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Rodney Fort's Sports Economics

Rodney Fort's Sports Economics. Chapter 11 The Stadium Mess. Figure 11-1 The Collective Action Triangle.

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Rodney Fort's Sports Economics

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  1. Rodney Fort's Sports Economics Chapter 11The Stadium Mess

  2. Figure 11-1The Collective Action Triangle Legend: The outcomes from collective action follow rational actor politics. A powerful Reelection Constituency is in control of the electoral chances of Elected Officials. Those officials choose policies that their Reelection Constituency evaluates in terms of their own economic welfare. If the policies are best for the Reelection Constituency, Elected Officials get reelected. The General Constituency is relegated to the sidelines.

  3. Table 11-1The Value of New Stadiums to Owners a One game won equals 6.2 points. b, c Data are unavailable for White Sox and Orioles. d, e, f, g The difference between the average for the 5 years before and the 5 years after the opening of the new stadium.

  4. Table 11.2Gate Revenues in Pro Sports, 2007 and 2008 Seasons  ($Millions)

  5. Figure 11-2The Stadium Mess Triangle Legend: The stadium mess follows rational actor politics. A powerful constituency of Owners and Supporters influences the electoral chances of state and local Elected Officials. Those officials choose subsidy levels and methods that Owners and Supporters evaluate in terms of their own economic welfare. If the policies are best for the Owners and Supporters, Elected Officials get reelected. The General Taxpayers are relegated to the sidelines but help pay the subsidies.

  6. Figure 11-3Setter Model of Voter Stadium Preferences Legend: On a single dimension of stadium spending, voter A prefers none (and no team), voter B prefers the current, obsolete stadium (no spending increase), voters C and D most prefer a new modest stadium and voter E prefers a new elaborate stadium. In a simple majority vote, voters C and D would get their way since their most preferred outcome is better for voter E than the obsolete stadium. But if the alternative is no team at all, voters C and D would join voter E in voting in favor of a new elaborate stadium since that is closer to their preference than the alternative.

  7. Table 11-3Sports Facility Referenda Since 1995 (slide 1 of 2)

  8. Table 11-3Sports Facility Referenda Since 1995 (slide 2 of 2)

  9. Table 11-4Average Public Spending for Stadiums and Arenas Where the Public Share Was at Least 50 Percent

  10. Table 11-5The Public-Private Spending Mix

  11. Table 11-6Kingdome Subsidy Calculation($Millions)

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