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HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption. Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, Japan) Kan Yasuda (NTT Corporation, Japan) FSE 2009 2009 Feb. 25, Leuven, Belgium. Table of contents. Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE)
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HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, Japan) Kan Yasuda (NTT Corporation, Japan) FSE 2009 2009 Feb. 25, Leuven, Belgium
Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security
Background (AE) • Blockcipher modes of operation • Two goals: • To establish authenticity(data integrity) • To preserve privacy(data confidentiality) • Authenticated Encryption (AE) • Concurrently achieves the two goals
Background (AE, nonce-based) • AE • CCM, GCM, OCB, … • Usually uses a randomized salt or state-dependent value • Formalized as nonce-based AE [Rogaway 2001, 2002, 2004] • Nonce • Never repeat the same value, or lose all security
Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security
Background (DAE) • Nonce misuse • Settled by Deterministic Authenticated Encryption (DAE)[Rogaway – Shrimpton 2006] • DAE • “Secure” even if the same value is used (all an adversary can do is to detect the repetition)
Background (How DAE works) • Deterministic algorithms • Encryption • Input: (Header H, Message M) Output: (Tag T, Encrypted Msg C) • Decryption • Verifies (H, T, C) • Outputs either or M
Security definition of DAE H, M H, T, C H, M H, T, C Enc Dec Random ? / M T, C $$$ Cannotdistinguish Ideal Real Adversaries
Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security
SIV mode of operation • A concrete DAE mode [Rogaway – Shrimpton Eurocrypt 2006] • “MAC-then-Encrypt” • Entirely blockcipher-based • Uses CMAC* (vectorized CMAC) for authentication • Uses CTR mode for encryption • Requires two keys
Motivation: • Can we construct a single-keyDAE mode?
Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security
HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • The HBS mode • Single-key • Also “MAC-then-Encrypt” style • New polynomial-hashing for MAC • “Odd” CTR (counter) mode for Enc
Vector-input (VI) polynomial hashing • Motivation: • Two different inputs (H,M) (H’,M’) • We may have H || M = H’ || M’ • Cannot use string-input polynomial hash • New notion: VI-–AXU hash functionFor any (H,M) (H’,M’) and Y Pr[ HashL(H,M) HashL(H’,M’)=Y] ≤ Pr is over random hash keys L
How to construct VI--AXU hash • Finite-field polynomial • L = EK(0n) is the hashing key • For header H = H0H1H2 andmessage M = M0M1M2hash value S = L7 L5H0 L3H1 LH2 L8 L6M0 L4M1 L2M2 • Use odd for header and even for message • Note the additional leading terms
Produce tag and “Steal” hash Header Message PolynomialHash S Steal the hash “block”and use it as IVfor the CTR mode EK Tag
“Odd” CTR mode XOR<x> Integer x rep. as bit string S <1> S <2> S <3> EK EK EK Necessary forthe securityof HBS M0 M1 M2 C0 C1 C2
Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security
Efficiency comparison Header h blocks, message m blocks
Security of HBS mode • Secure under the assumption that the blockcipher E is a SPRP • Security theorem:AdvDAE(HBS) ≤ AdvSPRP(E) + 33q2(1+h+2m)2/2n • q max # of queries • h max length of each header • m max length of each message