Case study: KOSOVO

1. Case study: KOSOVO By David Vilchez, Hannah Iqbal and David Kim War and Peace – SILS - Fall Semester 2012

2. Kosovo in the Balkans

3. June 25th, 1991 – In’tl dimension of the Yugoslavian crisis triggered by Croatian and Slovenian declaration of independence • 1974 Constitution - granted Kosovo and Vojvodina power to have their own court, police forces, and territorial defenses •  Kosovo-Serbians grew increasingly discontent with the state of affairs described above. Thought they deserved more privileges •  Kosovo-Serbians emigrate to Serbia proper: share of total population in Kosovo fell below 10%; those remaining faced hostility • Slobodan Milosevic’s policies played on Serbian resentment: Albanians were stripped of their rights • March, 1989: Milosevic calls for an “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution” – supporters successfully overthrew local governments of Kosovo and Vojvodina Start of conflict and ethnic tensions Historical Background (1)

4. U.S. Congress moves to halt financial aid to Yugoslavia’s federal government; hoping for Belgrade to reign in Milosevic’s calls for repression •  Yugoslavian appeal: The people should not be punished for Milosevic’s rhetoric – denying economic aid would result in an economic crisis and an increased risk of civil war • George Bush agrees • Perhaps, a missed opportunity. Opposition did not seize occasion to foster more moderate leadership to counter Milosevic • Franjo Tudjman (Croatian leader) did not sufficiently reassure Croatian-Serbs of protecting their rights •  The HDZ’s (Croatian Democratic Union) rhetoric was interpreted as hostile by Serbian minority – Serbians came to see violent secession as justified. • 1991: Serbian paramilitaries and JNA establish military camps in order to obtain Krajina region. Initial international reaction Historical Background (2)

5. 1991: Serbian paramilitaries and JNA establish military camps in order to obtain Krajina region •  In’tl Response: Condemn violence while issuing statements in support of keeping the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia •  CSCE and EC try to broker ceasefires – Serbian ethnic cleansing continues – Milosevic doesn’t fear Western intervention •  France, Germany, Netherlands, and Italy suggest that the WEU send a force to impose peace – UK opposes this motion • 2 months later, PM Major argues in the House of Commons that Western intervention “would extend the fighting to Bosnia, Macedonia, or elsewhere” •  This reveals to Belgrade leadership that Western diplomacy lacked the political will to use force •  Emboldened Serbia to extend war campaign from Croatia to Bosnia International Reaction - Krajina Historical Background (3)

6. Had the West recognized the secessionist republics, the conflicts could have become an interstate war • The West could not arm or support said republics (with airstrikes for instance) to counter JNA and Serbian paramilitary attacks. The former, because of precedent set by Resolution 713—arms embargo for states in Yugoslavian wars; the latter, for certain SC members could claim an illegal interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state • Although W would have justified use of force as Croatian defense, it would have been seen suspicious by a society of states fearful of setting precedents that might create wave of secessionist movements Western Reluctance to intervene Historical Background (4)

7. Resolution 713 • Instead of arming Croatia and Slovenia, the West kept a lid on the conflict by imposing a mandatory arms embargo on Yugoslavia • Robert Badinter Commission •  There was a need to find out how to reconcile the in’tl society’s commitment to self-determination an territorial integrity • Utispossidetis– a rule emerging out of the process of de-colonization, stating that self-determination applies to the existing borders at the time of independence •  Meant that Serbs outside of Serbia would have to accept the status of minority group (not acceptable to the vision of a “Greater Serbia”) UN Official stances Historical Background (5)

8. The Strict segregation policies imposed by the Serbs on the Albanians amounted to the creation of an ‘apartheid system in Kosovo’ •  Albania’s response was to form the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – led by Rugova • LDK set up a separate government, education system, and healthcare (pro non-violence) •  This approach didn’t win them any recognition at Dayton •  Led to the marginalization of Rugova by more radical approaches The ldk and rugova Historical Background (6)

9. 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) boms against Serbian targets – leads to retaliation • Clinton Administration condemns the forced expulsion of Kosovars •  Implication that Clinton would defend Kosovo •  However, due to Russian sensitivities all the U.S. does is condemn both the UCK and Serbia •  Reinforced by Resolution 1160: demanded an end to violence on both sides whiles openly supporting the path of non-violence followed by Rugova and the LDK • Russia and China hold reservations on UN intervention – believe the conflict is within domestic jurisdiction of the FRY • PM Blair speaks up after 100,000 refugees leave Decani after Serbian bombing Lead up to Operation Allied Force Historical Background (7)

10. 1. NATO didn’t want to become the UCK’s air force  The UCK was beginning to achieve some successes against Serbian forces – NATO didn’t want to act to support the cause of secessionism in Kosovo  However, the increase in scale of the Serbian attacks led NATO to rethink its position 2. Should the in’tl community act without the authorization of the security Council?  Resolution 1199 passed under Chapter VII, FRY and the Albanian leadership must stop hostilities and take actions to “aver the impending humanitarian catastrophe”  Its demands weren't backed by the threat of military action  Confirmation of their commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia  1199 requested an assessment of how the two parties were complying with the UN demands – the report was dismal – Britain proposed a draft resolution that would authorize “all necessary means” Difficulties of Military Action Historical Background (8)

11. German Bundestage gave its approval for Germany to join in any NATO air strikes • Foreign Minister Kinkel: • “The current situation in Kosovo, as it is described in Resolution 1199 of the UN Security Council, the threat of and if need be the use of force by NATO is justified” • “NATO has not created a new legal instrument which could be the basis for a general license for NATO to do interventions… NATO’s decision must not become a precedent” Germany’s Position Historical Background (9)

12. Legality of relying on Resolution 1160 and 1199 had been overcome when NATO issued an activation order for air strikes against Serbia • Russia and China not happy with NATO’s activation order without Security authorization • Contact Group sent Holbrooke to Belgrade to negotiate •  Milosevic agreed to a cessation of hostilities (October Agreement) and accepted the presence of a verification mission of 1,700 inspectors from OSCE • October Agreement •  Milosevic also allowed unarmed NATO aircraft to carry out inspection flights over Kosovo to monitor Serb compliance •  Kosovo Albanians not involved in the October Agreement – resented that it gave them less autonomy then they had under the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution •  UCK Continued their attacks against Serbia with Serbian retaliation (Racak) • Resolution 1203 Nato advocates Force Historical Background (10)

13. Račak Graves

14. Peace talks with Serbs and Kosovo Albanians • Challenge of how to reconcile respect for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia with the demands of the Kosovo Albanians for a referendum leading to eventual independence •  UCK / Rugova agree to transitional period of 3yrs until Kosovo’s status is decided •  Albania given substantial measure of autonomy •  NATO led international force (Kosovo Interim Agreement for Peace and Self- Government in Kosovo) – Russia refused to sign agreement • After Paris talks (a continuation of Rambouillet) Serbia begins ethnic cleansing •  Decision to launch air strikes against FRY taken up by Alliance governments on March 23rd, 1999 • Western Rationale: • 1. Action aimed at averting an impending humanitarian catastrophe • 2. NATO’s credibility was at stake • 3. Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo could not stand in Europe and posed a long-term threat to European security • 4.NATO’s use of force was in conformity with existing Security Council resolutions Rambouillet Historical Background (11)

15. Avoids costs / risks of committing ground troupes • Concern of maintaining domestic legitimacy • Serious show of force via air bombings would make Milosevic back down after only a few days • NATO underestimated how bombings would lead to an intensification by Serbia • NATO’s air strategy could have stopped Milosevic only if: • 1. The bombings compelled Belgrade within a short period of time to accept the deployment of NATO led forces to protect Kosovo • 2. NATO air attacks significantly degraded the Serb’s capacity to repress Kosovo Kosovo •  Need for ground troupes •  A large expeditionary force could have been built up in Macedonia and Albania – displaying the seriousness of NATO (open up possibilities for both negotiation or attack) Air strikes: Reasoning and Results Historical Background (12)

16. As NATO became desperate for results they attacked infrastructure targets •  Increased Serbian civilian deaths •  Targeting civilian installations on the grounds that they were important to the regime’s political control and could have military applications – controversial (proportionality?) • 3 Reasons prompting Milosevic’s acceptance of NATO’s terms: • 1. NATO signaled in a series of developments that it was increasingly serious about a ground intervention • 2. Belgrade’s recognition that Russia wouldn’t actively support it against the West • 3. A change in balance of military forces in Kosovo NATO’s Desperation and Milosevic’s end of Terror Historical Background (13)

17. Liberty Bridge, Novi Sad, Serbia

18. Security Council meeting, debate of NATO’s actions •  NATO invoked language of Resolution 1199 and 1203 • Britain’s argument: •  There is evidence accepted by the in’tl community of humanitarian distress on a large scale requiring immediate relief •  No practicable alternative to the use of force •  Use of force is necessary / proportionate and is strictly limited to the time and scope of the aim • Germany’s argument: •  There wasn’t an legal basis for the unilateral humanitarian intervention – use of force challenged the formal structures of in’tl law •  Veto brings with it a concomitant moral responsibility on the P5 to uphold standards of common humanity • UN Charter - Article 24 Debate of NATO’s Legality Historical Background (14)

19. Robert Badinter Commission Rugova / Dayton Decani / PM Blair Rambouillet / Paris Talks NATO air strikes Veto Key tipping points/Important events

20. Purpose: • To find out how to reconcile in’tl society’s commitment to self-determination and territorial integrity • Legal Basis: • Applied the principle of utipossidetis – a rule emerging out of the process of de-colonization – asserts that self-determination applies to the existing borders at the time of independence • Implication: • EC accepted that the inter-republican borders became the legally recognized borders of the new states • Serbs outside Serb would have to accept the status of min group – not acceptable to vision of “Greater Serbia” Robert Badinter Commission Tipping Points (1)

21. The strict segregation policies imposed by the Serbs on the Albanians amounted to the creation of an ‘apartheid System in Kosovo’ •  Albania’s response was to form the Dem League of Kos (LDK) – Rugova •  LDK set up a separate gov’t education, and health care – non-violent strategy •  Their approach didn’t win them any recognition at Dayton •  Led to Rugova being marginalized by more radical approaches • Missed opportunity for negotiations? Rugova and Dayton Tipping Points (2)

22. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo reported the intervention: “not legal but legitimate” •  Illegal: intervention didn’t meet with procedural rules provided by the UN Charter •  Legitimate: prior to the intervention all necessary diplomatic means were utilized Nato air campaign: what is intervention? Tipping Points (3)

23. Should repressive regimes such as Russia and China be given the opportunity to veto actions intended to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe by a coalition of liberal democracies? • Although the threat of Russian and Chinese vetoes gave NATO pause for thought, ultimately it didn’t stop them taking military action • Should independence for Kosovo follow from the NATO intervention, then two controversial precedents would have been set: • 1. That national minorities had a right to secession if subject to sustained human rights abuses • 2. States which carry out these abuses surrender their sovereign rights over such minorities Veto power: Russia and China Tipping Points (4)

24. Anti-interventionists do not accept the argument that diplomatic means were properly used or exhausted • Exclusion of Russian diplomatic participation prior to NATO’s recourse to war • Rigidity of the Holbrooke / Rambouillet formula • Absence of any evident diplomatic effort to induce China and Russia to accommodate the Security Council majority by shifting their veto to an abstention • Alternatives: •  Helping the KLA in securing an independent Kosovo • Insisting on a NATO strategy that combined ground assault with lower altitude air attacks. Concerns and alternatives Anti-Intervention (1)

25. Argument by Marjorie Cohn: •  Motivation behind the intervention was to preserve US hegemony in the region and to assure our access to the oil of the Caspian Sea region •  Russia wants Caspian Sea oil to run through its territory to Western Europe while the US wants the oil pipelines to run through Turkey and then shipped across the Black Sea and piped to the Adriatic via Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania • The American bombings along the Danube River blocked the passage of tankers carrying oil directly to Europe from the Caspian oil field •  Former US secretaries of state Alexander Haig and James Baker earned large consulting fees from oil companies working in the Caspian •  Sea region and the Trepca mines in Kosovo contain rich deposits of minerals such as zinc and lead •  Only Serbia as evidenced by its initial resistence to the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, had the will and resources to block US foreign policy objectives, Kosovo provided an excuse for US action to reduce the importance of Serbia, as the Gulf War had reduced the importance of Iraq. Marjorie Cohn Anti-Intervention (2)

26. Provocation: •  By its insistence at Rambouillet and Paris on terms designed to be unacceptable to Serbia • The intervention was less about the promotion of values than the assertion of ‘the strategic and economic interests of the US and the other western powers’ •  The targeting of civilian infrastructure / use of cluster bombs and depleted uranium gave rise to charges that NATO was in breach of the rules of warfare •  Preoccupation with force protection meant NATO aircraft flew at high altitudes, thus blunting the accuracy of the raids and leading to several incidents of mistaken targeting (including the bombing of refugee convoys) • Fear of taking casualties also meant an aversion to ground combat. This was morally untenable •  Contrary to NATO’s own war aims, Serbia accelerated its ethnic cleansing of Kosovar’s in response to the air campaigns Provocation: NATO Air strikes Anti-Intervention (3)

27. Delayed action Not committing ground troops Lack of pressure placed on Russia and China Rugova UtiPossidetis Failures of international community

28. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aeEE4uzWgPA Destruction on all sides

29. Supreme Humanitarian Emergency: 5 •  Ethnic cleansing was occurring while NATO was deliberating on when and how to act • Necessity/Last Resort: 5 •  Strategic bombing was the sole method by which the West would intervene (to avoid NATO casualties) • Proportionality: 3 •  The use of precision guided missiles (PGM), resulted in limited civilian casualties (approx. 500 according to W.J. Fenrick) when compared to previous instances of strategic bombing; however, because of their heightened accuracy, the range of possible targets also expanded to include infrastructure that is of both military and civilian use (i.e. bridges) • Positive Humanitarian Outcome: 3 •  Capitulation of Milosevic government resulted in end of ethnic cleansing; however, Kosovo’s political climate continues being tense and unstable because of ethnic issues Wheeler Criteria Wheeler Framework (1)

30. Humanitarian Motives: 5 • The ceasing of ethnic cleansing was the main motive • Humanitarian Justifications: 5 • An end to ethnic cleansing within Europe • Legality: 1 • Illegal under Article 2.4 • Selectivity: Wheeler’s additional criteria Wheeler Framework (2)

31. In’tl presence in postwar Kosovo largely supported the proper build-up and accreditation of political parties. This included issuance of the electoral code, the conduct and supervision of free and fair elections, control of central election bodies, and the guarantee of active and passive voting rights for all citizens • Parties were usually founded along ethnic lines, with few if any multi-ethnic parties or party programs in place •  However, with respect to citizens in the Serb enclaves, Belgrade exercised heavy manipulation by allowance of, or withdrawal of, financial benefits, involving both direct threats and intimidation • Furthermore, this polity was established along ethnic lines, with the dominant Albanian majority on one side (dominating a range of minor, mainly Muslim, minorities) and the Serbian minority on the other (establishing its own administrative system, parallel to the official one of the UNMIK/PISG) Political Parties Current Situation (1)

32. Task of providing security divided between: NATO’s KFOR troops who are responsible for overall security and order on the basis of Resolution 1244 and a bilateral agreement with Belgrade (Technical Military Agreement of Kumanovo),18 and UNMIK’s Civilian Police (CIVPOL), in cooperation with the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS) • In 1999 and 2000, former paramilitary structures of the UCK were demobilized, and partially integrated into the new Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The KPC has a mandate to provide emergency assistance (i.e., in case of natural disasters) and was “rearmed” in post-UDI Kosovo, in line with the provisions of the Ahtisaari Proposal. •  Despite provision of such security forces, the record to provide physical security to Kosovo’s population is poor – relapse into open warfare has been avoided since 1999, but a high degree of (reverse) ethnic violence took place in the second half of 1999, and again during the March riots of 2004, causing dozens of casualties and massive displacement of some 200,000 Kosovo-Serbs to Serbia, under the eyes of KFOR and international police Security Current Situation (2)

33. State capacity: ability of an administration to establish and enforce autonomous decision making, applies to UNMIK only in official terms with regard to Kosovo’s special condition under an international UN administration •  The low level of professional skills and performance at the public-service level has hampered the execution of decisions made by local structures •  Despite multiyear institution and capacity-building programs run by the OSCE and intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, or INGOs (e.g., the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], the National Democratic Institute [NDI], and so on), a well-established and competent bureaucratic state apparatus is still not present • World Bank, Kosovo lacks capacity to absorb financial aid • UNSCR 1244 had set out the terms for a cessation of hostilities but had involved necessary compromise and ambiguity - the resolution had created ‘a unique institutional hybrid’ in which the FRY retained formal sovereignty but international agencies led by the UN, and supported by NATO, the OSCE, the EU and others, were responsible for the restoration of political and economic order Capacities and legitimacy Current Situation (3)

34. 2005, February: Explosion rocks President Rugova’s vehicle in Pristina, however, he is unhurt • 2005, July: Explosions near UN, OSCE and Kosovo parliament buildings in Pristina • 2006, February: UN begins talks on future status of Kosovo, despite Serbian concerns • 2007, February: UN plan for future Independence; Serbia protests •  US and EU redraft plan, dropping independence clauses at the insistence of Russia • 2008, February: Kosovo unilaterally declares independence; Serbia declares it illegal; US and major EU countries recognize independence •  Serbs seize UN courthouse in Mitrovica, Kosovo; more than a hundred injured in clashes with UN and NATO forces Timeline of Recent Events Current Situation (4)

35. 2008, October: UN General Assembly refers Kosovo’s independence declaration to the ICJ •  EU mission (Eulex) takes over police, court and custom duties from UN; Serbia accepts • 2009, August: Ethnic clashes in Mitrovica • 2010, July: ICJ rules Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal • 2011, March: Kosovo and Serbia begin talks; first talk since declaration of independence •  Ethnic tensions lead to violence as Serbs resist Kosovo government efforts to impose its authority • 2012, September: EU ends supervisory role over Kosovo government; however, NATO peacekeepers remain Timeline of Recent Events Current Situation (5)

36. Humanitarian intervention as a competitive sector? •  Analyzing the pressure of possible unilateral action • Collective decisions vs. Unilateral decisions •  What makes a decision more legal / ethical? • What is the modern day role of veto? Critical Concluding Questions Critical Questions