380 likes | 628 Views
Why Government Systems Fail at Security. Chey Cobb chey@computer.org February 15, 2001. My Background. Whoami Firewall certification lab Anti-virus testing lab Web security since 1994 DoD systems architectures Intelligence systems security architectures
E N D
Why Government SystemsFail at Security Chey Cobb chey@computer.org February 15, 2001
My Background • Whoami • Firewall certification lab • Anti-virus testing lab • Web security since 1994 • DoD systems architectures • Intelligence systems security architectures • Senior technical security advisor for IC • Security program manager
Recently Retired • There’s no such thing as “too young” to retire!
Why THIS Topic? • Security needs to be discussed in the open • What is discussed behind closed doors tends to stay behind doors. • Credibility • No matter how you explain things to management, they tend not to believe you – until they see the same thing in the public forum.
Don’t Make the Same Mistakes • In many ways, the private sector is doing security much better than top secret facilities • Keeping secrets while sharing data and systems and providing public access. • In government, people tend to think firewalls and IDS are a “cure” for security • AIDS • Promiscuous connections to multiple systems • There is NO cure
3Ds • Disillusioned • Disgusted • Disappointed • … and did I mention DISGUSTED?
War Stories • Chief of security was an English major whose last job was in HR. • Software developers didn’t know what a “hardened OS” is. • NSA teams didn’t know that web servers have many vulnerabilities.
War Stories … 2 • Keyboard strings as passwords. • “Too much trouble to change it.” • “I use it on all my accounts.” • “It’s so obvious nobody would think I use it.” • Logging-off off at the end of the day was considered “adequate” security. • Root passwords on major systems had not been changed in 10 years.
What Does A Security Officer Do?? • Fight... • Ask your security officer what his/her last few big fights were about: • Of the last 10 fights, 9 involved internal politics. • The 10th fight was probably horribly mundane.
The Word is $$$$$ • Gov’t thought they were saving money going to COTS. • Gov’t can’t match the wages of good security personnel. • Gov’t can’t afford to keep their systems updated. • Is Corporate America that much different?
Good Cheap Fast You can only pick two! Security Decision Maker
Case In Point • Firewalls and Intrusion Detection are “new” to many facilities • They had to chose two from the triangle … guess which two? • Sysadmins are not sent for training. • Security officers don’t get their own monitoring systems. • In some circles, routers are still considered to be firewalls.
New Technologies? • The procurement process is “broke” • It can take up to FIVE years for a “new” system to be purchased and installed • Engineering and Acquisitions Don’t Talk • In some offices, Acquistions buys the technology before consulting Engineering. • Engineering is stuck with creating systems out of bargain basement clear-outs
Why Haven’t All Government Systems Been Hacked? • They are well hidden • But “Security through Obscurity” will bite them eventually.
Government Security Policies • Took FIVE years to get them written. • Took another year to get the agencies to all agree to use them. • Policies have different interpretations on key issues by the different agencies and organizations. • Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3“Protecting Sensitive Information within Information Systems • http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid_6-3_20manual.htm
Sidebar • John Deutsch Case • In the unclassified version of his hearings he stated that he “was not aware of the computer security rules”. • He did not know that sending mail on the Internet with the name of cia_deutsch@aol.com would be a problem • He was the HEAD of the CIA … (a/k/a DCI) … • His office WROTE the policies and he signed off on them. • Is it possible that in fact he did know? • … and now he has been PARDONED?
Are They Wearing Blinders? • GAO ordered exercise called “Eligible Receiver” to test the security of government systems (1997). • Found basic vulnerabilities in every single system they touched: • Rooted systems • Launched DoS attacks • Disrupted phone systems • Read and ALTERED e-mail • Most of this was done from the Internet • People in Top Secret facilities do not believe this report.
1998 GAO Investigation • http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/category/Inform.htm • Survey of security officers found: • 66% stated didn’t have enough time or training to do their jobs. • 53% stated that security was an ancillary duty. • 305 of 709 were totally unaware of what they should be doing (43% for those of you who have not had enough caffeine yet). • 57% had no security training.
2000 Investigation • AIMD-00-295, Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies • www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?accno=576618&rptno=AIMD-00-295 • Reported: • Computer security fraught with weaknesses • Physical and logical access controls were not effective in preventing or detecting systems intrusions and misuse • Installation commanders give systems security a low priority
GAO Summary • More needs to be done … including instituting routine risk management activities aimed at ensuring that risks are understood; that appropriate controls are implemented commensurate with the risk, and that these controls operate as intended. • DUH!
What’s It Mean? • The wrong people are allowed to make decisions about information security. • The people who are making the decisions either don’t know or don’t care. • There are no incentives to do things correctly and no repercussions for doing things wrong (Deutsch Pardoned!)
A War Story • Reviewed proposed system architecture approx 10 months prior to its initial testing. • Architecture included FTP. • Developers insisted that they needed 65,000+ ports open in the firewall to handle FTP. • Told them to scan the ports during testing and come back with a better answer. • Also told them to harden the OS – Solaris (What’s OS hardening?)
War Story … cont. • The equipment showed up for testing installation and they still wanted 65,000+ ports. • I denied them permission to install. • Developers complained it would take too long to change the code. • Project manager said it would cost too much. • Three months of fighting with them (which they could have spent fixing the code). • Over-ruled by a Director who said she would “accept the risk” – and then she retired.
Did You Know … • Germany requires ALL banks to use hardened, “trusted” OS’s for ALL systems
Accepting the Risk • Fancy way for management to say “get the hell out of the way.” • NO technical expertise and they want “simple” explanations. • When you try to explain the implications of their actions, they get pissed off. • They’ll accept the risk, but they sure as hell won’t put it in writing.
News Flash • Last year a hacker connected via the Internet to a printer at the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Center and rerouted a document to a server in Russia. • The Program Manager had accepted the risk to connect sensitive systems to the Internet. • Did anything happen to the Program Manager?
Security is Soooooo Inconvenient • NRO didn’t allow cell phones, two-way pagers, unclassified laptops, or PDAs into the building • Cell phone microphones can be opened remotely, even when the system is turned off • Classified data can be sent out of the building via text-based pagers • Unclassified laptops and PDAs can store classified material • THEN the Director got a new cell phone …
Security is Soooooo Inconvenient #2 • A junior sysadmin was found to installed several hacking tools on major networks. • Senior management decided NOT to have the root passwords changed because it would: • Take too long. • Would notify the general populace that “something” had happened. • Would interfere with normal operations.
Let the CIO Handle It? • Each agency has its own CIO. • Agencies and offices are loath to create MOAs or MOUs. • MOAs and MOUs are ignored. • NSA CIO had no idea how hugely interconnected they were – until everything “died” for four days last year.
Who Handles Incident Response? • Air Force CERT? (afcert) • Navy CERT? (navcert) • NSA? (noc) • CIA? • NRO? • DIA? • Keystone Kops?
Educate the Populace? • 4,000 in one office. • Average length of time at the office is two years. • $$$? (… sigh …) • Most are computer illiterates who can’t even change passwords without help.
Inspector General’s Office? • Nice folks … but • Understaffed • Inexperienced • Far too little technical expertise • Corrections they request are ignored – or lies are told.
Presidential Directive? • Been there – Done that • PDD-63, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures • By 2003, a “reliable, interconnected, and secure information systems infrastructure.” • Federal Government to serve as a “model” for country • Umpteen dozen new offices and positions
Hire More People? • Military billets are the cheapest • Average tour is 2 years • Pay scale is approximately 1/3 of market rate • More people does not ensure better security
Solutions? • Honey Nets and Honey Pots • Training, training, training for sys admins and security officers • Vulnerability labs within agencies should create their own listserver to share findings • Cancel ALL subscriptions to PC Magazine! • Stop looking at strong fortress walls and enforce common sense security within the walls
Corporate is Better • Take satisfaction in the fact that Corporate America is doing better than Government • You can more quickly take advantage of new technologies and react to new threats • More educational opportunities • You don’t have to worry about revealing secret associations with companies
Windows 2K? • Not any better or any worse than what you have • … but the Government doesn’t know that! • Default installations are always a risk • Who said that letting the OS make decisions for you would be a Good Thing?
</End Of Rant> • Questions?