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UNCLASSIFIED. PSI Exercise Program. CDR Tony Crego Joint Staff J5 Non-Proliferation. Mr. David Cameron SCC-WMD Interagency Coordination. Proliferation Security Initiative Overview. Launched May 31, 2003.
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UNCLASSIFIED PSI Exercise Program CDR Tony CregoJoint Staff J5Non-Proliferation Mr. David CameronSCC-WMDInteragency Coordination
Proliferation Security Initiative Overview • Launched May 31, 2003. • The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. • PSI provides committed states with a framework for strengthening counterproliferation capabilities and is a state-to-state cooperation enabler. • Participants agreed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (adopted in Sept, 2003) that identifies specific steps participants can take to effectively interdict WMD-related shipments and prevent proliferation.
PSI is… • A political commitment by 98 endorsing state partners • A flexible arrangement of international cooperation • A robust capacity-building program • Over 40 exercises involving over 70 nations • Regular meetings of operational experts to share best practices • Builds relationships through bilateral andregional engagement • Based on voluntary, national actions • Consistent with domestic and international legal authorities and frameworks • Dependent on strong interagency processes to assess threats and courses of action GCC opportunities
PSI is not… • A legally-binding, rules-based regime • A source of new authorities to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials • Administered by a Secretariat nor governed by consensus • A coordinator of real-world interdictions
U.S. Government - PSI Way Ahead • Strengthen interdiction policies and legal authorities • Build capacities of endorsing states to conduct interdictions • Promote the legitimacy of interdiction as an international counterproliferation norm
PSI Exercise Objectives • Develop national and international counterproliferation capacities and capabilities • Send a strategic message to proliferators and those that support proliferation activities • Reach out to nations that have not yet endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles
Typical PSI Exercise Elements • LIVEX • Maritime Interdiction Exercise • Easily incorporated into maritime interoperability exercises • Focus: Tactical Capabilities and C2 interoperability • PORTEX • Customs and Law Enforcement Agencies • Multinational Interagency Exchange or Demonstration • Focus: Customs Capabilities and Legal Authorities • Table-Top Exercise (TTX) • Typically a Fictional Interdiction Scenario • Facilitated Multinational Interagency Seminar • Focus: Policy Priorities and Decision Making Processes We can do the bulk of the required planning for you!
Examples of GCC PSI Opportunities • Integrate desired elements into pre-existing exercises • Example: Add a LIVEX event into a pre-existing exercise, add a bi-lateral TTX event for the host or partner country • PANAMAX 09 (SOUTHCOM) • Plan a dedicated PSI regional exercise. • Example: Engage with regional partners and execute a dedicated LIVEX, PORTEX, and TTX with a PSI focus. • LEADING EDGE 10 (CENTCOM) • Respond to a regional partner’s desire to host a PSI exercise. • Example: A regional partner volunteers to host a dedicated LIVEX, PORTEX, and TTX with a PSI focus. You contribute with assets, planning, and support • EASTERN ENDEAVOR (ROK/PACOM) • This option often creates the most churn for the applicable GCC. • Host a PSI meeting or Workshop • Example: SOUTHCOM hosted the 2009 Miami PSI-OEG Meeting
Requirements • SECDEF Memorandum to GCCs, 8 Aug, 2005 • “A key element of PSI’s success is robust participation in multinational exercises…I would like the Combatant Commands to…organize U.S. hosted PSI multinational exercises and provide assets and personnel to foreign-hosted PSI multinational exercises.” • “Combatant Commands should also seek and recommend to OSD/Joint Staff opportunities to incorporate an interdiction component into non-PSI exercises with regional partners wherever possible.”
Requirements • CJCSI 3520.02A, 1 March, 2007 • “GCCs should make every effort to include WMD interdiction exercises and training events in their exercise plans and/or to sponsor interdiction exercises and training events.” • “US military support to a PSI exercise may also be incorporated into a CJCS-sponsored exercise, with the applicable CJCS exercise instructions applying.” • “GCCs are encouraged to incorporate WMD interdiction components into existing bilateral and regional military exercises with countries who have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.” • “Efforts should be made to include law enforcement exercises in planning.” • More importantly, you should WANT to use PSI as a tool • Opportunity for significant partnership engagement in your AOR
How We Can Help • SCC-WMD Authorities: • CJCSI 3520.02A: “Designate a PSI Support Cell…” • USSTRATCOM OPDIR: “Conduct PSI support activities…” • Provide PSI-related scenario planning & execution support • Standardize PSI-related planning with focus on GCCs • Advocate best practices • Manage requests by GCCs and the IA for use of PBD-709 WMD-I exercise and training funds
SCC-WMD Support • SCC-WMD Planning, Personnel, and Travel support is available as long as: • Scenario complements or achieves GCC exercise objectives. • PSI scenario aligns with overarching exercise scenario. • Has support of participating PSI endorsing states. • Meets OSD(P) and Joint Staff (J-5) priorities and Dept of State policy guidance. • PSI Support Cell attends the planning conferences and the execution. • A request must be submitted in JTIMS.
Past Support • US/Israeli TTX 26-27 April 2009 (model for TTXs) • Black Sea region TTXs • PSI SBA TTXs: USCG, DOS and OUSD(P) w/Malta & Panama • Naval War College PSI Games • Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings • USPACOM participation in Singaporean PSI Exercise Deep Sabre 2 • Funded Navy and USCG travel
Ongoing/Anticipated Support • NAVAF/C6F Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS • Annual naval interoperability exercise – May/June • Central Med COCOMseam exercise (AFRICOM sponsorship) • PSI embed in its fourth year • USSOUTHCOM Exercise FA PANAMAX • Annual HA/DR, & stability operations exercise – August/September • PSI embed in its fifth year, CPX only during even years • Next year, anticipate engaging a partner nation for a boarding and multinational TTX • ROK/USPACOM Exercise EASTERN ENDEAVOR • ROK host, with strong US support - Oct 2010 • Short planning cycle but good return on investment • Seminar/Game on Day 1, LIVEX on Day 2
Ongoing/Anticipated Support (con’t) • USCENTCOM PSI Exercise EAGER LION 2011 • new Jordanian hosted exercise – June/July • includes consequence management and PSI venues designed to exercise Jordanian national response processes • EL11 is a bilateral event and will expand to include regional partners in 2012 • NAVAF/C6F Exercise SAHARAN EXPRESS 2011 • West Africa centered, Table Top and possible short U/W • Counterproliferation/PSI embed TBD • USEUCOM Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE 2011 • Annual HA/DR, & Regional Defense CPX – April/May • New PSI embed • USCENTCOM PSI Exercise LEADING EDGE 2012 • Tentatively an Air Interdiction Scenario in Kazakhstan
Our Message • PSI Exercises support National CWMD Policy Efforts • They are required, but you should want to do them anyway! • View them as an opportunity to help you achieve theater security cooperation and regional stability objectives. • We have a significant capability and willingness to help plan and pay for exercise elements attributed to PSI. “…we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions.” - President Barack Obama, 05 Apr 09
PSI Endorsing States by AOR USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USPACOM Angola Afghanistan Albania Liechtenstein Australia Djibouti Bahrain Andorra Lithuania Brunei Liberia** Iraq Austria Luxembourg Cambodia Libya Jordan Armenia Macedonia Fiji Morocco Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Malta** Japan Tunisia Kuwait Belarus Moldova Marshall Islands** Kyrgyzstan Belgium Montenegro Mongolia** Oman Bosnia The Netherlands New Zealand Qatar Bulgaria Norway Papua New Guinea USNORTHCOM Saudi Arabia Croatia** Poland Philippines Canada Tajikistan Cyprus** Portugal Samoa USA Turkmenistan Czech Rep. Romania Singapore United Arab Emirates Denmark Russia South Korea Uzbekistan Estonia San Marino Sri Lanka USSOUTHCOM Yemen Finland Serbia Vanuatu Argentina France Slovakia Bahamas** Georgia Slovenia Belize** Germany Spain Chile Greece Sweden Columbia Holy See Switzerland El Salvador Hungary Turkey Honduras Iceland Ukraine Panama** Ireland United Kingdom ParaguayIsrael St. Vincent/Grenadines**Italy Antigua/Barbuda** Latvia ** Bilateral shipboarding agreement
USG Led PSI Counterproliferation Interdiction Exercise *Guideline for Scenario Development Discovery of illicit movement of WMD, delivery system, or related material, technology, & expertise A “most likely” USG counterproliferation EXERCISE scenario does not: 1. Interdict a fully weaponized WMD 2. Involve terrorists directly 3. Use USG unilateral action Counterproliferation, Multi-National PSI Event Yes Yes resolution with PSI countries is advantageous to USG PSI countries will support weapons grade nuclear material or fully weaponized WMD time available supports resolution via PSI partner countries Yes No Yes No No No Yes WMD interdiction conducted under different authorities Counterproliferation unilateral USG action *This chart guides COCOMs in developing a scenario to exercise the USG’s PSI aspect of counterproliferation. It is not a guide for other PSI endorsing nations designing scenarios to test their own processes and capabilities within the PSI realm. SCC-WMD 12 SEP 07
Components of a PSI Scenario • Shared Intelligence between two or three endorsing states • Decision to act comes from a National Authority • Interdiction • Disposition Instructions
PSI Interdiction Principles • PSI participants are committed to: • Interdicting transfers of WMD and WMD-related material • Streamlining information exchange • Strengthening national legal authorities to facilitate interdiction • Taking specific actions in support of other interdiction efforts • Overall goals: • Stop shipments of WMD and WMD-related materials • Make proliferation more costly and more difficult for the proliferators • Reveal covert proliferation behavior and networks
Exercises: Global in Reach & Participation Over 70 countries have participated in over 40 PSI exercises Pacific Sea: Sep 03 - PACIFIC PROTECTOR (Australia) Oct 04 – TEAM SAMURAI (Japan) Aug 05 – DEEP SABRE (Singapore) Mar 07 – PACIFIC SHIELD (Japan) Sep 08 – MARU (New Zealand) Oct 09- DEEP SABRE (Singapore) Sep 10 – PACIFIC PROTECTOR (Australia) Air: Apr 06 – PACIFIC PROTECTOR (Australia) PSI Gaming Exercises Sep 04 – Maritime (US) Oct 05 – Air/Maritime (Norway) Jun 07 – Air/Maritime/Ground (US) Western Hemisphere Sea: Nov 04 – CHOKEPOINT(US) Sep 07 – PANAMAX (Panama) Aug 08 - PANAMAX (Panama) Sep 09 – PANAMAX (Panama) Persian Gulf Sea: Oct 06 – LEADING EDGE (US) Jan 10- LEADING EDGE (US/UAE) Indian Ocean Sea: Jan 04 – SEA SABER(US) Nov 05 – EXPLORING THEMIS (UK) Europe Ground: Apr 04 – SAFE BORDER (Poland) Mar 04 - HAWKEYE (Germany) Jun 05 – BOHEMIAN GUARD (Pol, CZ) Air: Jun 05 – BLUE ACTION (Spain) Jun 06 – HADES (France) Apr 07 – SMART RAVEN (Lithuania) Sea: Apr 06 – TOP PORT (Netherlands) Sep 06 – AMBER SUNRISE (Poland) May 07 – ADRIATIC GATE (Slovenia) Apr 08 – PHOENIX EXPRESS (US) May 09 – PHOENIX EXPRESS (US) May 10 – PHOENIX EXPRESS (US) Combined (Sea, Air and Ground): Oct 07 – EASTERN SHIELD (Ukraine) Mediterranean & Africa Sea: Oct 03- SANSO (Spain) Nov 03- BASILAC (France) Apr 04 - CLEVER SENTINEL (Italy) May 05 – NINFA (Portugal) Mar 08 – GUISTIR (Djibouti) May 08-ADRIATIC SHIELD (Croatia) Air: Oct 03 - AIR CPX TTX (UK) Feb 04 - AIR BRAKE (Italy) Jun 04 - ASPE (France) Combined (Sea, Air and Ground): May 06 – ANATOLIAN SUN(Turkey) KEY - Host nations in parentheses () 24
Web accessible database of USG-wide CBRN specific NP, CP and CM responsibilities, authorities and capabilities.... i.e. a JANE’s for CWMD. • International index underway. • Strategic level information resource to inform operations and to aid in planning, advocacy, training & exercises. • User focused information sharing. • Endorsed / Directed by National Security Council, OSD directives, Joint Staff instructions and Service regulations. • Owned, operated and maintained by the DTRA/SCC-WMD. • USG-wide POC’s review/update/validate their respective data. • NIPR and SIPR versions online; • >90% validated; • +2,700 USG registered users SEE: http://indrac.dtra.milhttps://indrac.dtra.smil.mil
Executive Summary The Interagency CWMD Database of Responsibilities, Authorities and Capabilities (INDRAC) system is strategic reference resource of U.S. government (USG) Departments and Agencies respective combating WMD (CWMD) responsibilities, authorities and capabilities. A nascent International CM capabilities reference index is also now available. INDRAC is not designed or intended to be a Global Force Management tool, it does not assess readiness levels or replace existing tasking processes and procedures. Instead, INDRAC serves as an information reference resource (i.e. a JANE’s for CWMD) to inform operations and to aid in planning, advocacy, training and exercises. INDRAC provides a hierarchical view of USG Departments and Agencies CWMD nonproliferation (NP), counterproliferation (CP) and consequence management (CM) responsibilities, authorities and capabilities. A suite of tools enable users to search and display information. An online document library, glossary, user-help, user-feedback and data-update tools are also available, as well as statistics on data content, system availability and system utilization. In November 2008 the National Security Council endorsed INDRAC and directed all USG Departments and Agencies to work with the INDRAC Team to populate and validate their respective CWMD information into the system. The DTRA and USSTRATCOM Center for CWMD INDRAC Team work with USG agency POCs to review, update and validate their respective data, at a minimum on an annual basis. Answers obtainable from INDRAC are only as good as the accuracy and completeness of the database and we are actively working to achieve and maintain 100% USG-wide participation. INDRAC is fully compliant with all DoD information assurance rules and regulations, and is IAW: DoDD 3150.08 “DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents; CJCSI 3125.01B “DSCA for Domestic CM Operations in response to a CBRNE Incident; CJCSI 3110.16A “Military Capabilities, Assets and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management Operations”; and CJCSM 5225.01B “Classification Guide for Combating WMD”. August 2010