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Addressing handover latency in mobile networks with improved authentication and key management through pre-authentication and application keying processes.
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HandOver and Application KEYingPre-Authentication HOAKEY and Pre-Auth IETF 65 Dallas
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Note these as well: • Minute takers • Blue sheets • Merged the HOAKEY and Pre-auth BoF • Combined charter for the two BoF • BoF chairs: Madjid Nakhjiri, Yoshihiro Ohba • Thanks to: Alper Yegin and Kutal Chowdhury
Agenda • Agenda bashing 5 min • Introduction 5 min • Handover Keying 15 min • Pre-Authentication 15 min • Application keying 15 min • EAP keying gap analysis 10 min • Scope/non-scope/deliverables10 min • Charter discussion
Charter http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/06mar/agenda/hoakey.txt
Charter summary:Handover keying and Pre-authentication • Handover latency is a big issue in mobile networks • Access authentication and key management cause large delays, the problem can be solved by two ways • Pre-authentication where the mobile node runs EAP authentication prior to handover • Derive keys for new attachment based on existing EAP session
Charter summary (2):Application keying • Providing full service access requires various network signaling protocols • Many of the protocols e.g. Mobile IP rely on security associations to protect their signaling messages • Bootstrapping these security associations can be optimized by deriving keys from the network access authentication
Presentations IETF 65 Dallas
Out of scope: We will not try… (1) • Coming up with EAPv2 • Extending EAP 3748 protocol • Revising EAP keying specs • Defining over-the-air EAP lower layers • Designing new RADIUS messages • BUT, requirements for RADIUS/Diameter attributes/AVP if needed • Replacing existing application signaling security • E.g. replacing Mobile IP authentication methods such as MN-HA AE, or return routabilitys
Out of Scope (2) • Pro-active configuration • E.g., acquiring an IP address from the target network prior to the handover • Making changes to L2 security specs (in other SDOs) • Identification of L2 changes, if any, is within scope
Deliverables (1) • Handover keying hierarchy draft (informational) • Keying hierarchy, functional model, key derivation, requirements for key caching and distribution including key scoping and channel binding for handover keying. • Handover keying protocol requirements draft (informational) • Requirements of a new protocol or new options/attributes for existing protocols for enabling a target authenticator to obtain handover keys.
Deliverables (2) • Application keying hierarchy draft (informational) • Keying hierarchy, functional model, key derivation, requirements for key caching and distribution including key scoping and channel binding for application keying. • Application keying protocol requirements draft (informational) • Requirements of new options/attributes for existing protocols for enabling application keying. • Pre-authentication protocol requirements draft (informational) • Requirements of new options/attributes for existing protocols for enabling a target authenticator to obtain handover keys using a pre-authentication protocol that runs EAP between a mobile node an a target authenticator.
Consensus Qs at the end? • Should IETF solve these problems? • Should a new WG be formed? Or existing WGs should deal with it? • How many people are willing to work on this?