Syria

1. Syria Military Choices, Diplomatic Decisions, and Strategic Imperatives

2. Syria: Training and Advising • The military option of training and advising must be viewed in the context of a broader strategic vision against al-Assad, and the forces loyal to him. By all accounts as of today al-Assad has regained ground in most of the major strategic arteries which feeds Damascus and keeps it continuing indefinitely.

3. Syria: Training and Advising • If the rebels, whose numbers have been estimated in excess of 80,000 men, are to be trained and advised then they have to have the right equipment. The president has authorized weapons shipments and training for the rebels (in Jordan), and while the CIA no doubt has assets in the north of the country, this alone is not enough.

4. Syria: No-Fly Zone • A no fly-zone which has been promulgated by the likes of Sen. McCain, and Graham are should not be entirely out of the question. In fact if the rebels are to hold onto their gains while steadily progressing to Damascus from Homs then the Idea of a no-fly zone in the upper hinterlands of the country from Aleppo till following the Euphrates heading east in Syrian territory is a good one.

5. Syria: No-Fly Zone • This action alone would allow the rebels to hang on to precious supply routes without the risk of being outflanked while continuing southward towards Damascus.

6. Syrian Tipping Point In the event that Homs is recaptured by the rebels I think that we face a juncture in the fighting that will force us to ultimately have to determine what our military as well as Diplomatic objectives are.

7. Syrian Military Objectives • In the event that Homs is recaptured by the rebels I think that we face a juncture in the fighting that will force us to ultimately have to determine what our military objectives are.

8. Syria: Option One • The first one seems simple but is rather not, A further push down the western end of the country reclaiming Homs, and Qusayr eventually taking Damascus in a sort of fly by night operation.

9. Syria: Military Option One • I’m assuming the American military establishment in the pentagon have this in mind since they are training forces across the border in neighboring Jordan in the hopes that Al-Assad will let his guard down south of Damascus once he sees that the rebels have retaken Homs and Qusayr. This is simply not going to be the case.

10. Syria: Military Option One • I think we should remember al-Assad is a Baathist like Saddam Hussein, and his security forces the Fedayeen are some of the most fearsome in the region. Along with Hizbollah, Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) troops and guidance from Russian Spetsnaz this is a daunting task indeed.

11. Syria: Military Option Two • The second logical idea is to after capturing Homs and Qusayr is to grind down al-Assad’s forces in a slug match with air support from America or NATO. This is another mistake in reasoning I believe, since al-Assad has many types of anti air deterrents be they soviet era Mig-29’s, MANPADS, SA-7’s, or the much feared shipment of Russian S-300’s.

12. Syria: Military Option Two • This along with the sheer density of Damascus makes a frontal assault far too costly and not worth the risk. One noteworthy tactic that I believe is just beginning to be used is the spreading out of hit and run style attacks, from sea ports in al-Assad’s hometown, to the far reaches of eastern Syria near the Iraqi border.

13. Syria: Military Option Two • These types of attacks would make any mad dash noteworthy yet doomed to fail since the rebel forces are not concentrated on one specific target. In my opinion any gains using this tactic will not hold so long as Assad has access to the major arteries that all coalesce at Homs.

14. Syria: Military Option Two • As Frederick Hohenstaufen once said: “He who defends everything, defends nothing.”

15. Syria: Military Option Three • The third, and final which is my own personal best idea, is to retake Homs and Qusayr and deprive Damascus of any routes to receive additional supplies.

16. Syrian No-Fly Zone Map

17. Syria: Military Option Three • By looking at the map it becomes clear why Assad went on the offensive to prevent the rebels from keeping Qusayr and Homs. There are routes which run directly from Beirut to Qusayr which allowed for Syrian allies to transport goods directly to the front in Homs expeditiously.

18. Syria: Military Option Three • And also by recapturing Homs he (Assad) was able to have one congruous state that was aligned with the rest of his territories to the only ports Syria has in the North West of the country.

19. Syria: Military Option Three • For military reasons the fight should be taken to Assad in Homs as soon as possible. This will allow for the rebels to cut off these vital ports from Assad and the rebels can then use them as their own.

20. Syria: Military Option Three • This will allow for the rebels to cut off these vital ports from Assad and the rebels can then use them as their own. And by capturing Qusayr you force Assad to take a very dangerous path from Beirut almost straight to Damascus, something he’d rather not do.

21. Syria: Military Option Three Conclusion • By then circumvallating Damascus and not letting anything come in, or go out of Damascus, the rebels would then be able to negotiate with Assad surrender or a Syrian Rebel Putsch as it is so called.

22. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch • Once Damascus has been circumvallated and the fighting is in the rebels favor It seems to me that it is absolutely imperative that we bring Bashar al-Assad to the negotiating table.

23. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • These negotiations must be conducted at the highest levels possible on all sides. It only makes sense to at the very least confront al-Assad since he’s the one that is conducting the war.

24. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • It serves a multirole purpose since from the perspective of the world we seem to be in a cycle of overthrowing strongmen in the Middle East beginning with Saddam Hussein. To allay any fears that this is simply another case of America having its way in the region we must make a full-throated and senior appeal to the Assad administration so as to have legitimacy on our side.

25. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • Assad, like most leaders, seems to be stuck in a bubble that is continually feeding him information that he quite frankly wants to hear, be it true or not.

26. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • This has only helped to harden his position and has prevented any sort of tangible progress toward an agreed settlement of the civil war. It’s also worth noting that al-Assad comes from a dynasty that had ruled Syria since the 1970’s.

27. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • This means that his “cult of personality” has been entrenched in Syrian society for at least that long. This makes an overthrow by the Syrian rebels that much more difficult to render. Unlike Saddam, Mubarak, Qaddafi, or even the Taliban al-Assad inherited his power from his dad Hafez. This makes it all the more difficult to convince the people within his immediate vicinity that he should “step down”.

28. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • After all as far as al-Assad is concerned he’s the one that is the rightful ruler of Syria and so it should be us not him who kowtow’s to demands to stop the bloodshed and prevent this wholesale slaughter from happening anymore. Enter Russia.

29. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. Vladimir Putin President of Russia.

30. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. • It’s not so much that they are sympathetic to his cause so much as the Russian federation is sympathetic to al-Assad’s crown authority and what diluting that would mean for not only Syria, not only Russia, but the rest of the world as well.

31. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. If the United States and its allies are allowed to overthrow a sovereign ruler without Just War casus belli ante, this could set a whole new precedent for how future engagement is settled throughout the world. Or so the thinking goes….

32. Syrian Diplomatic Putsch Cont. If we are to make any progress in talks we must take into consideration these factors at the least, particularly when dealing with Russia, and especially when dealing with the Assad regime.