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Explore market power issues in the hydroelectricity industry, including models with limited reservoirs and competitive thermal plants. Learn about monopolies, social optimality, and spilling regulations. Analyze scenarios where hydro firms interact with competitive fringes. Gain insights into pricing strategies and consumer surplus in different market power scenarios.
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ECON 4925 Autumn 2006Resource EconomicsMarket power Lecturer: Finn R. Førsund Market power
Background • The use of market power is a potential problem of the deregulated electricity sector • 20 % of the world’s electricity is produced by hydropower and 1/3 of the countries have more than 50% • Hydro power is a special case due to zero variable cost, water storage, high effect capacity and maximal flexible adjustment Market power
Plan of the talk • The basic hydropower model • Hydropower model with limited reservoir • Hydropower and thermal power • Hydropower with thermal competitive fringe Market power
The basic hydropower model • Discrete time periods (weeks) over a natural inflow cycle (one year) Deterministic demand and total water • All inflow occur in the first period, e.g. after snow melting, spring rain, autumn rain • The reservoir limit of the system will not be reached • Zero variable costs in the hydro system • Only variable cost alternative value of water Market power
Social utilisation of water • Social planning: maximising sum of consumer plus producer surplus = area under the demand curves • No discounting • Free terminal value of reservoir • Optimal solution: arbitrage price of stock of water (Hotelling); marginal willingness to pay (price) equal for all time periods Market power
Problem formulation The Lagrangian First-order condition The monopoly model Market power
The monopoly model, Interpretation of the conditions • Maximising profit introduces marginal revenue functions • Marginal revenue can be expressed as demand-flexibility corrected prices • Optimality condition: flexibility - corrected prices equal for all time periods • Market prices will vary with relative elastic periods having lower prices than relative inelastic periods Market power
Social optimum, and monopoly Period 2 Period 1 p2(e2H) p1(e1H) p2M p1S= λS p2S =λS p1M λM Market power
Spilling and monopoly • Depending on the characteristics of the demand functions it may be optimal for the monopoly to spill water • Spilling can be regulated by prohibition • Zero-spilling regulation will reduce the monopoly profit Market power
Spilling and zero-spilling regulation Period 2 Period 1 p1 p2 p2M p1M λ<0 λ<0 Total available energy Market power
Limited reservoir and the social solution • Reservoir dynamics: water at the end of a period = water at the end of previous period plus inflow minus release of water during the period • Shadow prices on water and reservoir limit recursively related, solving using backward induction (Bellmann) • Overflow is waste • Social price may vary if reservoir constraint is binding Market power
Problem formulation The Lagrangian Limited reservoir and monopoly Market power
Limited reservoir and monopoly, cont. • First-order conditions Market power
Limited reservoir and monopoly, cont. • The flexibility-corrected price substitute for the social price • Flexibility-corrected prices may differ if reservoir constraint binding • Social solution may be optimal if binding constraint • Differences with social solution depend on the demand elasticities • Spilling may be optimal Market power
Illustration of monopoly solutionwith reservoir Period 2 Period 1 p2M P2S p1M p1S p1M λ2M λM λ1M D A B C Spill Market power
Hydro and thermal • Thermal plants aggregated by merit order to a convex group marginal cost function • Total capacity is limited • Static problem: no start-up costs, no ramping constraints or minimum time on – off • Shadow price on water equal to flexibility-corrected prices and equal to marginal cost of thermal capacity Market power
Problem formulation The Lagrangian Hydro and thermal, the model Market power
Hydro and thermal model, cont • First-order conditions Market power
Monopoly and extended bath-tub Period 1 Period 2 p2M p1M λM c’ c’ a c A D C B d Hydro energy Thermal extension Market power
Hydro with competitive fringe • Thermal fringe modelled by a convex marginal cost function with limited capacity • The fringe is a price taker and sets market price equal to marginal cost • The dominant hydro firm must take fringe reaction into consideration • Market power is reduced due to the fringe • Conditional marginal revenue curve closer to demand curve due to market share less than 1 and fringe quantity adjustment Market power
Problem formulation Fringe response Total differentiation Hydro with competitive fringe; the model Market power
Hydro with competitive fringe • First-order conditions Market power
Hydro with competitive fringe, cont. • Conditional marginal revenue • Closer to the demand function due to • Market share effect • Fringe quantity reaction effect Market power
The leader – follower game Period 1 Period 2 p2 θ2 p1 c’ c’ λ λ A B C D E Hydro energy Thermal fringe Market power
Extentions • Hydro as competitive fringe • Hydro fringe can release all water just in one period, may restrict market power further • Oligopoly game between hydro producers • Essentially a dynamic game, reduces the possibilities of strategic shifting of water • Quite complex to find solutions to dynamic gaming • Uncertainty • Future water values become stochastic variables, system must avoid overflow or going dry, qualitatively the same problem for social planner and monopoly Market power
Conclusions • Hydro monopoly shifts water from relatively inelastic periods to elastic ones • May be difficult to detect because variable cost is zero, only alternative value of water is variable cost and not readily observable • Reservoir constraints, production constraints, etc. reduce the impact of market power • Competitive fringe may block use of market power • Fear of hydro market power exaggerated? Market power