Factors Influencing the Emergence of Collective Action: An empirical assessment of three coastal towns in Oman

1. Factors Influencing the Emergence of Collective Action: An empirical assessment of three coastal towns in Oman H.S. Al-Oufi Sultan Qaboos University, Department of Marine Science and Fisheries Sultanateof Oman

2. Introduction Collective action Collective action refers to activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or more individuals (Sandler, 2001). The collective action consists of fishermen obeying the group rules and participating in collective effort to manage the coastal fish resources to further the well-being of the group. • Applications of collective action: • provision of public goods • correction of externalities

3. Introduction Oman Fisheries Coastal fisheries form vital parts of the livelihoods of large sections of the population (20 %) Characteristics: Small scale 30,000 fishermen 12,000 vessels Management system: State control CPR

4. Introduction Oman Fisheries Inshore resources of the Sultanate have witnessed the symptoms of overfishing Preventing over-exploitation of coastal fisheries is of great importance for development policy in Oman

5. Introduction • Fisheries exploited by small-scale fishing communities are vulnerable to over-exploitation due to: • poverty • uncertainty of occupation • open access nature of inshore fisheries • high demands for fish (population growth) • high demands for employment opportunities (population growth)

6. Introduction Hardin (1968) “the Tragedy of the Commons” CPR users are individualistic and are unable to co-operate in their collective interest. Fisherman 2 Fisherman 1 * Nash equilibrium

7. Introduction Prisoner’s Dillemma Game Fisherman 2 Fisherman 1 In natural field setting: The game is played repeatedly by participants who communicate, negotiate, and care for their reputation allowing scope for collective action to avoid the tragedy of the commons

8. Introduction Hardin (1968) suggested strong state control to provide measures to regulate resource user’s activities. 30 years State control to solve the problem of the commons failed (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Runge, 1986; Berkes, 1989 and Ostrom, 1990).

9. Introduction Landings of S.commerson in Oman • Peak-recorded catches in 1988 in excess of 27,000 MT • Landings declined to around 3,000 MT during 1990s & it is 2560 MT at present landings of S. commerson in Oman (1985-1998)

10. Introduction Co-operative means to manage CPR have achieved successful results in many parts of the world, e.g.: See also: Baland and Platteau, 1996; McCay and Acheson,1987; Dasgupta, 1996&2001; Ostrom, 1990

11. Introduction Collective action Fisherman 2 • IF: • Individual benefit exceeds individual costs • Summation technology applies Fisherman 1 1 unit reduction in fishing effort contributed by each and every fisherman gives 5 units of benefits at a cost of 4 units

12. Introduction Conceptual framework: assessing the emergence of collective action Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Demands Retain status quo Internal world Inputs Individual choices to either cooperate or defect Outputs Support Change status quo

13. Introduction Factors influencing the emergence of collective action Internal world Individual choices to either cooperate or defect • 1. Economic factors • Econ. dependence • Perception of risk 2. Awareness of resources exploitation problems • 3. Demographical factors • Age • Education • Household size 4. Group size 5. Social Identity 6. Heterogeneity

14. Methodology Data for this study was gathered from 194 vessel’s owners (skippers) in three coastal towns (Barka, Masn’a and Suwaiq) Fishermen from 27 villages were face to face interviewed using a pre-tested questionnaire

15. Methodology

16. Results Mean values for the dependent and independent variables (N=194)

17. Results Factors influencing the emergence of collective action

18. Results • Economic dependence • fishermen who are more economically dependent on fishing show more willingness to cooperate in solving their common problem. • Perception of risk • the higher the D/A ratio (less risk averse), the lower the fishermen's willingness to cooperate. • A fisherman with a high debt to asset ratio will not take the offer of a cooperating game, as there is no guarantee that others will not defect and make him a "sucker".

19. Results • 3. Social identity • fishermen who consider themselves to have more social identity were significantly more likely to adopt a co-operative strategy • 4. Awareness of resource exploitation problems • fishermen who have high awareness of the likely factors that cause the resource to deplete show more willingness to cooperate to avoid further damage to their fishery.

20. Results • 5. Group size • there is no significant difference between fishermen's willingness to cooperate according to their group size • the study ruled out the direct effect of group size as the main predictor of the success or failure of collective action.

21. Results • 6. Heterogeneity • Sources of heterogeneity (cultural division and difference in objectives and interests) are considered as causing a strong obstruction to collective action (higher mean scores for full-time fishermen) • no statistically significant correlation between variation in income and fishermen cooperation • optimal provision of a public good in a community of a given size is independent of income distribution

22. Results • Modelling cooperation • The linear regression model chosen to test the relationship was: • Cooperation= constant + ß1X1+ ß2X2+ ß3X3+ ßnXn • Where: ß1 to ßn are the regression coefficients and X1 toXn are the independent variables entered into the regression equation.

23. Results Stepwise multiple regression modeling fishermen’s cooperation (N=194) * Standardised Beta coefficients

24. Thank you