offer an argument for a sceptical conclusion, then you are committed to the correctness of the argument

30. Self-defeat is success! • Pyrrhonian Sceptics merely suspend belief • Even about the effectiveness of their arguments • Sextus describes the things the sceptic says as a purgative which expels itself as well: • “we do not affirm definitely that they are true – after all, we say that they can be destroyed by themselves … just as purgative drugs … drive themselves out too along with the humours.” (I.206)

31. Sceptical Fideism • One might assume that, in matters of religion, a Pyrrhonian sceptic should be an agnostic – after all, they should suspend belief and what is agnosticism except suspension of belief? • But this is a big mistake. It is the AcademicSceptic who should be an agnostic. • It seems that the Pyrrhonian sceptic may be a Catholic or an atheist or anything in between.

32. The Pyrrhonian does not reject the appearances as they strike her (pathos) • She merely suspends judgement about which are true • So if she finds herself moved by the appearance of Christianity, then so be it • She would then be a Christian but she would suspend judgement on whether it is true

33. Montaigne • This is Montaigne’s view in the Apology • He shows at length that human reason is too weak to apprehend the truth of religion • But still thinks one can be moved by the appearances to be a Christian • But then it is just a brute fact about you: • “we are Christians by the same title as we are either Perigordians or Germans”

34. Orthodoxy? • This was deemed to be acceptable to the Church because: • It seems to be a version of the view that faith is not a human achievement but something bestowed by divine grace alone • It entails that critics of religion who use reason to object to doctrine will not damage the true faith • However, there remained a suspicion that the suspension of judgement about the truth of doctrine was in fact anti-Christian

35. Bayle • Bayle takes the debate about Pyrrhonism and religion one step further • He notes that there are some appearances which seem ‘evident’, such as the transitivity of identity • Even in a state of epoche, we will find ourselves accepting these • But they are contradicted by Christian doctrine, e.g. the Trinity

36. Meta-epoche • But this means that there are opposed accounts of whether Pyrrhonism is pro or anti-Christian • So we should suspend judgement on that too (‘Pyrrho’, Remark C) • Which is to say, taking Pyrrhonism to have any consequences for religion is itself an act of Dogmatism • The Pyrrhonist should merely do whatever feels right and never question whether it really is right

37. Ataraxia or Not? • Is that true intellectual tranquillity? • Or merely accepting defeat and getting the relief that comes when you stop banging you head against a wall? • Is it “better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied”? (Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch.2) • Montaigne would say he is fully human • The Pyrrhonist holds that the intellectual urges which drive us to Dogmatism about science, metaphysics or religion should be overcome

38. Questions for discussion • How is it possible for scepticism to lead to tranquillity (ataraxia)? • Which, if any, of the Ten Modes achieve suspension of belief (epoche)? • Apply the Problem of the Criterion to contemporary scientific method. What should we conclude? • Can the sceptic who has suspended belief on the truth of religion also be a Christian?