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Bart Miller – October 22 nd , 2012. Xoar. Outline. TCB & Threat Model Xen Platform Xoar Architecture Overview Xoar Components Design Goals Results Security Vulnerability Mitigation Performance. TCB.
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Outline • TCB & Threat Model • Xen Platform • Xoar Architecture Overview • Xoar Components • Design Goals • Results • Security • Vulnerability Mitigation • Performance
TCB • Trusted Computing Base is defined as “the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system – including hardware, firmware, and software – the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy.” • Xen, by virtue of privilege, is part of the TCB
TCB • In Xen, all components operate under a monolithic trust domain • Compromise of any component yields two benefits: • Gain privilege level of component • Access its interfaces to other components
Threat Model • Assumption #1: Administrators are not a concern • Business imperative • Assumption #2: Malicious guest VM • Violate data integrity or confidentiality • Exploiting code • Assumption #3: The control VM will contain bugs
Xen Platform – A brief revisit • Device drivers • Virtualized, passed-through, or emulated • XenStore • Hierarchical key-value store • System-wide registry • Most critical component • Vulnerable to DoS attacks • Perform most administrative operations
Xen Platform • Toolstack • Administrative functions • Create, destroy, managing resources and privilege for guest VMs • System Boot • Starts DomO process, initialize hardware
Design Goals • Reduce privilege • Each component should only have the privileges essential to its purpose • Each component should only expose interfaces when necessary
Design Goals • Reduce sharing • Sharing components should be avoided wherever it is reasonable • Any sharing of components must be explicit • Allows for logging and auditing in the event of a compromise
Design Goals • Reduce staleness • A component should only run for as long as it needs to perform its task. • It should be restored to a known, good state as frequently as practicable.
Results - Security • Reduced TCB • Bootstrapper, PCIBack, and Builder are most privileged components • Bootstrapper and PCIBack destroyed once initialized • TCB reduced • Linux: 7.6M LoC • Builder: 13,5k LoC (Builder)
Results – Vulnerability Mitigation • Solved through isolation • Device Emulation • Virtualized Drivers • XenStore, re-written • Hypervisor vulnerabilities remain
Results - Performance • Test system • Ca. 2011 server • Quad-core Xeon, 4Gb RAM • All virtualization features enabled • Memory overhead • 512Mb – 896Mb in Xoar vs. • 750Mb in XenServer
Questions • Any questions?