Al Capone, The Sword of Damocles & the Police: Prisons Budget Ratio

1. Lawrence Sherman Institute of Criminology University of Cambridge Al Capone, The Sword of Damocles & the Police: Prisons Budget Ratio

2. Very Harmful No evidence to prove his murdering Prosecution on tax evasion Died in Prison Al Capone

3. Average Charges for MURDER or Attempted Murder Within Two Years of Probation Start: Philadelphia .375 High Neither Low .033 .005

4. Papers Richard Berk, Lawrence Sherman, Geoffrey Barnes, Ellen Kurtz and Lindsay Ahlman 2009 “Forecasting murder within a population of probationers and parolees: a high stakes application of statistical learning” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 172: 191–211 Lawrence Sherman (2011) “Al Capone, the Sword of Damocles, and the Police–Corrections Budget Ratio” Criminology & Public Policy 10: 195-206. Lawrence Sherman (2010). Less Prison, More Police, Less Crime: How Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice Video posted at http://nij.ncjrs.gov/multimedia/video-sherman.htm .

5. Neither Crime nor Criminals Are All Equal in Their HARM • What does it mean to say “crime” dropped? • All crimes are not created equal • Some far more harmful than others • Yet governments publish “crime” totals • Completely unweighted by harm • Total crime down, homicides X 100 • How to interpret?

6. Crime Harm Index (CHI)(Sherman, 2007) • Tool for combining elements of different weights into a single scale value • E.g., murder = 200, car theft = 5, shoplift = 1 • What is 100 crimes in CHI? Example: 10 murders X 200 = 2,000 50 car thefts X 5 = 250 1,000 shop thefts X 1 = 1,000 TOTAL = 3,250

7. Cut Costs, Manage Criminals • Stop summing crimes • Start weighing harms • Provide a transparent, total harm “level” • Not a confusing flood of undigested data

8. Use Crime Harm Index (CHI) • Evaluate national trends in harm levels • Compare police force areas • Make decisions about criminals • Apportion CJ costs in relation to harm prevention benefit

9. Keep It Simple? • Manage less harmful offenders in communit (key role of police) • Lock up dangerous people forever (main role for prisons) • Keep testing value for money

10. Apply CHI to Justice • CJ Act 2003 • Judge must assess dangerousness • Take CHI Forecasts Into Account • Early diversion for low risk • Probation on tight license • Certainty, swiftness—not severity

11. Braggart at King’s Table Not Punished Merely Threatened with Punishment Curbed Behaviour Sword of Damocles

12. Percent of USA CJS Budgets:Local Police vs. Prisons

13. US: 50,000(?) Police Laid Off

15. Nieuwbeerta, Paul, Daniel Nagin and Arjan A. J. Blokland (2009). “Assessing the Impact of First-Time Imprisonment on Offenders’ Subsequent Criminal Career Development: A Matched Samples Comparison” Journal of Quantitative Criminology.

17. Prisons? Police? Probation? Which Can Prevent Crime Better?

18. The Politics of Early Release

19. Petrosino Campbell 2009

20. Jeremy Bentham Sir Robert Peel Blending Two Thinkers onPrevention

21. Certainty Celerity (speed) Severity Bentham: Deterrence

22. Certainty Celerity Cessation: --Stopping the crime in progress Abolished death penalties Australia? Transportation Today Still Possible Peel, 1829

23. Peel’s Principles 1829 • Minimum Force Necessary • Minimum Cost to Taxpayers • Test of Success: NOT punishment • BUT the demonstrable absence of crime • Prevention, not detection • Management of crime and criminals • Deter, intercept thieves, break up fights • Reserve prosecution for the very worst

24. Deferred Prosecution You are under arrest We can charge you Put you in Jail But we suspend action So you can go straight Go to drug treatment Get a job Do Restorative Justice Relocate “Turning Point” Plan Or-- we will prosecute Operation Damocles!

25. The Regulatory Pyramid

26. Certainty, Swiftness:the Project Hope Example • Hawaii Offender Probation Enhancement • Chronic Drug-Abusing Property Criminals • Drug-Testing as a condition • Failure COULD mean 5 years in prison • Typically failure had not been reported • 5, 10, 15 times—no sanction • 17th time? Or 19th? Or 13th? • Unexpected, sudden, very severe penalty

27. How Does HOPE Improve, In Theory? • Certainty—call every day, Mon-Fri • Swiftness—Immediate processing of tests Immediate jail time • Severity-------Low at first Steadily rising with repeats

28. How Does HOPE Improve, In Effects? • Randomized Controlled Trial • Prison Days 50% lower for HOPE • New Crimes 50% lower for HOPE • NIJ to replicate in multiple states

29. Risk-Based Policy:Foundation of Cost-Effectiveness Pew Trust Report Parole Guidelines on Release Virginia sentencing Guidelines—risk, not desert RAND 1982 Report on Selective Incapacitation Idea rejected by 1986 NAS Report on Error False positives too high for values But prison rate has tripled False positives are embedded in sentencing Actuarial Risk could keep them out, not put them in

30. Police as Offender Managers • Classify Risks • Prosecute highest risk, maximum prison • Divert Lowest Risk, minimal cost • Manage for desistance • More emphasis on offender-victim future • Test specific tactics—RJ, drug treatment, even “transportation” by consent

31. Where to Start • Not Hard-Core Recidivists • Diamond Districts results (Met) • But where diversion alone does best • First Offenders—or early

32. 500 Offenders Age 70 In & out of crime Key Turning Points John Laub Robert Sampson Turning Points

33. Big Ones • Partner (spouse) • Job • Change of community • Cut off ties to old friends—family!

34. Relocation Strategy: Funding Incentive, All Stages

35. Prisoner Resettlement Re-Location “Experiment” Whether they went back to their “hood” Unrelated to their choice Most US states require same community Louisiana does not

36. David S. Kirk “A Natural Experiment on Residential Change and Recidivism: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina” American Sociological Review 2009

37. Cause and Effect If re-imprisonment rates differ “Returners” higher than “Relocaters” Likely to be caused by relocation Not self-selection bias But were they unknown to police? QUESTION: long-term effects—not 1-year Would three years be convincing?

38. 3-Year Results: Brand new

39. Relocation  Less Prison? Four-Year Re-imprisonment Rates (Louisiana or other states) 1-Year4-Year Returners = 26% 65% Relocators = 11% 35% 1-year Difference = 15% raw, 58% relative 3-year Difference = 30% raw, 54% relative

40. Further the Better For every ten miles they moved from their old neighbourhood, at one year out, One Percent Less Re-Imprisonment

41. Managing Offenders in Community:Summary • Regulatory Pyramid • Escalating control, sanctions • Low to moderate severity • But also individual needs, crime by crime: --restorative justice --relocation --drug treatment --curfews --not associating with other offenders

42. “Turning Point Policing”(funded by Monument Trust) • Develop Risk Assessment Tool UK • Develop Damocles Tactics • Divert sample of first offenders to Damocles • Then test overall forecast-based triage

43. Randomized Controlled Trial RCT:COMPARISON or NET difference

44. Research & Development • British Society for Evidence-Based Policing • Testing “rehabilitative policing” or “Offender Desistance Policing (ODP) or “Turning Point Policing” • Managing desistance as a lifelong task • Comprehensive studies of what works

45. Thank You Lawrence W. Sherman Jerry Lee Centre of Experimental Criminology University of Cambridge