PPA 503 – The Public Policy-Making Process

1. PPA 503 – The Public Policy-Making Process Lecture 9b – Homeland Security, Disaster Management, and Evaluation

2. Homeland Security Goals and Objectives • National Strategy for Homeland Security. • http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/sect1.pdf. • Strategic Plan of the Department of Homeland Security. • http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf.

3. Implementation Assessment • DHS Office of Inspector General Management Challenges. • DHS has made significant progress in addressing all of its management challenges. However, some of the planned improvements will take years to develop and implement, and much remains to be done. For example: • § DHS has taken steps to consolidate many of its support service operations, including financial management, contracting, and human resources, but the operations are still not under central control, and contracts management and information technology present formidable challenges. • § DHS has taken steps to consolidate its preparedness grant programs under one component, and generally has been timely in awarding “first responder” funds; however, state and local grant recipients have been slow in spending the funds, and an effective grants management system is needed.

4. Implementation Assessment • DHS Office of Inspector General Management Challenges. • § Financial management functions provided by 19 separate service providers during FY 2003 are now provided by 10 service providers, including 4 outside DHS; however, development and implementation of a single, integrated financial management system are still years away. • § DHS has developed and distributed for public comment proposed human resource regulations that will dramatically affect DHS employees and could serve as a model for the whole federal government; however, finalizing and implementing these regulations will be challenging. • § DHS has made major strides in protecting U.S. borders, including beginning implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology System (US-VISIT) program, which will provide the capability to record entry and exit information on foreign visitors who travel through U.S. air, sea, and land ports of entry. However, the challenges are immense, and it will take years to address them fully.

5. Implementation Assessment • Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection  GAO-04-557T  March 31, 2004HighlightsAccessible Text

6. Implementation Assessment • After the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns intensified that terrorists would attempt to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. One possible method is to use one of the 7 million cargo containers that arrive at our seaports each year. Addressing the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing cargo containers falls to the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Since CBP cannot inspect all arriving cargo containers, it uses a targeting strategy, including an Automated Targeting System. This system targets containers for inspection based on perceived level of risk.

7. Implementation Assessment • In this testimony, GAO summarizes its work on (1) whether the development of CBP's targeting strategy is consistent with recognized key risk management and modeling practices and (2) how well the strategy has been implemented at selected seaports.

8. Implementation Assessment • CBP has taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by oceangoing cargo containers, but its strategy neither incorporates all key elements of a risk management framework nor is it entirely consistent with recognized modeling practices.

9. Implementation Assessment • Actions CBP has taken included refining the Automated Targeting System to target cargo containers that are a high risk for terrorism, or other smuggling, for physical inspection. CBP has also implemented national targeting training and sought to improve the quality and timeliness of manifest information, which is one of the inputs for its Automated Targeting System.

10. Implementation Assessment • However, regarding risk management, CPB has not performed a comprehensive set of assessments vital for determining the level of risk for oceangoing cargo containers and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk.

11. Implementation Assessment • Regarding recognized modeling practices, CBP has not subjected the Automated Targeting System to adequate external peer review or testing. It has also not fully implemented a process to randomly examine containers in order to test the targeting strategy. Without incorporating all key elements of a risk management framework and recognized modeling practices, CBP cannot be reasonably sure that its targeting strategy provides the best method to protect against weapons of mass destruction entering the United States at its seaports.

12. Implementation Assessment • GAO's visits to selected seaports found that the implementation of CBP's targeting strategy faces a number of challenges. Although port officials said that inspectors were able to inspect all containers designated by the Automated Targeting System as high-risk, GAO's requests for documentation raised concerns about the adequacy of CBP's data to document these inspections.

13. Implementation Assessment • CBP lacks an adequate mechanism to test or certify the competence of students who participate in their national targeting training. Additionally, CBP has not been able to fully address longshoremen's safety concerns related to inspection equipment. Addressing these concerns is important to ensure that cargo inspections are conducted safely and efficiently.

14. Implementation Assessment • Challenges to both the development and the implementation of CBP's targeting strategy, if not addressed, may limit the effectiveness of targeting as a tool to help ensure homeland security.

15. Outcome Assessment • DISASTER MANAGEMENT: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic Disasters (GAO/RCED-93-186), July 1993

16. Outcome Assessment • The federal strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters is deficient because it lacks provisions for the federal government to immediately • (1) assess in a comprehensive manner the damage and the corresponding needs of disaster victims and • (2) provide food, shelter, and other essential services when the needs of disaster victims outstrip the resources of the state, local, and private voluntary community.

17. Outcome Assessment • Moreover, the federal strategy - encompassing 26 different agencies - does not promote adequate preparedness when there is advance warning of a disaster because preparatory activities are not explicitly authorized until the President has issued a disaster declaration. • These problems were most evident in the immediate response to Hurricane Andrew in South Florida.

18. Outcome Assessment • To improve the federal response, the nation needs presidential involvement and leadership both before and after a catastrophic disaster strikes.

19. Outcome Assessment • To underscore the commitment of the President, responsibility for catastrophic disaster preparedness and response should be placed with a key official in the White House. • This would institutionalize the direct presidential involvement that occurred on an ad hoc basis in Hurricane Andrew and other recent major disasters. • Furthermore, this organizational arrangement could increase the levels of attention given to emergency management responsibilities throughout the government, not just in times of catastrophic disasters. • This responsibility should not be a full-time position that would effectively duplicate the role of the Director of FEMA, but the White House official should be sufficiently knowledgeable about disaster response to guide the federal effort.

20. Outcome Assessment • Within FEMA, a disaster unit is needed to provide the White House and the Director of FEMA with information, analysis, and technical support to improve federal decision-making on helping state and local governments before, during, and after catastrophic disasters. • Consisting of a core staff located in FEMA and augmented by staff in other participating federal agencies, the disaster unit would plan for and respond to a wide variety of catastrophic disasters.

21. Outcome Assessment • We believe a major reorganization would be necessary in order to ensure a disaster unit’s success in FEMA. • Since FEMA was formed 14 years ago by consolidating several agencies from throughout the federal government, two of its Directorates (whose resources would form the bulk of a disaster unit) have historically not worked well together. • Institutional and cultural barriers have prevented effective cooperation between the two Directorates during disasters.

22. Outcome Assessment • The military can play an important role in responding to catastrophic disasters. • After Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, the military was highly effective in providing supplies and services and in establishing the infrastructure necessary to restore order and meet the immediate needs of victims. • While only the Department of Defense (DOD) can quickly escalate the federal response when the destruction and the need for mass care is far greater than first anticipated, the disaster unit we propose for FEMA - and not DOD - would be in the best position to determine when such an escalation is necessary. • Neither the responses to Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki nor the experts with whom we consulted indicated that DOD should have overall management responsibility for disaster relief and recovery.

23. Outcome Assessment • Legislative changes may also be needed to foster a more effective federal response to catastrophic disasters. • Current federal law governing disaster response does not explicitly authorize federal agencies to undertake preparatory activities before a disaster declaration by the President, nor does it authorize FEMA to reimburse agencies for such preparation, even when disasters like hurricanes provide some warning that such activities will be needed. • Federal agencies may fail to undertake advance preparations because of uncertainty over whether costs incurred before a disaster declaration will ultimately be reimbursed by FEMA.

24. Outcome Assessment • Legislative changes may also be needed to foster a more effective federal response to catastrophic disasters. • The success or failure of any of these proposed changes in the national disaster response system will be heavily affected by the efforts of state and local governments, which are expected to be the first responders when a disaster strikes. • However, these responders do not have adequate training and funding to respond to catastrophic disasters on their own. • As a result, FEMA needs to use its existing resources to better prepare state and local governments for catastrophic disaster response so that they are as effective as possible.

25. Outcome Assessment • Finally, FEMA is not organized for and does not carry out the types of training, exercises, and oversight needed to ensure that deficiencies in state preparedness are identified and corrected. • While it sets policies, provides funding, and has established limited exercises and some general training programs for the states, FEMA has neither established performance standards nor developed a training and exercise program specifically geared toward enhancing state and local preparedness for catastrophic disaster response.