Secure Migration of VM in Cloud Federation using Enhanced Key Management

1. Secure Migration of VM in Cloud Federation using Enhanced Key Management Naveed Ahmad 2012-NUST-MS-CCS5-31 Supervisor: Dr. Awais Shibli Dr. Abdul Ghafoor, Dr. Zahid Anwar, Miss Hirra Anwar Committee Members:

2. Agenda • Introduction • Cloud Computing • Virtualization • VM migration • Key Management in Cloud • Literature Survey • Survey Findings • Industry Survey • Community Response • Problem Statement • Proposed Architecture Design • Technology and standards • Future Milestones • References

3. Cloud Computing • Cloud Services Model • SaaS • PaaS • IaaS • Cloud Federation • Federation Benefits • Cloud Burst • Load Balancing

4. Virtualization • Virtualization • Types of Virtualization • Virtual Machine (VM)

5. VM Migration • VM Migration • Live Migration (only shared storage) • Suspend/Pause and Transfer • Benefits of Migration • Load balancing • Disaster recovery • Hardware maintenance

6. Key Management in Cloud • Service Side Encryption (SSE) with KMS provides • Data protection • Hardware Encryption (AES-NI) • Reduce client maintenance effort • Amazon /Google’s provides transparent encryption. • VM images (object), Volume, Data encryption • Creating, Storing, Protecting, and Providing access to keys.

7. Literature Survey • Problem • Insecure VM migration in Xen/VMware/KVM. • Solution • Categorized Attack on VM migration into: • Control plane (Unauthorized migration operation) • Data plane (insecure channel) • Migration Module (buffer overflow issues) • Developed Xensploit Tool for exploitation Reference: J. Oberheide, E. Cooke and F. Jahanian, “Empirical exploitation of live Virtual Machine migration”, Proc. of BlackHat DC convention.

8. Literature Survey • Problem • Inter Cloud VM mobility for cloud bursting and load balancing • Solution • Inter Cloud Proxies • Secure Channel between Proxies using SSH • Analysis • Tunnel does not provide host to host secure channel during migration. • Port forwarding on firewalls between the clouds • No Authorization mechanism. Reference: K. Nagin, D. Hadas, Z. Dubitzky, A. Glikson, I. Loy, B. Rochwerger and L. Schour, “Inter-cloud mobility of virtual machines”, International Conference on Systems and Storage, May 30-June 01, 2011, Haifa, Israel.

9. Literature Survey • Problem • Trusted channel and remote attestation in VM migration • Solution • vTPM based migration proposed provides • Authentication, confidentiality, Integrity, • Reply Resistance, source non-repudiation • Two phases • Trusted channel establishment • VM and vTPM migration • Analysis • Authorization is not supported. • Dependency on TPM hardware . • Suspension of vTPM instance • Complex Key hierarchy from TPM to vTPM. • ` Reference: X. Wan, X. Zhang, L. Chen and J. Zhu, “An improved vTPM migration protocol based trusted channel”, International Conference on Systems and Informatics, 2012, pp. 871-875

10. Literature Survey • Problem • VM migration is insecure process • Solution. • Load calculation on physical host • RSA with SSL protocol for authentication and encryption • Pre-copy or Post-copy migration techniques • Analysis. • Authorization is not supported • Neglected the affects of migration in cloud environment. Reference: V. P. Patil and G.A. Patil, “Migrating process and virtual machine in the cloud: load balancing and security perspectives,” International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Information Technology 2012, vol. 1, pp. 11-19.

11. Literature Survey • Problem • Security and Reliability in VM migration • Solution. • Policy/Role based Migration approach • Consists of attestation service, seal storage, policy service, migration service and secure hypervisor components • Analysis. • Authentication is not supported • Dependency on TPM and Seal storage hardware. Reference: W. Wang, Y. Zhang, B. Lin, X. Wu and K. Miao, “Secured and reliable VM migration in personal cloud”, 2nd International Conference on Computer Engineering and Technology, 2010

12. Literature Survey • Problem • Resource Optimization in Federated Cloud using VM migration. • Solution. • Monitor the current workload of the physical servers • Detect the overloaded servers efficiently • VM replacement considering the federated environment • Analysis. • No security feature is supported Reference: Y. Xu, Y. Sekiya , “Scheme of Resource Optimization using VM Migration for Federated Cloud Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network 2011 v. 32, p. 36-44

13. Survey Findings Analysis of Existing Solutions and Approaches

14. Survey FindingsIdentified Limitations • Security • Insufficient Access Control • Lack of Mutual Authentication • Lack of Confidentiality • Lack of Integrity • Implementation • Dependency on TPM/Seal Storage module • TPM is bottleneck • Leakage of information in vTPM. • Port forwarding on intermediate firewall

15. Industrial Survey http://searchservervirtualization.techtarget.com/feature/Virtual-machine-migration-FAQ-Live-migration-P2V-and-more

16. Cont.. http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=11825

17. Problem Statement This research work is intended to propose a secure migration of Encrypted Images of VM and their keys between CSP’s. Furthermore, we also propose enhanced key management which securely handle migrated keys.

18. Cont.. A Dashboard/CLI B Load Monitoring Dashboard/CLI Load Monitoring Insecure channel 3 1 2 4 5 1 2 Encrypted Image Store, (Windows8, Ubuntu, Centos,Suse ) Xen/KVM Encrypted Images Store, (Windows8, Ubuntu, Centos,Suse) Xen/KVM Authentication/ Authorization Module Authentication/ Authorization Module Key Manager Key Manager Can not store migration keys

19. Requirements for VM migrationProcess • Security: • Role based access control • Mutual Authentication (source non-repudiation and trust) • Confidentiality during migration process • Integrity of VM and Keys • Key Management: • Migrated Keys of Encrypted VM Images must be included in Key Manager of receiver CSP.

20. Proposed Architecture Design 1. Cert Req 1. Cert Req 2. Auth/Autz 2. Auth/Autz A B Dashboard/CLI Dashboard/CLI Load Monitoring 4. Migration Request 8 b). Migrated VM. 1 2 3 3. Run VM Instance 3. Run VM instance 2 5. Mutual Authentication 2 4 5 1 2 Xen/KVM Encrypted Images Store, Windows8, Ubuntu, Centos,Suse Encrypted Image Store, Windows8, Ubuntu, Centos,Suse Xen/KVM 6. SSL Channel/ Key shared (K) Authentication/ Authorization Module Authentication/ Authorization Module 7. [VM + {Key} Pub_B ] K 9. ACK Key Manager Key Manager 8a). Decrypt & Update Key Manager

21. Technologies and Standards • Libvirt • KVM/XEN • Python • OpenStack Cloud OS • Key Manager (OpenStack ) • PKI (DogTag) • M2Crypt/pyopenssl

22. Community Response https://launchpad.net/~harlowja

23. Future Milestones

24. THANKS

25. References [1] K. Hashizume, D. G. Rosado, E. Fernández-Medina, and E. B. Fernandez, “An analysis of security issues for cloud computing,” Journal of Internet Services and Applications 2013. [2] P. Mell, T. Grance, 'The NIST definition of cloud computing". NIST,Special Publication 800–145, Gaithersburg, MD. [3] J. Oberheide, E. Cooke and F. Jahanian, “Empirical exploitation of live Virtual Machine migration”, Proc. of BlackHat DC convention 2008. [4] V. Vaidya, "Virtualization vulnerabilities and threats: a solution white paper", RedCannon Security Inc, 2009. http://www.redcannon.com/vDefense/VM_security_wp.pdf. [5] Steve Orrin, Virtualization Security: Challenges and Solutions, 2010. http://365.rsaconference.com/servlet/JiveServlet/previewBody/2555-102-2-3214/STAR-303.pdf. [6] J. Shetty, Anala M. R, Shobha G, “A survey on techniques of secure live migration of virtual machine”, International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887), vol. 39, no.12, February 2012. [7] X. Wan, X. Zhang, L. Chen and J. Zhu, “An improved vTPM migration protocol based trusted channel”, International Conference on Systems and Informatics, 2012, pp. 871-875. [8] OpenStack Security Guide, 2013. http://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/security-guide.pdf. [9] W. Wang, Y. Zhang, B. Lin, X. Wu and K. Miao, “Secured and reliable VM migration in personal cloud”, 2nd International Conference on Computer Engineering and Technology, 2010.

26. References [10] B. Danev, R. J. Masti, G. O. Karame and S. Capkun,“Enabling secure VM-vTPM migration in private clouds”, Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, December 05-09, 2011, Orlando, Florida. [11] K. Nagin, D. Hadas, Z. Dubitzky, A. Glikson, I. Loy, B. Rochwerger and L. Schour, “Inter-cloud mobility of virtual machines”, International Conference on Systems and Storage, May 30-June 01, 2011, Haifa, Israel. [12] Y. Chen, Q. Shen, P. Sun, Y. Li, Z. Chen and S. Qing, “Reliable migration module in trusted cloud based on security level - design and implementation”, International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops & PhD Forum 2012. [13]. V. P. Patil and G.A. Patil, “Migrating process and virtual machine in the cloud: load balancing and security perspectives,” International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Information Technology 2012, vol. 1, pp. 11-19 [14]. M. Aslam, C. Gehrmann, M. Bjorkman “Security and trust preserving VM migrations in public clouds”, International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications 2012. [15] P. Botero, Diego “A brief tutorial on live virtual machine migration from a security perspective”, University of Princeton, USA. [16]. A. Rehman, S. Alqahtani, A. Altameem and T. Saba, “Virtual machine security challenges: case studies”, International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics: 1-14, April 2013. [17]. F. Zhang, Y. Huang, H. Wang, H. Chen, B. Zang, “PALM: security preserving VM live migration for systems with VMM-enforced protection”, Third Asia-Pacific Trusted Infrastructure Technologies Conference, 2008.