Outline

1. Culture: Ramblings on Ketchup, Dagen H, Condensed Matter Physicists, Efficiency and DiversityScott E Page

2. Outline • Culture: what is it? • Culture: why we care? • Game Theory Model of Culture as Coordination • Bednar Page: GameS theory Model • The Model of our model as told to physicists • Our version of the model of our model • Culture in the laboratory • ABM culture

3. Culture: What is it? • Behavior • Beliefs • Roles • Categories • Values • Symbols • Artifacts • Networks

4. Culture: Why We Care Our ability to improve our lot and the lot of others depends on an understanding of culture. The performance of institutions from markets writ large to water rights systems to educational reforms hinges on culture. Knowing how people answer the question “do you trust other people?” is as informative in predicting per capita GDP as is average level of education.

5. Do I know Anything About Culture? No!

6. Larger Project Culture Institutions Bednar and Page (2007) “Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior Within Multiple Game” Rationality and Society

7. Larger Project Culture Institutions Bednar and Page (2007) “Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior Within Multiple Game” Rationality and Society

8. Start Simple Game Theory Model Axelrod Model Bednar Page Model Model of Bednar Page Model

9. Suppose you could ask people one question

10. Where do you keep your ketchup?

11. Fridge Cupboard

12. No!

13. Coordination Formally, these are called games of coordination. People benefit by coordinating with others more than they benefit by doing what they want.

14. Subtle Difference In the standing ovation model, we discussed to reasons why people might copy others: - social influence - information How does coordination differ from influence?

16. Dagen H At 4:45 am on September 3, 1967, all cars on the road in Sweden came to a stop. They switched sides (from the left to the right) and at 5 am, the cars began moving again.

17. Coordination Examples Choice of Language Time Classes Start Meeting Place Electric Plugs

18. Hard and Soft Externalities An externality is hard (economic) f it’s easily measured An externality is soft (psychological) if it’s not.

19. No Bright Line Some decisions involve both hard and soft coordination externalities. Suppose I’m buying a bike. The more people that buy mountain bikes, the more trails that get created (hard). Buying a mountain bike might also make me hip (soft).

20. Anecdote Once, I was riding in a cab to the New Orleans airport. I told the driver I was in a hurry and he began to run through stop signs. At first, I was scared. Then, I realized he was only running East-West stop signs.

21. Basic Coordination Game Cab #2 EW NS EW NS Cab #1

22. Cultural Efficiency You and a friend are told that you’ve won a free trip for spring break provided that you both choose the same location from a list of two. If you do pick the same location, you get to go there for an all expenses paid week of fun.

23. Maui- Des Moines Game Friend Maui DM Maui DM You

24. Shake or Bow? We could great people in a variety of ways. In the West, people tend to shake hands. In the East People tend to bow.

25. Shake or Bow Game Friend Shake Bow Shake Bow You Is a <> 1

26. The CDC Opinion Getting off from an airplane and shaking hands (or worse yet hugging or kissing) is akin to saying “here take all of these diverse germs and viruses I’ve accumulated after three hours in a sealed container with a bunch of strangers.” a < 1

27. Inefficient Coordination Beta vs VHS Mac vs IBM English vs Metric Fruit Cake vs iStore

28. Lots of Ketchup We’ve focused so far on how coordination can lead us to arbitrary behaviors and sometimes inefficient behaviors. It also can explain cultural differences.

29. A List of Questions Ketchup in the fridge? Do people wear shoes inside your house? Do you cross the street when the don’t walk sign is flashing? Read the newspaper at the breakfast table? Do you hug your friends when you see them? Individual Napkins?

30. A List of Questions Ketchup in the fridge? Yes Do people wear shoes inside your house? No Do you cross the street when the don’t walk sign is flashing? Yes Read the newspaper at the breakfast table? Yes Do you hug your friends when you see them? Yes Individual Napkins? Yes You’re part of YNYYY Nation

31. How Many Cultures? Six questions Two answers each 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 64

32. The Set of The Possible Dead People: bury or burn Foods do you eat? Dress? Music do you play Stories do you tell 8 x 19 x 40 x 6 x 11 x 23 x 2 x 43 .. = HUGE

33. Axelrod’s Culture Model People play many cocrdination games with neighbors If two neighbors don’t coordinate in many games, they stop playing with each other Result: Emergence of distinct cultures

34. Bednar Page Model Agents play game ensembles with a community of agents. Each agent has only one brain (automata) Agents evolve “similar” strategies across games

35. World vs Models Coordination and Axelord Models: Inter cultural differences but intra cultural heterogeneity (all Irish the same) Bednar Page Model and World: Heterogeneity within and across cultures.

36. Jenna’s Question “Suppose people play many coordination games and that in addition to trying to coordinate with other people they also want to be consistent across the games. For example, suppose each game has a hot action (1) and a cold action (0). What happens?”

37. Scott’s Response “Clearly, the community will just converge to everyone being hot or everyone being cold and it should happen fast. I’ll tell you after lunch.”

38. Scott’s Question to Len “Suppose people play many coordination games and that in addition to trying to coordinate with other people they also want to be consistent across the games. For example, suppose each game has a hot action (1) and a cold action (0). What happens?”

39. Len’s Response “Oh, like a coupled voter model. Neat question. Clearly, the community will just converge to everyone being hot or everyone being cold and it should happen fast. I’ll tell you after lunch.”

40. Len’s Question to Casey “Suppose people play many coordination games and that in addition to trying to coordinate with other people they also want to be consistent across the games. For example, suppose each game has a hot action (1) and a cold action (0). What happens?”

41. Casey’s Response “The time for both conformity and consistency (what we call exit time) is much longer than for either process alone.” Conformity and Dissonance in Generalized Voter Models” - Scott E Page, Leonard M. Sander, and Casey Schneider - Mizell

42. Cultural Emergence in Game Ensembles: An Experimental Study Jenna Bednar, Yan Chen, Xiao Liu and Scott Page University of Michigan - Ann Arbor

43. This Paper Does “culture” emerge in the laboratory by having subjects play multiple games? Behavioral Spillover = Institutional Externality

44. Standard Experiment 7,7 2,10 10,2 4,4 D

45. Our Experiments 7,7 4,14 7,7 2,10 14,4 5,5 10,2 4,4

46. Our Games Strong ALT PD 7,7 4,14 7,7 2,10 14,4 5,5 10,2 4,4 Weak ALT Self Interest 7,7 4,11 7,7 2,9 9,2 10,10 11,4 5,5

47. Experimental Design Controls: WA, SA, PD, SI Pairs: WA + SA, WA +SI, WA + PD

48. Hypothesis 1 % of CC in WA higher in WA+PD, than in WA % alternation in WA higher in WA than in WA+PD

49. Hypothesis 2 % alternation in WA higher in WA than in WA+SI % CC,DD in WA higher in WA+SI than in WA

50. Hypothesis 3 % alternation in WA higher in WA+SA than in WA