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Export Enforcement Export Controls Training June 2011

Export Enforcement Export Controls Training June 2011. Rick Shimon Special Agent In Charge Washington Field Office. National Security A shared responsibility between the Exporting Community and Law Enforcement. Export Enforcement.

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Export Enforcement Export Controls Training June 2011

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  1. Export Enforcement Export Controls Training June 2011 Rick Shimon Special Agent In Charge Washington Field Office

  2. National SecurityA shared responsibility between the Exporting Community and Law Enforcement

  3. Export Enforcement …task is to prevent the export of U.S. goods and technology that may be used by rogue states or terrorists to make chemical, biological or nuclear weapons OEE Priorities • WMD Proliferation • Terrorism/Terrorist Support • Unauthorized Military/Govt Use

  4. AVS AVS HOUGHTON CHEMICAL INTERNATIONAL Bet Air Illinois Tool Works Inc. INDUSTRIAL SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION PAN AVIATION IGG Corporation Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ATT Communications Hercaire RII OMEGA TAL Industries CCP SYNTEX JML FREIGHT SWISSCO ICS INC SIGMA-ALDRICH Digital Creations

  5. Export Enforcement Field Offices • Nine Offices nationwide • Staff… Federal Agents who are criminal investigators empowered to make arrests, carry firearms, execute search warrants, and seize goods about to be exported illegally. • Work closely with FBI, CBP, ICE, and other LE agencies

  6. Office of Export Enforcement Field Office Regions Chicago Boston San Jose New York Washington Los Angeles Dallas Houston Miami

  7. Why do we need controls on Dual-Use commodities?

  8. Improvised Explosive Devices Three major components: • Trigger system • Initiator (fuse) • Explosive

  9. Improvised Explosive DevicesTrigger Devices • P2 V23079 Telecom Relay • Used in office equipment and consumer electronics • Produced in Pennsylvania

  10. IED Investigation Results • Executed over 90 search warrants • Analyzed more than 500,000 email messages • 33 companies and individuals indicted • Two US citizens and one British citizen have been convicted • One US citizen in custody pending trial • One German citizen pending extradition

  11. Top Cape TechnologiesCape Town South Africa • Owner: Asher Karni, (b 1954) • Israeli citizen -- MBA from Tel Aviv Univ • Major in the Israeli military (‘71 to ’85) • Emigrated to South Africa to work for a Jewish charity • Worked for Eagle Technology -- specializes in obtaining sophisticated sensitive equipment…terminated • Lived on Ocean View Drive, Cape Town SA in exclusive “Millionaires’ Row”

  12. Pakland PME CorporationIslamabad, Pakistan • Owner: Humayun Khan • Supplies Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear weapons programs • Connected to Al Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference: Pakistani opposition party that supports extremist fighters in Kashmir, a disputed territory between Pakistan and India

  13. The Commodities Triggered Spark Gap • ECCN 3A228 • South Africa Q - Is License Required? • Pakistan Q - Is License Required? • $447 a piece

  14. Civil Use – Spark Gaps • High speed electrical switches capable of sending synchronized electronic pulses • Can be used in the medical field as part of lithotripter machines to break up kidney stones

  15. WMD Use – Spark Gaps Can be used as part of a triggering system for detonating a nuclear device SPARK GAPS + =

  16. The Crime… Players: Asher Karni and Humayun Khan Crime: Conspired to ship 200 nuclear trigger devices to nuclear end users in Pakistan

  17. The Diversion Scheme… X $$ $$ $$

  18. The rest of the story… Asher Karni • Arrested…Jan 04 • Guilty Plea…Aug 04 • Sentenced 3 years Fed Prison… • Released Jan 07 • Old Sentencing Guidelines • “I felt shock and horror…how such a devout Jew could be supplying nuclear triggers for the nuclear weapons of a staunch Islamic country.” -- Michael Bagraim, Chairman of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies ASHER KARNI Inmate # 32338-016

  19. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Grand Jury I N D I C T M E N T UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HUMAYUN A. KHAN, Defendant VIOLATIONS: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy) 50 U.S.C. (Export Admin Act)

  20. Export Enforcement Investigations and Sanctions • Criminal Investigation • Every case • Sanctions • Criminal fines and imprisonment • Civil fines and penalties • Denial of export privileges

  21. What actions might make a case Criminal? • “Person/company knowingly and willfully…” • Knowing that the transaction was controlled (license was required) and proceeding with the export without required authorization. • Deliberate Ignorance (Self Blinding) • Corporate Knowledge • Individuals versus Corporate

  22. Press Release on a Criminal Case: “ They did everything they could to evade (the) regulations There really was a problem with the corporate culture here – a failure to take responsibility – all the way up to the CEO. They made up documents, destroyed documents and made false statements.” - Julie Myers, Asst. Sec. Export Enforcement

  23. Criminal Penalties Export Administration Regulations - currently enforced under 50 U.S.C. - International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) • Criminal fine up to $1,000,000 • Jail time up to 20 years Criminal liability for anyone who “willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of” an unlawful act described in the statute.

  24. Administrative Sanctions Administrative Penalties in Export Administration Regulations: • Strict Liability -- knowledge is not a prerequisite for imposition of an administrative penalty • Administrative violations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence…51% • 5 year statute of limitations on administrative enforcement cases

  25. Administrative Penalties IEEPA ENHANCEMENT ACT - (Public Law No. 110-96) Civil fines up to $250,000 per violation or… Twice the amount of the transaction that is the basis of the violation. Denial of Export Privileges “…export privileges under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) have been denied for 20 years for violating and conspiring to violate the EAR for the unauthorized export and attempted export of industrial commodities from the United States to Iran…” Standard Denial Order covers all items (commodities, technology, and software) subject to the EAR …there is no limit on how long we can deny export privileges.

  26. Entity Listing Entity List Listing of foreign persons –businesses, research institutions, government and private organizations, individuals – that are subject to specific license requirements for the export of “all items subject to the EAR...Presumption of Denial” Targeted Entities have engaged in: Suspected diversion of exported items to WMD programs or Activities contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy interests.

  27. Recent Cases U.K. Firm pleads guilty to illegally exporting Boeing 747 Aircraft to Iran • Firm Agrees to Pay $15 Million in Fines North Carolina firm settles with BIS and DOJ for evading a denial order issued by BIS • $10.1 million in criminal fines, including expending $1.5 million over 3 years on the implementation of an export compliance program • $2.5 million for the 10 charged violations of the EAR

  28. “This is a fine mess you’ve gotten us into…” Some Typical Causes of Export Violations… • Incomplete Transaction Information • Lists to Check • Ignoring Red Flags • Human Error • Incorrect AES Filing

  29. 1. Incomplete Transaction Information • Unknown end-user 24 x 7 Internet Sales - on-line registration/purchase “Terrorists who bought this item also bought the following…” • Unknown or inappropriate end-use • Incorrect product classification

  30. 2. Lists to Check… http://www.bis.doc.gov “Lists to Check” Link • Denied Persons List (BIS) • Entity List (BIS) • Specially Designated Nationals List (OFAC)

  31. 3. Ignoring Red Flags Ask yourself: “Does this sale make good business sense?” • Person placing the order is unfamiliar with product or the end-use. • Unconventional commercial transactions… funding schemes, in-direct shipping routes, etc. • Inappropriate end-user: banks, overseas freight forwarders, etc.

  32. 4. Human Factors • Pressure to meet sales goals and rush order processing • Export Manager on vacation - no cross trained back up export managers • Poor communication with sales staff and foreign distributors

  33. 5. Incorrect AES Filing Automated Export System (AES) collects Electronic Export Information (EEI) • EEI required for: • Commodities over $2500 in value or • Commodities which require a license or • Commodities* destined for Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. • Filing Timeframes: 2o prior (Air) 24o prior (Ship)

  34. Forwarder Actions : 1. Sender is identified and screened against SDN, Denied Parties, Debarred Parties, and Entity Lists 2. Consignee is screened against SDN, Denied Parties, Entity, Debarred Parties, Unverified, Nonproliferation Sanctions’ Lists 3. Haz Mat questions are asked 4. Customs Declaration is Accomplished and Reviewed Description of Contents (Legal to ship?) Value of Contents 5. Is an Export License, or additional documents, required? 6. Electronic Export Information is filed to AES and ITN received prior to being shipped Shipping Check List Requirements

  35. Deemed Exports “Deemed Export" occurs when both of the following conditions are met: (1) parties intend to transfer controlled technologies to foreign nationals in the United States; and (2) transfer of the same technology to the foreign national's home country would require an export license. Transfer occurs when technology is available to foreign nationals for: 1) Visual Inspection (reading tech specs, plans, blueprints) 2) Oral exchange (briefing, discussion, etc.) 3) When technology is made available (hands on) by practice or application under the guidance of persons with knowledge of the technology.

  36. Form I-129 - Release of Controlled Technology… Form I-129 requires that the employer certify for all H-1B, L-1, and O-1A petitioners that it has reviewed U.S. Export laws and determined: 1. An export license is not required to release such technology or technical data to the foreign person; or, 2. An export license is required and the employer will deny access to the controlled technology until required license is received. Penalties • Perjury or False Statements • Export violations if controlled technology was ‘Deemed’ released Completion of the certification assumes that the employer is knowledgeable about export control requirements

  37. Deemed Exports Professor Roth Case University of Tennessee Prof. J. Reece Roth found guilty 18 counts of export violations, conspiracy, and fraud for passing sensitive information to two foreign research assistants from China and Iran. Roth is also accused of taking reports and related studies in his laptop to China during a lecture tour in 2006 UT’s Export Control Officer informed Roth that the graduate student couldn’t work on the project. Roth’s conviction is upheld by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on January 5, 2011

  38. Record Keeping §762.6 PERIOD OF RETENTION Five year retention period All records required to be kept by the EAR must be retained for five years from the latest of the following times: (1) The export from the United States of the item involved in the transaction to which the records pertain or the provision of financing, transporting or other service for or on behalf of end-users of proliferation concern as described in §§736.2(b)(7) and 744.6 of the EAR;

  39. VoluntarySelf-Disclosures You find a problem…do you really want to turnyourself in? • Confess early and often…before we hear about it • Might not be a violation or just a Warning Letter • Significant Penalty Mitigation…half-price sale • Tell the truth, the WHOLE truth… • What’s the plan: How will you avoid a repeat? Or do you roll the dice? • Play the odds… • If you are a manager - Sarbanes-Oxley Implications…

  40. What you need to know… The Big I D E A Item being exported (ECCN) Destination (License required to ship there?) End-User (Can you ship to him?) Activity (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, Missile?)

  41. True or False? You shouldn’t contact Export Enforcement to report your sleazy competitor, who always seems to secure those shady deals that you refuse to take, because nobody likes a snitch…

  42. True or False? You shouldn’t contact Export Enforcement to report your sleazy competitor, who always seems to secure those shady deals that you refuse to take, because nobody likes a snitch… FALSE – We want to level the playing field and make law-abiding companies more competitive…

  43. Report Suspicious Transactions Washington Field Office – 703.487.9300 24 Hour Hot Line - 800.424.2980 www.bis.doc.gov

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