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Strengthening economic governance in EMU

European Commission. Strengthening economic governance in EMU. Declan COSTELLO Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs Faes Foundation, Madrid 1 February 2012. Many elements in the debate. Crisis-support mechanisms EFSM, EFSF, ESM. Economic policy coordination

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Strengthening economic governance in EMU

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  1. European Commission Strengthening economic governance in EMU Declan COSTELLO Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs Faes Foundation, Madrid 1 February 2012

  2. Many elements in the debate Crisis-support mechanisms EFSM, EFSF, ESM Economic policy coordination financial markets, fiscal, competitiveness, growth Institutional design & capacity Euro summitt, Eurogroup, EP

  3. Stronger economic policy coordination: much wider than fiscal policy • Fiscal policy • Stronger SGP (6 pack, 2 pack), fiscal compact Competitiveness Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (6 pack) Growth and policy integration European semester and 2020 strategy Financial markets ESRB … and integrated into the European semester

  4. Competitive,ess broad/flexible scope of surveillance under the MIP • External positions (e.g. current accounts, net international investment positions) • Competitiveness developments (e.g. REERs, ULCs) • Export performance (e.g. export market shares) • Private sector indebtedness (e.g. credit, debt) • Public sector indebtedness • Assets markets (e.g. housing) • [Banking/financial sector] External imbalances Internal imbalances

  5. The corrective arm of the MIP Sufficient abeyance Member State is placed in “Excessive Imbalance Position” Corrective Action Plan Surveillance of compliance with reform commitments Insufficient: Fine 0.1% of GDP Insufficient: interest bearing deposit Insufficient: Fine 0.1% of GDP

  6. The Corrective Arm is INTRUSIVE Sufficient abeyance Member State is placed in an Excessive Imbalance Position Corrective Action Plan Surveillance of compliance with reform commitments Insufficient: fine 0.1% of GDP Insufficient: interest bearing deposit Insufficient: Fine 0.1% of GDP

  7. The Corrective Arm focuses on POLICY RESPONSES Sufficient abeyance Member State is placed in an Excessive Imbalance Position Corrective Action Plan Surveillance of compliance with reform commitments Fine 0.1% of GDP Insufficient: interest bearing deposit Insufficient: Fine 0.1% of GDP

  8. The Corrective Arm works on the basis of reverse Qualified Majority Votes Sufficient abeyance Member State is placed in an Excessive Imbalance Position Corrective Action Plan Surveillance of compliance with reform commitments Fine 0.1% of GDP Insufficient: interest bearing deposit Insufficient: Fine 0.1% of GDP

  9. Institutional changes for more timely and decesive decision making • Euro Summitt: met twice a year and has permanent President for 2½ years • Eurogroup: if a formal Council formation, with a Permanent President and preparatory committee with Brussels based staff • European Parliament: co-legislator and has scrutiny role with quarterly hearings with ECB President and economic dialogue with European Commissioner • Commission: Vice President for Economic and Monetary Affairs with more idependence

  10. Challenge 1: the complexity of many surveillance mechanisms • Should recommendations on wage policy be considered a competitiveness issue under the MIP or a growth issue under the 2020 strategy? • Is it clear when one moves from a preventive to a corrective recommendation under the SGP-MIP? • What is the threshold for triggering a preventive or full ESM programme? • The ins and the outs

  11. Challenge 2: analytical capacity • Alot of qualititave judgement involved, e.g. is a current account deficit due to catching-up effects or excessive demand ? • Especially difficult to identify problems early on and issue preventive recommendations, e.g. credit growth, house prices? • Economic literature is not conclusive on policy recommendations, e.g. how effective is macro-prudential policy, do strucrural refroms always improve current account positions? • Requires alot of country specific knowledge: does the Commission have the expert teams present enough on the ground?

  12. Challenge 3: political economy • Positive note: spillover costs of in-action are very clear, and blocking minorities are harder to form: • But…. • how to respect the subsidiarity principle: when macroeconomic problems at the level of the Euro area require microeconomic actions at MS level • will the new institutions work on a Community-method or intergovernmental basis

  13. Challenge 4: agreeing on what sort of EMU in the long run • does the mandate of the ECB need to evolve? • what sort of fiscsal union? • what sort of banking union? • genuine policy setting for the euro area as a whole (also on the international stage)

  14. Some useful links • ECFIN’s web-site on economic governance • http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm • The Commission’s Roadmap for stability and growth (nov. 2011) • http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20111012communication_roadmap_en.pdf • Commission’s Green Paper on stability bonds (Nov. 2001) • http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2011-11-23-green-paper-stability-bonds_en.htm

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