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Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases

2. CG and Its Effect on the Lives of CEOs . In 2006 record number of CEOs lost jobs DismissalRetirementRecruitment to another firmPartly due to increasing scrutiny by BoardsGovernance activistsIncreased pressure from the market for corporate controlMediaTrend: decrease in average tenure (

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Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases

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    1. 1 Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases Part III: Strategic Actions: Strategy Implementation Chapter 10: Corporate Governance

    2. 2 CG and Its Effect on the Lives of CEOs In 2006 record number of CEOs lost jobs Dismissal Retirement Recruitment to another firm Partly due to increasing scrutiny by Boards Governance activists Increased pressure from the market for corporate control Media Trend: decrease in average tenure (current: 18-24 mo.) Result: CEOs looking at short-term vs. long-term

    3. 3 CG and Its Effect on the Lives of CEOs (Cont’d) CEOs now serving on fewer external boards CG: Double-edged sword Can put an end to scandals Might restrictive CEOs (i.e., they won’t take risks)

    4. 7–4 Reasons for Acquisitions

    5. 5 Introduction Corporate Governance (CG) Set of mechanisms used to manage the relationships (and conflicting interests) among stakeholders, and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizations (aligning strategic decisions with company values) Effective CG interest to nations as it reflects societal standards Firms’ shareholders are treated as key stakeholders as they are the company’s legal owners

    6. 6 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control Introduction Historically, firms managed by founder-owners & descendants Separation of ownership and managerial control allow shareholders to purchase stock, entitling them to income (residual returns) – implies ‘risk’ for this group who manage their investment risk Shareholder value reflected in price of stock

    7. 7 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control (Cont’d) Introduction Small firms’ managers are high percentage owners, which implies less separation between ownership and management control Usually implies family-owned businesses This group faces 2 critical issues 1. As they grow, they may not have access to all needed skills to manage the growing firm and maximize its returns, so may need outsiders to improve management 2. May need to seek outside capital (whereby they give up some ownership control)

    8. 8 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control (Cont’d) Agency relationships Relationships between business owners (principals) and decision-making specialists (agents) hired to manage principals' operations and maximize returns on investment (and focus of this chapter) Other agency relationship examples: Consultants/clients; insured/insurer; manager/employee

    9. 9 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control (Cont’d) Agency relationships (Cont’d) Managerial Opportunism: Seeking self-interest with guile (i.e., cunning or deceit) Opportunism: an attitude and set of behaviors Managers don’t know which agents will enact managerial opportunism Principals establish governance and control mechanisms to prevent agents from acting opportunistically

    10. 10–10 FIGURE 10.1 An Agency Relationship

    11. 11 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control (Cont’d) Agency problems: Product diversification Can result in 2 manager benefits shareholders “don’t enjoy” 1. Increase in firm size 2. Firm portfolio diversification which can reduce top executives’ employment risk (i.e., job loss, loss of compensation and loss of managerial reputation) Diversification reduces these risks because a firm and its managers are less vulnerable to the reduction in demand associated with a single or limited number of product lines or businesses

    12. 12 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control (Cont’d) Agency problems: Firm’s free cash flow Resources remaining after the firm has invested in all projects that have positive net present values within its current businesses Available cash flows Managerial inclination to overdiversify can be acted upon Shareholders may prefer distribution as dividends, so they can control how the cash is invested Curve S depicts shareholders’ optimal level of diversification where Point A is preferred by shareholders and Point B by top executives

    13. 10–13 FIGURE 10.2 Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification

    14. 14 Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control (Cont’d) Agency costs and governance mechanisms Sum of incentive costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs, and individual financial losses incurred by principals, because governance mechanisms cannot guarantee total compliance by the agent Costs associated with agency relationships, and effective governance mechanisms should be employed to improve managerial decision making and strategic effectiveness Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    15. 15 Ownership Concentration Introduction: Key concepts Ownership Concentration: Governance mechanism defined by both the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of shares they own Large Block Shareholders: Shareholders owning a concentration of at least 5 percent of a corporation’s issued shares Institutional Owners: Financial institutions such as stock mutual funds and pension funds that control large-block shareholder positions

    16. 16 Ownership Concentration (Cont’d) Introduction: Key concepts Institutional Owners (Cont’d) The growing influence of institutional owners Provides size to influence strategy and the incentive to discipline ineffective managers Increased shareholder activism supported by SEC rulings in support of shareholder involvement and control of managerial decisions

    17. 17 The Board of Directors (BOD) Introduction Group of shareholder-elected individuals (usually called ‘directors’) whose primary responsibility is to act in the owners’ interests by formally monitoring and controlling the corporation’s top-level executives

    18. 18 The Board of Directors (BOD) (Cont’d) As stewards of an organization's resources, an effective and well-structured board of directors can influence the performance of a firm Oversee managers to ensure the company is operated in ways to maximize shareholder wealth Direct the affairs of the organization Punish and reward managers Protect shareholders’ rights and interests Protect owners from managerial opportunism 3 types: Insider, related outsider and outsider

    19. 19 The Board of Directors (BOD) (Cont’d) Historically, BOD dominated by inside managers Managers suspected of using their power to select and compensate directors NYSE implemented an audit committee rule requiring outside directors to head audit committee (a response to SEC’s proposal requiring audit committees be made up of outside directors) Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed leading to BOD changes CG becoming more intense through BOD mechanism BOD scandals led to trend of separating roles of CEO and Chairperson

    20. 20 The Board of Directors (BOD) (Cont’d) Outside directors Improve weak managerial monitoring and control that corresponds to inside directors Tend to emphasize financial controls, to the detriment of risk-related decisions by managers, as they do not have access to daily operations and a high level of information about managers and strategy

    21. 21 The Board of Directors (BOD) (Cont’d) Outside directors (Cont’d) Large number of outsiders can create problems Limited contact with the firm’s day-to-day operations and incomplete information about managers results in ineffective assessments of managerial decisions and initiatives. emphasizes financial, as opposed to strategic, controls to gather performance information to evaluate performance of managers & business units, which could reduce R&D investments, increase diversification, and pursue higher compensation to offset their employment risk

    22. 22 The Board of Directors (BOD) (Cont’d) Enhancing BOD effectiveness (N=5 changes) Increased diversity in board members’ backgrounds Establishment and consistent use of formal processes to evaluate the board’s performance Creation of a “lead director” role that has strong agenda-setting and oversight powers Modified compensation of directors Requires that directors own significant stakes in the company in order to keep focused on shareholder interests

    23. 23 Executive Compensation (EC) Executive compensation (EC): Defined: Governance mechanism that seeks to align the interests of top managers and owners through salaries, bonuses, and long-term incentive compensation, such as stock awards and stock options Thought to be excessive and out of line with performance Alignment of pay and performance: complicated board responsibility The effectiveness of pay plans as a governance mechanism is suspect

    24. 24 Executive Compensation (EC) (Contd’) The effectiveness of executive compensation Complicated, especially long-term incentive comp The quality of complex and nonroutine strategic decisions that top-level managers make is difficult to evaluate Decisions affect financial outcomes over an extended period, making it difficult to assess the effect of current decisions on corporation performance External factors affect a firm’s performance in addition to top-level management decisions and behavior

    25. 25 Executive Compensation (EC) (Contd’) The effectiveness of executive compensation (Cont’d) Performance-based compensation used to motivate decisions that best serve shareholder interest are imperfect in their ability to monitor and control managers Incentive-based compensation plans intended to increase firm value, in line with shareholder expectations, subject to managerial manipulation to maximize managerial interests Many plans seemingly designed to maximize manager wealth rather than guarantee a high stock price that aligns the interests of managers and shareholders

    26. 26 Executive Compensation (EC) (Contd’) The effectiveness of executive compensation (Cont’d) Stock options are highly popular Repricing: strike price value of options is commonly lowered from its original position Backdating: options grant is commonly dated earlier than actually drawn up to ensure an attractive exercise price

    27. 27 Market for Corporate Control Market for Corporate Control Definition: external governance mechanism consisting of a set of potential owners seeking to acquire undervalued firms and earn above-average returns on their investments Becomes active when a firm’s internal controls fail Need (for external mechanisms) exists to address weak internal corporate governance correct suboptimal performance relative to competitors, and discipline ineffective or opportunistic managers. External mechanisms are less precise than internal governance mechanisms

    28. 28 Market for Corporate Control Managerial defense tactics Hostile takeovers are the major activity Not always due to poor performance Consequent to tactics are the defenses

    29. 29 International Corporate Governance Corporate Governance in Germany Concentration of ownership is strong Banks exercise significant power as a source of financing for firms Two-tiered board structures, required for larger employers, place responsibility for monitoring and controlling managerial decisions and actions with separate groups Power sharing includes representation from the community as well as unions

    30. 30 International Corporate Governance (Cont’d) Corporate Governance in Japan Cultural concepts of obligation, family, and consensus affect attitudes toward governance Close relationships between stakeholders and a company are manifested in cross-shareholding, and can negatively impact efficiencies Banks play an important role in financing and monitoring large public firms Despite the counter-cultural nature of corporate takeovers, changes in corporate governance have introduced this practice

    31. 31 International Corporate Governance (Cont’d) Global Corporate Governance Relatively uniform governance structures are evolving These structures are moving closer to the U.S. corporate governance model Although implementation is slower, merging with U.S. practices is occurring even in transitional economies

    32. 32 Governance Mechanisms and Ethical Behavior It is important to serve the interest of the firms’ multiple stakeholder groups In the U.S., shareholders (in the capital market stakeholder group) are the most important stakeholder group served by the board of directors Governance mechanisms focus on control of managerial decisions to protect shareholders’ interests

    33. 33 Governance Mechanisms and Ethical Behavior (Cont’d) Product market stakeholders (customers, suppliers and host communities) and organizational stakeholders (managerial and non-managerial employees) are also important stakeholder groups Although the idea is subject to debate, some believe that ethically responsible companies design and use governance mechanisms that serve all stakeholders’ interests Importance of maintaining ethical behavior through governance mechanisms – just remember Enron and Arthur Andersen!

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