320 likes | 401 Views
On the Evolution of the World Income. by Charles I. Jones. Main questions. Are poor countries catching up to the rich countries or falling behind ? How might the world income distribution look in the future?. Overview.
E N D
On the Evolution of the World Income by Charles I. Jones
Main questions • Arepoorcountriescatching up to the richcountriesorfallingbehind? • Howmight the worldincome distribution look in the future?
Overview • Empirical facts concerning the distribution of GDP per workeracross the countries of the world and how the distribution has changedsince 1960. • Characterize the future of the worldincome distribution using 3 differenttechniques.
3 differenttechniques • Using standard growth models to project the currentdynamics of the income distribution forward. • Cross-country growth regression • Employ a statisticaltechniqueusing the frequency of growthmiracles and growthdisasters
Facts • Firstdefineincome: • GDP per capitaseemsnatural. • But in developingcountriesnonmarketproduction is quiteimportant => GDP per worker. • Thispaper, GDP per worker relative to U.S. GDP per worker.
Commentson the figureU.S. highest GDP per worker in both 1960 & 1988.U.S. GDP per workergrewrelativelysteady 1.4 pct. annually from 1960 to 1988. 1960 1988 Twin-peaked Hump is between 20 & 65 % • Single-peaked • Hump is between 5 & 30 %
Commentson the figure • Changes in world distribution of incomeareillustrated by departures from the 45-degree line. • Convergence at the top of the income distribution. • Divergence at the bottom. • Growthmiracles: Hong Kong, Korea, Botswana. • Growthdisasters: manlysub-Saharancountries.
Commentson the figure • Nodivergence at the bottom. • The income of the country containing the median person has improved from 8.1 pct. of U.S. income in 1960 to 11.8 pct. in 1988. • The 75th percentile of the population lived in a country with 22.5 pct. of U.S. income in 1960, but 40.3 pct. in 1988.
The Assumption of SimilarLong-TermGrowth Rates • Concepturalview: • The argument is, thatotherwisewill the income ratios between to countrieswithdifferentlong-termgrowth rates diverge to infinity. • Whatabout all the endogenousgrowthliterature (ex. technologicalprogress )? • All countrieseventuallygrow at the average rate of growth of worldknowledge.
The Assumption of SimilarLong-TermGrowth Rates • Empiricalview: • U.S. grew at an average rate of 1.8 pct. per year from 1870 to 1994 while UK onlygrew at 1.3 pct. • The resolution of thisapparentinconsistency is transition dynamics. • Thismeansthatcountriesarechanging position within the worldincome distribution, theiraveragegrowth rate canbe faster orslowerthen the growth rate of worldknowledge over anyfiniteperiod.
The Future of the Global Income Distribution • Solow • Transition dynamics • Frequency of growthmiracles and growthdisasters
Solow • In the classicalSolow model the long run level of output per worker is a function of the rate of investment in capital, the growth rate of labor force, and the level of technology. • All weneed is to perdictwherethese variables aregoing to settle.
Solow • Jones (1997) incorporates human capital. • He furtherassumesthatinvestment rates and population growthsettles at the rates prevailed in the 1980s.
Commentson the figure • 1988 distribution is quitesimilar to the distribution of steadystates. • Countrieslike Uganda and Malawi are not poorbecause of transition dynamics but becausetechnologylevels and investment rates arelow (population growth rates have relatively small effects in most neoclassical models).
Commentson the figure • In the top of the income distribution a number of countriesarepredicted to surpass the U.S. in GDP per worker. • Differences in incomeare driven by differences in investment rates in physical and human capital. • U.S. have a hightechnologylevel and investment rate in human capital but toolow to compensate for the low U.S. capitalinvestment rate.
Transition Dynamics and Steady State • The growth rate of relative income is proportional to the gab between the country’scurrent position in the income distribution and it’ssteadystate. • Ex. A country has a GDP per worker relative to the U.S. of 0.4 and a steadystate of 0.5 (20 pct. gab). If speed of convergence is 5 pct. per year, the actural GDP grows at 1 pct. plus the growth rate of worldtechnologicalprogress (ass the U.S. has reacheditssteadystate).
Transition Dynamics and Steady State • The key parameter ”speed of convergence” is estimated to bebetween 2 and 6. • Whenusing data ongrowth rates from 1960 to 1988 and initial incomes in 1960 the steadystatescanbecalculated (assumingthatcountriesobey the principle of transition dynamics over this 28-year period):
Commentson the figures • Countriesthat have grown faster then the U.S. over the 28-year periodarepredicted to continue to increase relative to the U.S. • If the speed is slow the steadystate must be far away in order to explain a given growthdifferential, implying large additionalchanges in the income distribution.
The VeryLong-RunIncome Distribution • Untilnow policy has beenassumedconstant. • Predictingwhen and where large changes in institutions and economicpolicieswilloccur is extremelydifficult. • Insteadit’spossible to use the frequency of growthmiracles and growthdisasters.
Commentson the table • Fast growth and slowgrowthoccur at roughly the same frequency at the bottom of the income distribution. • For countrieswithincomes of more then 10 pct. of U.S. GDP per workerfrequency of rapid growth rises.
Commentson the table • The long-runresultssuggestthatthere is nodevelopment trap intowhich the poorestcountrieswillbepermantlycondemned. • Markov’sresultsstronglysuggestthat the convergencewillplay a dominant role in the continuing evolution of the income distribution.
Conclusion • Fast growth has been more commonthenslowgrowth from 1960 to 1988. • Countries have showntendency to move up in the income distribution. • Viewed in terms of populatons, the recent growth in China and India reinforcesthisconclusion. • The factthat the world have not allreadyreached the long-rundistibutionindicatesthat the forces currentlyshaping the income distribution are a somewhat recent phenomenon.