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This presentation discusses migration in Kuwait and Gulf Council countries, particularly in the context of maritime security operations. It explores the implications of human trafficking in the Gulf of Aden and the challenges it poses to security in the region.
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Migration in Kuwait and Golf Council Countries, in the Gulf of Aden and Maritime Security Operations (MSO) under the framework of NATO`s “Allied Maritime Strategy” and the “European Union`s Maritime Security Strategy” A presentation for the EuroDefense Presidents Meeting in Lisbon 13-15 April 2016
1951 Refugee ConventionA refugee is someone who“ owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of protection of that country.“
Palestinian Migrants in Kuwait in percentage of the population
Migration in the Gulf of Aden Context: • Historical migratory patters between East Africa and South West Arabian Peninsula (2000+ Years) • Bi - directional migration trends: • SOUTH (77,249 arrivals to Horn of Africa [2015]): • Conflict in Yemen driving individuals out • Returning migrants from last two years prior to conflict • NORTH (92,466 arrivals in Yemen from Horn of Africa [2015]): • El Nino influenced draught in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia) • Instability within Somalia and surrounding areas • Perceived prospects of economic mobility within Gulf States • VEO and Militia recruitment • Recent Eastward shift in migration arrival points. • Average journey between 25-50 individuals; usually undergone in small dhows and skiffs utilizing multiple fleets and transfer points throughout the Gulf of Aden.
Gulf of AdenSecurity Implications • Human Trafficking of individuals into Yemen: • Intensifies overall competition for limited resources within Yemen; increasing food insecurity and worsening the ongoing humanitarian crisis. • Strands multiple military aged men within an active warzone with no means to generate wealth outside of crime or extremism. • Taxes an already underfunded Humanitarian support network through the region • Delegitimizes governance throughout the region. • Threatens long term freedom of movement through the BAM • Human Trafficking in Gulf of Aden is often conducted by the same organizations that : • Smuggle Weapons ,transport narcotics, , • Circumvent national tariffs and import restriction (Fuel) • Traffic Jihadists and Mercenaries , engage in Piracy • AQAP • Daish / ISIS - Yemen • Al Shabaab • Criminal enterprises
1 - Ports: Yemen historically Imports 70 to 80% of all food and fuel needs. Ports were identified early as the Center of Gravity (COG) due to the ability to support governance and stability and deter the growth of VEOs. 2 - VEO Growth: With the lack of effective governance due to the ongoing Civil War conditions which foster the growth VEO flourished. AQAP has risen to prominence in eastern Yemen specifically in Al Mukalla 3- Bidirectional Movement: Equal number of people enter and exit Yemen via illegal smuggling routes run by the same organizations that traffic weapons, narcotics and fund VEO operations. Many arrivals find no means to support themselves once in Yemen. $ 4 - VEO Operations: As VEOs grow and begin to exert governance within their Area of Control they conduct open acts of defiance and violence against legitimate governments delegitimizing the RoYG and building support. Source: IOM
“Ahead of Crisis” • CTF Role • Sentinel through naval presence - key choke point – sea control • Threaten and deter freedom of movement of smuggling network • Utilize UNSCR (2216) as basis for countering smuggling while monitoring migration • Comprehensive Solution: • Grass roots for a whole of government approach • Utilize Host Nation(s) mechanism to increase overall government efficacy and legitimize. (HA/ commercial shipping) • Work by with and through Non Governmental Organization (NGOs) and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) to support organized movement and reception of individuals and refugees • Attacking the Network • Conduct messaging operations to inform possible migrants about perils of journey and conditions • Undermine funding sources and enforce UNSCR
Challenges to Security in Africa and Middle East Daesh/IS Illegal migration Various factions Fragile State Libya ^ Piracy AL Shabab Boko Haram AL-Quaeda in Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) Ansar Eddine Piracy Fragile State Burundi Fragile State Central African Republic
Actions against Smugglers and Human Traffickers European Council, 20 April 2015 – Three action areas 1. Strengthening our presence at sea 2. Preventing illegal migration flows 3. Reinforcing internal solidarity and responsibility Comprehensive Approach
EU NAVFOR Med SOPHIA MISSION: ….identitfy, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used ……. by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks….." "established" : 17 May 2015 "launched": 22 Jun 2015 22 Member States, 1341 personnel ```
Operation Sophia Mastering the migrant crisis with EUNAVFOR MED, a CMF Phase 1 Collecting information Phase 2 Searching, boarding, and diversion on high seas Phase 3 Searching, boarding, and diversion in territorial waters of Libya
Operation Sophia Main actors and key assets • ITS Garibali as Command Ship • Frigates and submarines • MPAs and UAVs • National intelligence agencies • Frontex • Europol with JOT MARE • UK and NL National Crime Agencies • EU Satellite Centre
CMF: Mission Facts • AOR: Central part of southern Med • HQ: Rome, IT • Force strength • Varying on frequent rotation • Phase 2: 6 surface units, 7 air assets • Contributing states: 24 EU MS
CMF: Challenges • The internal-external link • Consensus vs. enforcement • Legal basis • EU Council and UNSC resolutions • First SHADE meeting for the Med • Using a proven and successful tool to advance cooperation
NATO Operation in the Aegean Sea • The “Sea of Sensibilities” • Turkish-Greek antagonism • The role of the CFM Commander • Agreements at the tactical level • Open issue: AOR
NATO Operation in the Aegean Sea • A typical CMF under NATO Command Standing Maritime Group 2 • Surface assets from Greece, Turkey, Canada, and Germany • Main Tasks • Cutting supply lines of illegal trafficking and migration • Reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveilance • Institutional link with Frontex Operation Poseidon
NATO’s Maritime Capabilities in the European Maritime Domain • Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 and 2 • Standing NATO Maritime Mine Countermeasure Group 1 and 2 • NATO Response Force • Strike Force NATO