Austerity vs. Stimulus: US Fiscal Policy & Procyclicality

1. Austerity vs. Stimulus:US fiscal policy & procyclicalityJeffrey Frankel Harvard Kennedy School, October 25, 2013

2. Austerity vs. Stimulus Definitions • Fiscal austerity (“contraction”): • Cut government spending / raise taxes, • to avoid economic overheating • & strengthen long-run debt sustainability. • Fiscal stimulus (“expansion”): • Raise government spending / cut taxes • to provide short-term economic stimulus, • for growth & employment.

3. Austerity vs. Stimulus, continued • “What is the best fiscal policy, Austerity or Stimulus?” • The question is as foolish as to ask, “Should a driver turn leftorright?” • It depends where he is in the road. • Sometimes left is the answer, sometimes right.

4. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy • Keynes favored counter-cyclical policy: • fiscal stimulus when under conditions like the1930s-- depressed income, high unemployment, low inflation, low interest rates – to moderate the downturn, • but fiscal contraction during boom periods, to prevent over-heating. • The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury.” - John Maynard Keynes (1937) Collected Writings

5. “Keynesian” policy fell into disfavor • in part because it was seen as justifying chronic over-expansion • & in part because it is hard to get the timing right (“fine-tuning”): • By the time fiscal stimulus became law, sometimes the recession would be over, • e.g., the Kennedy tax cut, passed in1964. • But that is no excuse for pro-cyclical fiscal policy. • Definition of pro-cyclical fiscal policy: Governments raise spending (or cut taxes) in booms; and are then forced to retrench in downturns, thereby exacerbating upswings & downswings.

6. During the decade after 2000, • some Emerging Market governments learned how to do counter-cyclical fiscal policy, • while many Advanced Country politicians forgot, • turning pro-cyclical instead, • acting to exacerbate the business cycle.

7. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy,continued • Conspicuously, Greece & other euro members failed to reduce budget deficits during yearsofgrowth, 2002-08 • and were then forced to cutspending & raisetaxes during the euro debt crisis of 2010-12, • exacerbating the recession, • & even raising Debt/GDP. • But the United Kingdom did the same, • despite no euro-constraint forcing austerity in 2010-13. • And so did the United States !

8. Why do leaders fail to take advantage of booms to strengthen the budget? • People don’t see the need to “fix the hole in the roof when the sun is shining.” • They do see the mistake when the storm hits, • but then it is too late. • Official forecasts are over-optimistic in boom periods, rationalizing the failure to act. • according to data from 33 countries.

9. Threedistinct US fiscalproblems • The long-term debt problem • The medium-term economic problem • The short-term political problem

10. Three distinct US fiscal problems • The long-term problem -- debt unsustainability • warrants a path back to fiscal discipline. • The medium-term economic problem -- slow recovery in aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, • warranted demand stimulus today, not contraction, • which has been holding back growth. • The short-term problem is political: • A succession of artificial deadlines, each threatening disaster.

11. Fiscal policy The US does have a long-term debt problem.. Not sustainable Source: Concord Coalition, spring 2013 http://www.concordcoalition.org/issues/indicators/projected-debt

12. The long-term US debt problem, continued • “Long-term” in the sense that debt/GDP will rise alarmingly after the 2020s • unless entitlements are put on a sound footing: • Social Security & Medicare are due to run big deficits • as the baby-boomers retire (predictably) • and the cost of health care rises rapidly (less predictably). • Definition of debt sustainability: • regardless the level of the debt, it is sustainable if the future debt/GDP ratio is forecast to fall indefinitely.

13. Long-term debt problem, continued • There is not a short-term problem: • Far from tiring of absorbing ever-greater levels of US treasury securities, global investors continue happily to lend at record-low interest rates (2008-13): • The US enjoys safe-haven status; the $ enjoys “exorbitant privilege.” • There is no fiscal crisis. The US is not Greece, • though we want to be sure not to become Greece in 20 years. • Indeed the federal budget deficit is now coming down • from 9 % of GDP in FY 2009 to 4 % in FY 2013. • despite the continued weakness in the economy. • Debt/GDP will come down over 2014-18.

14. The budget deficit is currently on a declining path. “The Rapidly Shrinking Federal Deficit” Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities & Strategy Research (Hatzius), Apr.10, 2013

15. Debt /GDP is set to decline over 2014 -18. • CBPP recommends a further $1.2 tr. in spending cuts & tax rises to stabilize debt out to 2022. • But there is no need for it to hit this year. That would send us back into recession. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Jan.9, 2013 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3885

16. Long-term debt problem, continued The debt problem is also “long-term” inthesense that we have known about it a long time. E.g., when Ronald Reagan, took office: "For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the present… We must act today in order to preserve tomorrow. And let there be no misunderstanding: We are going to begin to act, beginning today.” • Inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1981

17. BriefUSfiscalhistory: The1980s The newlyelected Reagan complainedof the inheriteddebt: “Our national debt is approaching $1 trillion. …A trillion dollars would be a stack of 1,000-$ bills 67 miles high.” address to Congress, Feb. 18, 1981. Reagan’s actions: sharp tax cuts& rise in defense spending. The claim: budget surpluses would result. The reality: record deficits that added to the national debt a 2nd trillion in his 1st term a 3rd trillion in his 2nd term a 4th trillion when G.H.W. Bush initially continued the policies. (“Read my lips, no new taxes.”)

18. US fiscal history,continued: The1990s The deficits were gradually cut, and then converted to surpluses by the end of the 1990s. How was this accomplished? Regime of “Shared Sacrifice” -- 3 key policy events. 1990: GHWBushbravelyagreed spendingcaps, taxes&PAYGO 1993: Clinton extended the policy. 1998: As surpluses emerged, “SaveSocialSecurity 1st.” Strong growth in late 1990s.

19. Fiscal history,continued: The 2000s The Shared Sacrifice regime ended on the day G.W. Bush took office in Jan. 2001. He returned to the Reagan policies: Large tax cuts together with rapid increase in spending(triple Clinton’s) not just in military spending (esp. Iraq & Afghanistan), but also domestic spending: discretionary + Medicare drugs benefit. Just like Reagan, he claimed budget surpluses would result. Just like Reagan, the result was record deficits: The national debt doubled. I.e., GWB incurred more debt than his father + Reagan + 39 predecessors

21. The US public discussion is framed as a battle between conservatives who philosophically believe in strong budgets & small government, and liberals who do not.Democrats, Republicans, & the media all use this language. (1) The right goal should be budgets that allow surpluses in booms and deficits in recession. (2) The correlation between how loudly an American politician proclaims a belief in fiscal conservatism and how likely he is to take genuine policy steps < 0. [1] Never mind that small government is classically supposed to be the aim of “liberals,” in the 19th century definition, not “conservatives.” My point is different: those who call themselves conservatives in practice tend to adopt policies that are the opposite of fiscal conservatism. I call them “illiberal.” “Republican & Democratic Presidents Have Switched Economic Policies”Milken Inst.Rev.2003. It is not the right way to characterize the debate. [1]

22. 1.SomeUSpoliticianshavepursuedpro-cyclical (i.e., destabilizing) fiscal policy.1st cycle: Recession: austerity. • Boom: profligacy. • 1988: As the economy neared the peak of the business cycle, candidate George H.W. Bush was unconcerned about budget deficits: • “Read my lips, no new taxes.” • 1980-81:Reagan’sspeeches pledging action to reduce the national debt “beginning today” came during a period of severe recession.

23. Some US politicians have sought pro-cyclical fiscal policy, continued2nd cycle Recession: austerity. • Boom: profligacy. • 1993-2000: Despite the most robust recovery in US history, • 1993: all Republican congressmen voted against Clinton’s legislation to continue PAYGO etc. • 2000: Even after 7 years of strong growth, with unemployment < 4%, G. W. Bush campaigned on tax cuts. • 2003: Afterhisfiscal expansionhad turned the inherited surpluses into deficits, GWB went for a 2nd round of tax cuts & continued a spending growth rate > Clinton’s. • VP Cheney: “Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter.” 1990: The first President Bush summoned the politicalwill to raise taxes & rein in spending (PAYGO) at precisely the wrong moment -- just as the US entered another recession.

24. Some US politicians have sought pro-cyclical fiscal policy, continued3rd cycle Recession: austerity. • 2007-09: Predictably, when the new recession hit (worst since the 1930s ), Republican congressmen suddenly re-discovered the evil of deficits, deciding that retrenchment was urgent. • They opposed Obama’s initial fiscal stimulus in February 2009. • 2011: Subsequently, with a majority in the House, despite still-high unemployment; they blocked further efforts by Obama as the stimulus ran out, • and instead cut discretionary spending sharply in 2012 and 2013 • via the debt ceiling stand-offs, fiscal cliff, sequestration, etc.. • and also allowed the payroll tax holiday to expire in Jan. 2013.

25. Thus, through 3 cycles, the efforts at austerity came during recessions, followed by fiscal expansionwhen the economy was already expanding.

26. The US has its own version of biased forecasts Official US forecasts in the 2000s • White House forecasts were over-optimistic. • OMB in Jan. 2001 forecast rapid rise in tax revenue, • in effect assuming there would never be a recession. • Four tricksto justify tax cuts, dating from the 1980s: • The Magic Asterisk • Rosy Scenario • Laffer Hypothesis • Starve the Beast Hypothesis

27. The US version of biased forecasts, continued Official US forecasts in the 2000s • Congressional Budget Office forecasts are honest. • But the Bush Administration adopted new tricks, • so that “current-law budget” would show future surpluses: • continuation of Iraq & Afghan wars treated as a surprise each year; • phony sun-setting of tax cuts…

28. Where are we now? • The political crisis: • repeated partisan standoffs in Congress. • To reduce the budget deficit: • how far can we get by discretionary spending cuts? • Where are the right places to squeeze, • politics aside ?

29. Repeated partisan stand-offs in Congress The summer of 2011:Congress refused the usual debt ceiling increase, recklessly threatening government default. Political dysfunction led S&P to downgrade US bonds from AAA. 2013: “Fiscal cliff,” Jan. 1; Sequestration into effect March 1; Government shutdown, Oct. 1-16; Debt ceiling, Oct.17. Next: Dec.15: Attempt at negotiating a budget. Jan. 15, 2013: Next shutdown deadline. Feb. 7: Next debt ceiling deadline.

30. The game of “Chicken” In the 1955 movie Rebel WithoutaCause, whoever jumps out of his car first supposedly “loses” the game. James Dean does; but the other guy miscalculates and goes over the cliff. . The Republicans may have miscalculated.

31. How far can we get by cutting spending? Totalfederalspending = $3½ trillion. That spending minus tax revenue leaves a budget deficit of $ ¾ trillion in 2013 down from $1.1 trillion in 2012, and from $1.4 trillion in 2009. Many Republican congressmen have campaigned to cut only non-defense discretionary spending, to exempt defense & senior-related spending(Soc. Security & Medicare). And adamantly no tax increase.  That was their official platform in the 2010 election. Even if we could set all non-defense discretionary spending =0, it would not eliminate the deficit.

32. 3 biggest spending categories:Health, Social Security, & Defense { Medicare & medicaid Concord Coalition. Data Source: CBO, Jan. 2012 Since 2011, discretionary spending is down (esp. as share of GDP): Defense to 18% of spending, income security to 15%. Entitlements are up: SocialSecurity to 23% of spending &health to 25%. Both will rise rapidly in the future.

33. 12 years ago, if the country thought it important enough to protect any single category against belt-tightening in the long run -- say military or social security or tax cuts for the rich -- it would have been arithmetically possible, by making the cuts elsewhere. But we no longer have the luxury of such choices after the legacy of the last decade — after the effects of mammoth tax cuts (2001 & 2003), two wars (2001, 2003), the Medicare prescription drug benefit (2003), and the severe financial crisis & recession (2008). Starting from our current position, each of the 5 components must play a role, along with taxes.

34. What steps should be taken today to lock in future fiscal consolidation? Not by raising taxes or cutting spending today(new recession); nor by promising to do so in a year or two(not credible). There are lots of economically sensible proposals for spending to eliminate over time, more efficient taxes to phase in, and “tax expenditures” to phase out. If there were no political constraints…

35. How to reduce the budget deficit The only way to do this is both reduce spending & raise tax revenue, as we did in the 1990s. • Spending. Examples: • Eliminate agricultural subsidies. • Cut manned space program. • Trim National Guard & Reserves, • Close unwanted military bases • Cut unwanted weapons systems • A rare success: the F22 Raptor fighter. Now F-35 Joint Strike Fighter? ($600b/10 yrs.) • Global Hawk Block 30 drone program? • The C-27J Spartan cargo aircraft? • Upgrades to the M1 Abrams tank • Virginia-class submarine? ($2.6 b)

36. How to reduce the budget deficit The only way is both reduce spending & raise tax revenue, continued. • Tax revenue options • We could have let G.W. Bush’s tax cuts expire in 2013. • Can still curtail expensive&distorting“taxexpenditures” • E.g., Tax-deductibility of mortgage interest, • & of health insurance • Subsidies to oil industry, low tax rate on carried interest, … • Or launch more ambitious tax reform: • Introduce a VAT, sales, or consumption tax • or phase in an energy or carbon tax • or auctioning of tradable emission permits

37. Distortionary subsidies hiding as tax expenditures $128 b $305 billion $93 b $84 b Joint Committee of Taxation, Jan. 2012

38. The long-term problem is entitlements Concord Coalition. Data Source: CBO, Jan. 2012

39. Social security Raise retirement age – just a little, perhaps exempting low-income workers. Index benefit growth to chain measure of inflation. Further options: To please Democrats: Raise the cap on social security taxes. To please Republicans: encourage private accounts though they contribute nothing to closing the gap. 39

40. Health care Encourage hospitals to standardize around best-practice medicine. Pay health providers for “value,” not per medical procedure. Standardize around best-practice treatment: evidence-based (to be facilitated by electronic health records). E.g., pursue the checklist that minimizes patient infections, and avoid unnecessary medical tests & procedures. That is not “death panels.” Levers to get providers to follow best practices: make Medicare payments conditional or protection from malpractice litigation. Curtail corporate tax-deductibility of health insurance, especially gold-plated. 40

41. Writings by J.Frankel on fiscal policy: • On Graduation from Fiscal Procyclicality,” 2013, with C.Végh & G.Vuletin, J. Developmt. Econ. Summary: "Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: Escape from Procyclicality," VoxEU, 2011. NBER WP 17619. • "Over-optimism in Forecasts by Official Budget Agencies and Its Implications," Oxford Review of Econ. PolicyVol.27,Issue 4, 2011, 536-62. NBER WP 17239; Summary in NBER Digest, Nov.2011. • “Snake-Oil Tax Cuts,” 2008, EPI, Briefing Paper 221. HKS RWP 08-056. • "Responding to Crises,"Cato Journalvol.27, no. 2, Spring/Summer, 2007. • “Republican and Democratic Presidents Have Switched Economic Policies,”Milken Institute Review 5, no. 1, 2003 QI.

42. Appendices on cyclicality & US fiscal troubles • I. The historic reversal in cyclicality • II. US fiscal troubles • 2. The long-term debt path is unsustainable • 3. Consequences of recent Congressional show-downs • for uncertainty; cost to the economy. • 4. Can we balance the budget by cutting non-defense discretionary spending?

43. Appendix I: The historic role reversal Over the last decade some emerging market countries finally developed countercyclical fiscal policies: They took advantage of the boom years 2003-2007 to run primary budget surpluses and cumulate reserves. And so were able to respond to global recession of 2008-09 . E.g., Botswana, Chile, China, Korea, & Malaysia. Debt levels among rich countries (debt/GDP ratios > 90%) have reached triple those of emerging markets. Some emerging markets have earned credit ratings higher than some so-called advanced countries. 43

44. Correlations between Gov.t Spending & GDP 1960-1999 } procyclical Adapted from Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh (2004) Pro-cyclical spending countercyclical Counter-cyclical spending G always used to be pro-cyclical for most developing countries.

45. Correlations between Government spending & GDP 2000-2009 procyclical Frankel, Vegh & Vuletin (2012) In the last decade, about 1/3 developing countries switched to countercyclical fiscal policy:Negative correlation of G & GDP. countercyclical

47. Remainder of this talk • Consider the experiences of • Emerging Market / Developing countries • Europe • How can countries head off temptation for fiscal stimulus in the boom?

48. Most experience with sovereign debt problems during our lifetimes arose in developing countries • Recycling of petrodollars after 1974 - • ended in the international debt crisis of 1982 • and the Lost Decade of growth in Latin America. • Emerging market inflows in the 1990s • ended in currency crashes: • Mexico (1994), • East Asia, Russia (1997-98) • Turkey, Argentina (2001)…

49. Emerging Market (EM) countries learned from the crises of the 1980s & 1990s. • Many EMs took advantage of the 2002-07 expansion to strengthen their budgets • along with other reforms, esp. adding to reserves & reducing currency mismatch. • They achieved: • Lower debt levels than advanced economies; • improved credit ratings; • lower sovereign spreads; and • less pro-cyclical fiscal policies. • Historically, policy in developing countries was pro-cyclical. • E.g., the correlation between spending & GDP was positive.

50. Country creditworthiness is now inter-shuffled “Advanced” countries (Formerly) “Developing” countries AAA Germany, UK Singapore, Hong Kong AA+ US, France AA Belgium Chile AA- Japan China A+ Korea A Malaysia, South Africa A- Brazil, Thailand, Botswana BBB+ Ireland, Italy, Spain BBB- Iceland Colombia, India BB+ Indonesia, Philippines BB Portugal Costa Rica, Jordan B Burkina Faso SD Greece S&P ratings, Feb.2012updated 8/2012