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Government E-1275: Asia in World Affairs Session #3. The Cold War in Asia

Government E-1275: Asia in World Affairs Session #3. The Cold War in Asia. 1. How did the Cold War begin in Asia? 2. How did the Soviet-led communist and the U.S.-led capitalist alliances work in Asia? 3. How did the Cold War “end” in Asia?. Distinctive Tenets of the Cold War in Asia.

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Government E-1275: Asia in World Affairs Session #3. The Cold War in Asia

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  1. Government E-1275: Asia in World AffairsSession #3. The Cold War in Asia 1. How did the Cold War begin in Asia? 2. How did the Soviet-led communist and the U.S.-led capitalist alliances work in Asia? 3. How did the Cold War “end” in Asia?

  2. Distinctive Tenets of the Cold War in Asia • Japanese foreign policy transformed (Berger): • Projection of U.S. military power in Asia. • Civil wars in China, Korea, and Vietnam (Christensen): • Communist authoritarianism vs. capitalist authoritarianism. • Weak multilateral institutions (Hemmer/Katzenstein): • No North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or European Community (EC, now EU). • Problems of cooperation in the revisionist alliance between the S.U. and PRC (Christensen). • “Economic miracle” in East Asia: • Reduced appeal of communism; capitalism won the Cold War. • Democratization and nationalism in ROK, ROC. • The “end” of the Cold War (Yahuda): • PRC, DPRK, SRV resilient, didn’t collapse.

  3. Origins of the Cold War (I):U.S. Occupation of Japan • Early U.S. occupation policies (1945-47): • Democratization and demilitarization. • Disbanding of the Imperial Japanese military. • Constitution (1947): “symbol monarchy”; Art. 9. • Purge the right-wing, release the left-wing. • Empower labor unions. • Land reform. • Break up the zaibatsu. • “The reverse course,” 1948-52: • Reverse demilitarization. • Purge the left, release the right-wing. • Reorganization of the zaibatsu into keiretsu networks. • Development of the conservative political order, dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, est. 1955).

  4. Discussion: Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum…” “…Japan’s anti-militarism in its present form could not survive both a weakening of its alliance with the United States and the emergence of a new regional security threat.” (p. 120) “Cultures can and do change, but usually they do so in an evolutionary fashion.” (p. 148) “Japan’s military buildup in the 1970s and 1980s took place in close consultation with the United States. Consequently, the Japanese force structure is designed to complement that of U.S. forces in the region, with a heavy emphasis on defensive weaponry, and little independent capacity for power projection.” (p. 127)

  5. Origins of the Cold War (II): The Chinese Civil War • Nationalists (Kuomintang, KMT) vs. Communists (Chinese Communist Party, CCP). • PRC founded, Oct. ’49. • First & Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-55; 1958). • Jinmen/Quemoy, Matsu.

  6. Origins of the Cold War (III): The Korean War • Legacies of the Pacific War: • Yalta and Potsdam; Soviet Red Army into Manchuria, Korea. • U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission: 38th parallel. • Divided Korea (1945-50): • Rhee Syngman (U.S.); Kim Il-Sung (S.U.). • Seoul, KMAG est. ROKA; Pyongyang, KPA. • Election (5/48); ROK (est. 8/15/48); DPRK (est. 9/8/48). • Outbreak of the Korean War: • Guerrilla warfare in the south.

  7. The Korean War (cont.) • Sec. State Dean Acheson’s speech (Jan. ’50): ROK and ROC not included explicitly in U.S. “defense perimeter.” • Balance of military power; NK attacks on 6/25/50. • General Douglas MacArthur: “rollback strategy,” to Yalu. • Chinese entry (Nov. ’50): Kim Il-Sung’s role in the Chinese civil war.

  8. Dean Acheson on the Korean War (1953) “I think we can sum it up this way… that Korea moved a great many things from the realm of theory and brought them right into… the realm of urgency. [The war] confirmed in our minds the correctness of the analysis of the NSC 68.”

  9. Origins of the Cold War (IV): The Vietnam War • First Indochina War (1946-54). • Viet Minh’s anti-Japanese resistance. • Ho Chi Minh’s proclamation of independence. • French defeat; Dien Bien Phu. • Geneva Agreements (1954): 17th parallel. • Divided Vietnam: • South: Ngo Dinh Diem; U.S. aid. • Viet Minh’s infiltration of the south; National Liberation front. • U.S. concerns: “domino theory.”

  10. The Vietnam War (cont.) • Johnson administration and the “Americanization” of the war. • “Rolling thunder”: air bombings (Feb. 1856-). • North Vietnam: increased aid from S.U. and China. • Nixon administration and the “Vietnamization” of the war. • Guam (Nixon) Doctrine (1969). • Paris peace talks (1968-73) and settlement; fall of Saigon (1975).

  11. U.S.-Led, Capitalist Alliances in Asia:Hemmer/Katzenstein: “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” “America’s potential Asian allies… were seen as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior community… Multilateralism is a particularly demanding form of international cooperation. It requires a strong sense of collective identity in addition to shared interests.” (pp. 575-6) “Germany’s pariah status following World War II as equal to if not greater than Japan’s.” (p. 581) “A direct line from a certain type of threat (cross-border Soviet attack) to a particular institutional form (multilateralism) cannot be drawn in Europe.” (p. 585)

  12. Soviet-Led Communist Alliances:T. Christensen: “Worse Than a Monolith…” • Different security interests of the S.U. and PRC. • Suspicion & competition between S.U. and PRC. • Small, weak states (such as DPRK and North Vietnam) could manipulate S.U. and PRC. • Lack of coordination b/w S.U. and PRC. • Small states received more material support from both S.U. & PRC. • Lack of transparency: U.S. misreading of the cohesion & resolve of the communist bloc.

  13. The “End” of the Cold War in Asia • “Tripolarity” • 1970s: Sino-Soviet split; Sino-American diplomatic normalization (1972); U.S.-S.U. détente in the 1970s. • Decline of the Soviet Union: • War in Afghanistan. • The Gorbachev revolution in Soviet diplomacy. • Moderation of China’s revolutionary goals: • Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping’s reformist China. • The rise of the Japanese economy. • U.S.-Japan trade & currency disputes in the ’70s & ’80s. • “Containing Japan” (James Fallows, ’89). • Economic disputes may undermine security alliance (?).

  14. The “End” of the Cold War in Asia (cont.) • Divided Korea & China: • DPRK vs. ROK; PRC vs. ROC. • Democratization & nationalism in ROK & ROC. • Hereditary dictatorship in DPRK; econ. reform in PRC. • “Domino theory” turned out to be wrong in Southeast Asia.

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