1 / 23

Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System

Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System. Hugues Thiesen. Acknowledgments: K. Dahlerup -Petersen, R. Denz , A. Funken , J. Gomez, V. Montabonnet , D. Nisbet , M. Zerlauth and HCC team. Contents. UPS overview

dale
Download Presentation

Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System HuguesThiesen Acknowledgments: K. Dahlerup-Petersen, R. Denz, A. Funken, J. Gomez, V. Montabonnet, D. Nisbet, M. Zerlauth and HCC team Chamonix 2009

  2. Contents • UPS overview • UPS for Superconducting Circuit Protection System (CPS) • Impact of UPS malfunction • Actual Situation • Conclusions Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009

  3. UPS overview Point 4 Point 5 Point 6 B e a m d u m p Point 3 S P S Point 7 Point 2 T I 2 Point 8 I n j e c t i o n T I 8 Point 1 I n j e c t i o n CPS (28) Cryo (12) RF (2) General (8) SR (16) Total UPS systems for LHC: > 60 (8 MVA) Total UPS systems for CPS: > 28 (56 UPS units) Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 3

  4. UPS overview • Human Safety • Access* • Fire detection*, ODH* • Radiation Monitor*, etc… • Beam Systems • Beam Instrumentation • BIC, FMCM • Beam Dump System • RF • Vacuum, etc… • Technical Network, etc… • Cryogenic System • SC Circuit Protection System • Power Converters • PIC • Energy Extraction System (EE) • CLQD, GQD and MPS Standard Systems use in all CERN accelerators Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 Specific Systems use in LHC 4 * = internal UPS

  5. UPS for CPS • Particularities of Superconducting Circuits • High current: up to 13 kA • High energy stored: up to 1.4 GJ • High current density: up to 1000A/mm2 • High time constant: up to 400 sec (EE switches opened). • 250 s (4 min) for RB to decrease the current from 13 kA to 1 kA • 800 s (14 min) for RQX to decrease the current from 7 kA to 1 kA (UPS specification = 10 min. of autonomy) • Functionalities require for CPS • Protect magnets • Protect Current Leads • Protect Bus-Bars • Slow Abort the PCs in case of cryogenic warning • Avoid to start without all systems fully operational • Save data for analyzing Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 5

  6. UPS for CPS • UPS redundancy Equip. UPS_1 F3a EBD EOD UPS_2 Equip. F3b • Each UPS can deliver the requested power (10 min of autonomy) • 2 orders of redundancy • If one UPS fails the load is supplied by the second UPS • If the second UPS fails the load is supplied by the electrical network • Weak point = breakers (the number of breakers must be optimized and selectivity must be guaranteed) • Characteristics of UPS Network = Characteristics of General Network (see next slide) Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 6

  7. UPS for CPS • Main Parameters of the LHC 400/230V Electrical Network • Nominal values • Nominal voltage: 400/230 V ± 10 % • Nominal frequency: 50 Hz ± 0.5 Hz • THD: 5 % • Voltage unbalance: 2 % • Transients • Peak mains surges: 1200 V for 0.2 ms • Mains over voltage: 50 % of Un for 10 ms • Voltage drops: 50 % of Un for 100 ms Transients = Normal Operation Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 7 EDMS # 113154: Main Parameters Of The LHC 400/230V Distribution System (G. Fernqvist / J. Pedersen)

  8. UPS for CPS • UPS connected to the PIC • Software link for PPermit • "Not possible" to start in case of one UPS warning /fault • Hardware link for Energy Extraction (Fast_Abort) • Fast abort in case of two UPS warnings/faults (eg. batteries mode) PPermit PIC Supervision UPS_1 UPS_2 FastAbort Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 8

  9. UPS for CPS UPS_UA83 UPS_RE82 UPS_RE78 UPS_UJ76 C2n+1 C2n+1 C2n+1 C2n+1 C2n C2n C2n C2n C34LR C12R IP8 C12L IP7 • 4 redundant UPS systems to protect 1 sector • 1 UPS in UA => IT, IPQ and IPD • 1 UPS in RE => C12L to C34L (77 MB and 24 MQ) • 1 UPS in RE => C34R to C12R (77 MB and 24 MQ) • 1 UPS in UJ => IT, IPQ and IPD Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 9

  10. UPS for CPS As for any other systems, the UPS systems can malfunction • Diagnostic malfunction • Supervision malfunction • Interlock malfunction • Etc… • Power malfunction • Degradation of the output voltage • 1 phase loss • 3 phases loss • Partial network loss • Etc… Interlock malfunction Total Loss of the output power Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 10

  11. Impact of UPS malfunction Interlock malfunction PIC Supervision UPS_1 UPS_2 • If the interlock system of one UPS does not work • The PIC does not stop the powering if the second UPS stops working (UPS system in by-pass). Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 No action before loss of the UPS system output power 11

  12. Impact of UPS malfunction Power malfunction Cold Part Warm Part GQD Ref. M PC PIC CLQD MQD EE QHPS • SC Circuit Protection System • Three protection systems • The Magnet Protection System (MQD + QHPS) • The CL Protection System • The Global Protection System • The Energy Extraction System • The PIC • The PC Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 12

  13. Impact on PC (1) PC CR F G C CCC GW Network FIP DCCT • UPS for power converter • Only DCCTs and FGC for high current power converters are on UPS (MB, MQ, IPQ, IPD and IT). The power part is not supplied by UPS • Gateway and computing network are on UPS to assure the control of the PCs Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 13

  14. Impact on PC (2) PC CR F G C CCC GW Network FIP DCCT • Loss of FGC and DCCT • The power converter switches off • The CR fires (not need power) • PC PM data is lost • The quench loop does not open (except if water failure) • Loss of GW • After 10mn, all power converters connected on this GW switch off • Their CR fire • PC PM data is stored inside FGCs • Loss of Computing Network • The control of the PC is lost (Only PC with PIC can be switched off). • The 60A PCs can not be switched off Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 14

  15. Impact on EE system EN CCC Network • Loss of EE system Electronic • The Energy Extraction Switch opens • The Quench Loop opens • The power converter switches off and its CR fires • The EE system PM data is lost • Loss of communication with the CCC • Nothing happens • The EE system remains fully operational Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 15

  16. Impact on CLPS system Network CCC CLPS • Loss of CLPS Electronic • The Quench loop opens • The EE switch opens • The power converter switches off and its CR fires • The CLPS PM data is lost • Loss of the communication with the CCC • Nothing happens • The CLPS remains fully operational Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 16

  17. Impact on GQPS system Network CCC GQPS Ref. M CLPS • Loss of GQPS Electronic • The Quench loop opens • The EE switch opens • The power converter switches off and its CR fires • The GQPS PM data is lost • Loss of the communication with the CCC • Nothing happens • The GQPS remains fully operational Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 17

  18. Impact on MQPS system (1) Network CCC QD QHPS • MQPS • Implemented only for the high current circuits (MB, MQ, IPQ, IPD and IT) • For the IPQ, IPD and IT circuits, the MQPS protects also the busbars • Single phase powering • QHPS • The QHPS are not in the Quench Loop and can be only fired by the QD • 4 QHPS per magnets and 1 is needed to protect correctly the magnet • The QHPS are connected to the Power Permit Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 18

  19. Impact on MQPS system (2) Network CCC QD QHPS • Loss of QD/QHPS (same single phase feeder) • The Quench loop opens • The EE switch opens • The power converter switches off and its CR fires • The MQPS PM data is lost • To avoid a "sector quench" in case of UPS loss the QHPS are not fired. The consequence is the magnet is not protected during the current decay. • Loss of the communication with the CCC • Nothing happens • The MQPS system remains fully operational Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 19

  20. Impact on PIC Network CCC PIC • PIC Level • All HW interlock loops of this PIC open • All EE switches of concerned circuits open • All power converters of concerned circuits switch off and their CR fire • The PIC PM data after the event is lost • Loss of the communication with the CCC • Slow Abort after 30 seconds • The currents of concerned circuits decays to 0 A • The PIC remains fully operational Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 20

  21. Resume GQD Ref. M PC PIC CLQD MQD EE QHPS PC PIC EE CLQD GQD MPS* 13kA okokokokoknok IT okok - ok -nok IPQ/IPD okok - ok -nok 600A-EE okokokokok - 600A-NoEE okok - okok - 120A okok - ok - - 60A ½ ok - - ok - - Pb with MPS Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 No Issue Issue with PC control * To avoid a "sector quench" in case of UPS loss the QHPS are not fired. The consequence is the magnet is not protected during the current decay. 21

  22. Actual Situation • Tested • UPS IST • Devices IST • No tested • Devices on UPS network (verification on going during AUG tests) • UPS with theirs loads Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 22

  23. Conclusions • Conclusions • UPS has not been tested with its load. Tests of UPS systems (with load) are recommended. • New devices will be installed on UPS network (nQPS system). "AUG tests" in operational conditions are recommended. • UPS is important for the LHC safety. Annual tests after each shut down are recommended. • High Current magnets are not protected in case of UPS powering failure. This issue must be clarified by MPWG (to fire or not to fire?). • QHPS are not interlocked. This issue must be clarified by MPWG (software interlock could be implemented?). • The PM files are lost in case of UPS powering failure. • 10 min of UPS autonomy are not enough to protect correctly the RQX circuits (1.8 kA after 10 min). 20 min of autonomy are recommended. • What is the situation for the other systems? Risks due to UPS malfunctioning, H. Thiesen, Chamonix 2009 23

More Related